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Abstract
For decades, ethical issues have been seen as a problem throughout the social
work profession, not just in the UK but also internationally. In the English
context, the Care Standards Act 2000, which led to the establishment of the
General Social Care Council, aimed to protect service users, employers and social
workers/social care practitioners through the publication of codes of practice. As
Strom-Gottfried and 0'Aprix (2006) have noted, however, the plethora of codes
of ethics and codes of conduct have failed to address explicitly the issues faced
by those regulated by them. Consequently, the actual situation in England
remains the same: practitioners work in difficult situations that frequently result
in ethical dilemmas, yet the guidance fails to address the actual complexity of the
situations in which practitioners find themselves.
The aim of this research was to investigate the expenences of practitioners In
England working for statutory social services in comparison with those of
practitioners from social action organisations and who work for the voluntary
sector, in relation to their conduct, ethics and professional values.
The methodological framework was based on Grounded Theory. The data were
collected VIa focus groups, semi-structured interviews, semi-structured
questionnaires and vignette-based interviews. Constant comparisons were made
between sectors during the data analysis. The research was validated by inter-
triangulation and by communicative validation. The concept of power remained
IV
the sole category of the Grounded Theory process once the research had reached
saturation.
The key conclusion was that, by adopting a Foucaultian perspective, the
"organisational context of work" is an expression of the power relationships that
influence the ethical decision-making of social workers and social care
practitioners. The concept of virtue ethics was introduced in the discussion of the
data to counteract the effect of power felt by social workers and social care
practitioners. The research concluded by proposing ways of incorporating the
findings into the teaching of social work at the higher educational level and among
qualified practitioners, emphasising the concept of practical reasoning (MacIntyre
1999) at the collective level.
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My interest in this research area began in 1998 while in the last year of my
bachelor's degree at Laval University, Canada. During this time, I had the
opportunity to undertake a fieldwork placement at my place of work. I was
working as a community worker for a voluntary organisation that provided
food and clothing for Native American people experiencing poverty at
various levels. My role as a co-ordinator was to fundraise for the organisation
and to manage employees, volunteers and activities within the centre.
One of my objectives as a student on placement was to set up a group
intervention that would enable service users to define the issues they faced
and to eventually create alternative activities and resources that would
replace the need for accessing basic food and clothes through the
organisation. I decided to set up a group of users that would work to
incorporate the principles and process of self-directed groupwork (Mullender
and Ward, 1991), also known as social action work. Indeed, this method
seemed to be the most appropriate, as people using the services reported
oppression and victimisation by the rest of the community through regular
acts of discrimination, due to their social status. Since self-directed groupwork
is a well-known method for addressing the roots of oppression, I envisaged
that it would be an appropriate method for working with this group.
Because part of our funding came from local government, my line manager
was a practitioner (qualified social worker) from the local authority. I quickly
realised that adopting an anti-oppressive practice framework and trying to
challenge inequalities at both the social and structural level would not be
straightforward, since I would be using self-directed groupwork within a
bureaucratic environment with many rules and regulations. For example, I
had to justify the outcomes of the intervention at the same time as fulfilling
the aims of the funding body. The result was that the funding body wanted
me to identify, prior to the intervention, what the outcomes and the duration
of the group would be, whereas I had planned to let the group decide what
they needed and how long they wished to work together (in line with my
interpretation of self-directed groupwork), Consequently, I realised that it
would be impossible to define the group's outcomes based on the self-
directed groupwork principle while also answering the needs of the funding
body. I was therefore faced with a difficult situation, as the group desperately
needed the funding for developments, but I did not want to plan the
intervention and influence the process for them simply to justify the funding.
Another issue I faced was in relation to my involvement within the group. In
using a self-directed groupwork model, the worker adopts a role of facilitator
and specialised member of the group. I had made this clear with the user
group, and I felt that the group was comfortable with this approach: I was not
seen as an agent of social control, and the group felt able to explore the issues
they faced. After a few sessions of collective cooking (a project that emerged
from the self-directed group process), members of the group wanted me to
take some food home that we had cooked collectively, as they had done. A
social worker, however, should not accept gifts or benefit from their
intervention (Ordre Professionnel des Travailleurs Sociaux du Quebec
(OPTSQ), 1993). My line manager therefore called me in for a meeting and
assertively told me that I would have to keep my distance from the group and
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adopt a "more professional role". In taking the food home, however, I was
aiming only to practise what I preached, to indicate that I was a 'specialised
member of the group'. I envisaged my action as rendering the situation more
'normal' and 'accessible', and I believed that it was thus good practice to do
so. I was therefore put again in a situation where my personal and
professional values were in conflict with the OPTSQ code of ethics for Quebec
social workers (1993) and with the agency, which enforced the code of ethics
through their policies.
After almost a year of working in this environment, I had the opportunity to
meet my current supervisors, David Ward and Jennie Fleming, at a conference
on groupwork in Quebec. I decided to register for an MPhil/phD in order to
explore the issue of professional boundaries in self-directed groupwork, My
interest in this research topic therefore came from a very personal situation
where my own professional social work values were at issue. I believed that
research on the topic would be beneficial for me as well as for other social
workers practising a social action work approach. I decided to engage in
research on this topic in order to further understanding and gain insights in
relation to ethics and social work.
In England, as in Canada, the role of the social care practitioner is often vague
and confusing, while the guidelines for practice and codes of ethics are often
very rigid or contradictory. Work becomes even more complicated when
trying to deal with issues such as empowerment and social action work.
This research project therefore aims to investigate the experiences of
practitioners in England working for statutory social services in comparison
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with practitioners using social action principles and those who work for the
voluntary sector, in relation to their conduct and ethics.
To accomplish this, the research will have two objectives. The first will be to
explore and compare the experiences of practitioners in statutory social
services from the voluntary sectors and social action settings with regard to
their conduct and ethics. The comparative analysis between areas of social
care practice emerged in part due to the Grounded Theory methodology, but
also due to the difficulties I had experienced in trying to apply social action
principles while working for a voluntary organisation mainly funded by the
statutory sector. Indeed, it became apparent that social action work, the
voluntary sector and statutory social work involve fundamental differences
that affect the others' practice and that this issue therefore needed further
examination. The second objective of the research will be to determine the
differences or similarities between the three sectors in terms of decision-
making processes and to examine critically the interface between the statutory
and voluntary sectors and social action work settings, especially in relation to
ethics and empowerment.
The thesis will be presented in an order that does not totally capture the
research process conducted under a Grounded Theory framework. For
example, while only some background literature was consulted at the
beginning of the research process, constant examination of academic sources
was done during each stage of the data analysis and therefore cannot be
summarised within a traditional 'literature review' chapter. The literature
review was updated at the end of the research process, and therefore the three
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chapters on the literature review include more information than was known
at the beginning of the research process.
In order to accommodate the variety of topics necessary for understanding the
research and to facilitate the structure of the literature review, the first part of
the thesis, namely the literature review, will be divided into three chapters.
Thus, Chapter Two will explore the research context, that is to say the nature
of social work and, more generally, social care in England. Chapter Three will
explore two very important concepts in the practice of social work and social
care, that is to say the notions of 'power' and 'empowerment'. Finally, to
conclude this first part of the thesis and the review of the literature, Chapter
Four will examine the concepts of 'ethics' and 'ethical practice' in social work
and social care and the contributions of various mainstream moral theories to
social work practice.
This research was based on a qualitative framework using Grounded Theory.
Data were collected using a systematic approach by means of semi-structured
interviews, focus groups, semi-structured questionnaires and vignette-based
interviews. Part Two of this thesis aims at examining the research design as
well as the different methodological procedures for collecting and analysing
the data. Chapter Five will therefore explore the overall research design,
paying particular attention to the research perspective, methodology and
methods used to conduct the research. This chapter will conclude with an
examination of the research's validity and reliability and a reflection on
research ethics. Chapter Six will focus on data analysis procedures as well as
the presentation of data according to the various stages of data analysis.
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Part Three of the thesis will focus on making sense of the data on a theoretical
level. Thus, Chapter Seven will theorise on the final and sole category of
,power', whereas Chapter Eight will take the discussion further and examine
the findings for future practice, proposing a framework for understanding
ethics in various sectors of social care practice as well as making some
propositions for maintaining high standards of ethical practice in social work.
It is important to note that this research project was carried out over a period
of eight years in total, during which I lived in two different countries. In
addition, during this time, I had the chance to practise within various areas of
social work: as a youth and community worker in Quebec, as a social work
lecturer, as a youth and community lecturer, as a researcher for the
Connexions service in Plymouth, and also as a manager in the Centre Local
des Services Communautaires (CLSC), a local-authority agency providing
health and social services (specialising in older people) in Montreal. My
understanding of social services and ethical practice is therefore influenced by
a variety of social policies and work settings, all of which have contributed to
my understanding of the contexts of research on a global level. I do not,
however, claim that the research findings are applicable to countries or
practice settings other than those explored here. Further research would be
needed to verify the extent of the applicability of these findings to other
social-services systems across the world.
6
Chapter Two
The research context: Social work activities in England
"European social work can perhaps best face up to the actuality of value
questions through a critical examination of its own historical roots and its
'received ideas' in the context of their various discourses" (Rojek, Peacock and
Collins 1998 in Lorenz 1994:41)
This research project aimed at examining the understanding and experience of
ethical practice among social workers, qualified and non-qualified,' from three
different fields of practice. This thesis will use the terms 'social workers' and
'social care practitioners' interchangeably to include the staff working in the
social care/welfare sector with responsibilities for the development or provision
of services and care packages and working directly with clients and service
users. This definition includes staff calling themselves 'social workers',
'community workers', 'youth workers' and 'social care practitioners' but
excludes people having primary 'caring' roles such as care assistants and
auxiliary staff.
As briefly explored in the introduction to this thesis, three sectors of social care
provision were included for the comparative element of the study. This opening
chapter aims to highlight on the development of social work activities in
England and provide an understanding of the three sectors under study.
Underpinned by an historical approach, the chapter will begin by briefly
examining the origins and development of different forms of social work in
England and will end by providing a summary of the key features of each
1 Since 2005, the title Social Worker is reserved to those who hold a Social Work qualification
recognised by the General Social Care Council
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sector considered in this study, that is to say, the statutory sector, the voluntary
sector and the social action setting.
There have been a plethora of Acts and regulations related to the development
of the welfare state since the end of the Second World War, some of which were
related to Health, Education, Housing or Social Security; some to other
legislative frameworks related to personal social services and social care.
Among the social policies related to personal social services and social care,
some were developed in relation to a particular field of care, such as Children
and Mental Health, whereas some others were related to the structure and
provision of personal social services (jones and Lowe 2002). Using an historical
approach, this section will only consider those social policies and regulations
that are essential to this thesis such as the Beveridge Report (1942), the Seebohm
Report (1968) and the Care Standard Act (2000).
The origins of Social Work in Britain: before 1940
It is difficult to argue against the fact that the origins of social work and more
broadly social care in Britain have their roots partly in philanthropic activities
and Christian tradition, as well as the women's and socialist movements,
much from well before the beginning of the twentieth century (Lorenz 1994).
Indeed, Payne (2005) asserts that social work in Britain began to emerge as
early as the initial 1600s with the creation of the Poor Law and continued to
develop steadily, through activities such as mutual help movements, the
Charity Organisation Society (COS) and the diverse Settlement movement.
However, it is during and after the industrial revolution that, by the many
changes in social conditions such as an increase in population moving from
rural to city areas, changes in agricultural industry which contributed to a
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rural poverty and the overall change in occupational structure that social
problems multiplied and that a greater need for social order emerged (Harris
2004). As Cowden (2006:3) explains,
the development of capitalism and industrialisation saw the
destruction of centuries old ways of life, as formerly rural populations
migrated into the huge urban centres like London, Manchester and
Birmingham. The result was social dislocation, poverty and squalor on
a scale never previously witnessed.
The emergence of modern social problems and the impetus for maintaining
social order both contributed to the emergence and continuous development
of social work activities which became a central feature of modern social care.
However, as Payne (2005) points out, it is apparent that as early as the end of
the nineteenth century, two main forms of 'social work' activities began to
develop alongside the support offered by the family and the neighbourhood:
the Settlement movement, on the one hand, and the Charity Organisation
Society (COS), on the other:
Organisations like the Mutual Insurance and Friendly Societies, the
Charity Organisation Society or the Settlement Movement
characterised an early approach to welfare that is based on initiatives at
the civil society level and expressed a sense of self-help or of self-
organisation in such way that it did not involve the state directly
(Lorenz 2005:201)
Both the Settlement movement and the COS can be considered as early forms
of social work, emerging from different philanthropic activities, but with
different values, aims and functioning. As Payne (2005:31) puts it,
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Charity organisation developed 'social casework', a method that
eventually combined with Poor Law welfare to become local
government social work. Settlement work drew on movements for
social reform to develop more radical social action in a move towards
community and groupwork, especially for young people.
The Settlement movement consisted of groups of people striving for working-
class education and Christian values in new cities. The original Settlement
was Toynbee Hall, which was established by Canon Samuel Barnett in
Whitechapel in 1884 (Payne 2005). The key idea behind the Settlement
movement was that students and the well educated would live in poor areas
and use their skills to both practise what was learnt in their education as well
as to improve the quality of life for those people. As W. Moore Ede (1896 in
Woodroofe 1962:65) explains, the settlements:
will not be converted by missionaries and tracts sent by dwellers in the
West End. The dwellers in the West End must go to the dwellers in the
East themselves, share with the East those pleasures which give
interest and delight to the dwellers in the West, and make up the
fullness of their lives.
Participation in the lives of people living in difficult conditions was therefore
central to the ethos of the Settlement movement, an ethos that marked 'true
human fellowship between the more educated and the less educated, the
value of knowledge for its own sake, and the duty of all men to fulfil their
functions in the social order" (Woodroofe 1962:65-6). Therefore, the
Settlement movement, by its nature, had the dual purpose of providing a
space for people from different social classes to live together as well as learn
from each other. This also emphasises the importance of Settlements as an
educational setting:
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the training dimension was most pronounced within the settlement
movement both for the recipients of philanthropic attention and for the
.middle-class participants in its activities, and settlements, with their
emphasis on 'practical learning', had a lasting influence on the applied
nature of social work training. (Lorenz 1994:47)
Therefore, the Settlements were unique in so far as their educational purpose
was central to the movement. Yet, the Settlement movement was not the only
group to provide training within its activities. The Charity Organisation
Society (COS), although providing quite a fundamentally different approach
by their 'deficit' model value base, also developed formal training for their
'philanthropists', from 1896 through lectures and practical work and then
from 1912 onwards, within the London School of Economics (Woodroofe
1962). As Woodroofe (1962:53 citing Loch 1895) explains,
since charity was the work of the social physician, it was to the interest
of the community that it should not be entrusted to novices or to
dilettanti or to quacks.
This emphasis on training the 'social physician' or 'social doctors' who
diagnose the causes of social failure and prescribed treatments (Richmond
1917 in Rimmer 2005), highlights the already medicalised aspect of social
work which has left an important legacy to social work in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries and, less significantly, with the training of social
workers (Vincent 1999).
It can therefore be assumed that the COS is an important movement that
contributed to the development of modem social work and emerged as a
response to poverty (Payne 2005). As Smith (2002:1) explains,
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founded in 1869, COS provided a key foundation for the development
of social work as a profession in Britain. The aims of COS were to help
and encourage 'self-respecting families who were struggling to keep
themselves from destitution' on the one hand, and to organise and
coordinate 'so the best could be made of resources' (Roof 1972 in Smith
2002).
The aims of COS highlight an important feature, that of deserving and non-
deserving poor and of services based on individualism (Vincent 1999). Roof
(1972) explains that the COS's aims were to respond to urgent needs and
encourage "self-respecting families who were struggling to keep themselves
from destitution" (in Smith 2002). Therefore the COS's purpose was in
"helping the poor to demonstrate qualities such as cleanliness, thrift and
sobriety" (Payne 2005) rather than learning from them, as in the case of the
Settlement movement.
It is partly from the COS that social work took its origins, especially 'family
casework', with its roots in social visiting (Vincent 1999; Smith 2002; Payne
2005). However Younghusband (1981 in Homer 2006) argues that both the
COS and the Settlement movement have all contributed to the development of
social work in more general terms, including social case work, groupwork
approaches and community work. Nevertheless, the two 'branches' of social
work practice shared some important differences that are still apparent in
modem social work: the COS and subsequently social casework is concerned
with elements of care, but also with control, although social control is not only
typical of the COS's activity but can be traced back to the beginning of the
Poor Law of 1834 (Payne 2005). On the other hand, the Settlement movement,
and more recently social action work, social groupwork, community and
12
youth work are more concerned with the empowerment and social reform
element than the social control aspect (Woodroofe 1962; Horner 2006).
Therefore, from the evidence of early social work activities, it becomes
apparent that social work is developing in two entirely different directions:
On the one hand, activities around campaigning, advocacy and practical
measures to improve the lives of people in impoverished communities, and
on the other hand, social work as a body which aims to regulate and control
the lives of the poor and the imposition of values from the dominant social
order (Cowden 2006).
The social control aspect of at least one of the directions of social work
appeared quite early on in the development of the profession. Indeed, Harris
(2004:61-62) agrees that some forms of philanthropy have been regarded as a
form of social control but that such views have become increasingly
controversial. For example, he cites Prochaska who believes that although in
all parts of society, "the ruling classes ... openly expressed a desire to
subordinate the lower classes through charitable agencies," the concept of
social control is "rather murky and reductionist, for the wish to make another
conform to the same values and speak the same language is important in
social relations generally, from family life to national politics" (in Harris
2004:62). Consequently, while some authors view COS and other
philanthropic organisations as being driven by a social control agenda, others
interpret these activities as being "used to maintain social harmony and create
mutually advantageous links between members of different social groups in
an unequal society" (Harris 2004:62). Jones (2002:31) concludes that to argue
that "all philanthropists were virtuous and self-sacrificing, or that all
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philanthropists were gratifying their own egos, is to do less than justice to a
very complex subject".
Whether the COS and the Settlement movement were considered as a
mechanism of social control to a certain extent or not, it is difficult to argue
against the fact that they both constituted, by their independence from the state,
a form of voluntary action, or even charitable organisations:
Some of the most influential leaders in the world of charity believed that
charity amounted to a social principle. Charitable endeavour represented
citizens united by moral purpose, voluntarily fulfilling their duty to
those less fortunate than themselves. The idea was that better-off people
would voluntarily perform their duty as citizens and help the poor to
become fully participative members of society. The injunction to behave
charitably thus amounted to a particular vision of an ethical society in
which citizens motivated by altruism performed their duties towards
one another voluntarily. (Lewis 1999:14).
Yet, this idea is contested and commentators argued that, even though these
organisations were seen as independent from the state, they "may best be
conceptualised as part of a range of 'buffer institutions' [to the state]" (Thane
1950 in Lewis 1999:15). Weisbrod (1988 in Lewis 1999) explains that the
voluntary sector develops when the market or the state fails to meet minority
demands, but that as the demands grow, the involvement of the state in
meeting it also increases. Seen from this perspective therefore, the voluntary
organisation is not totally independent of the state, as central government,
through a small central bureaucracy and a strong aspiration to limits its
activities, influenced them in their purpose and service provision. As Lewis
explains, encompassing the work of voluntary organisations, were Acts such as
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the Poor Law, and later Pension Act 1908 and Social Insurance Act 1911.
However, as Harris (1999:43) points out,
The annual income and expenditure of registered and unregistered
charities, friendly societies, collecting societies, benefit-paying trade
unions and other benevolent and self-help institutions vastly exceeded
the annual budget of the Poor Law.
Therefore, the voluntary sector was the main provider of social welfare in
Britain and the state's involvement was minimal. It is really from the Social
Insurance Act 1911, by its compulsory nature, that "mixed economy of welfare
began to tilt in favour of the state" (Lewis 1999:13).
The involvement of the state did not, however, dominate the welfare
provision until the 1940s, and developed mainly as a response to the war
(Glennerster 1995). As Titmuss (in Thane 1982:223) explains, II the
circumstances of the war created an unprecedented sense of social solidarity
among the British people, which made them willing to accept a great increase
of egalitarian policies and collective state intervention".
Social work and social welfare from 19405 to 19705
During the first half of the Second World War, the provision of social work
and social care remained largely unchanged. However, with the publication
of the Beveridge Report in 1942, this was to change considerably. This key
report to the development of the welfare state in Britain would have the aim
of eradicating divisions between health and social welfare, and between the
rich and the poor. The Beveridge Report is one of the key documents for
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understanding modem social welfare, and consequently, the development of
social work into the twentieth century.
Although Beveridge began to be involved in politics early on-, it was in 19-12,
with the publication of his report Social Insurance and Allied Seroices that the
welfare state began to take on its characteristic shape. Indeed, the report was
to propose a 'blueprint' aimed at fighting against the five' evils' of the modern
world, namely Want, Disease, Ignorance, Squalor and Idleness and
recommend a free, universal and comprehensive provision of service from
'the cradle to the grave' (Fraser 2003; Payne 2005). Therefore, from the
publication of the Beveridge Report, the Welfare State slowly began to take
shape in the form of a universal system, aimed at providing services to
everyone in need in relation to health and social assistance. This element of
universalism is important in so far as it dissolves differences between
attitudes towards the deserving and undeserving promoted by the COS
earlier on in the evolution of social work. However, the universal nature of
the propositions found in the Beveridge Report were not without criticism
Indeed, Titmuss (1987) argues that the report should be based on a more
'actuarial' formula for distribution of resources, and establish a closer
relationship between what one pays in and what one gets out. Other criticisms
were that the Beveridge Report was perceived as an 'ineffective and
conservative document' as well as a report that was 'flawed and failed to live
up to its promises' (Fraser 2003).
2 Beveridge's first major contribution to social policy was in 1907 with his article on the subject
of 'labour exchanges' in the Economic Journal (Glennester 1995:20)
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The Beveridge Report has also been criticised for having had an adverse effect
on the development of social work resulting in practices more inclined to
social casework than social activism. Indeed, Payne (2005:53) explains that,
Cradle to grave provision of education, health, housing and social
security might mean that interpersonal help is unnecessary. However,
these changes also led to the development in social work services, as
part of the general movement to improve welfare, which in facing up
the social casework method, sought to demonstrate the value of
interpersonal help as part of a universal welfare state.
Thus, social work activities changed with the publication of the Beveridge
Report, shifting from a provision that was voluntary to something more of a
public service.
Nevertheless, and despite of the number of criticisms the Beveridge Report
also had a lasting effect on the development of the Welfare State, and
indirectly, on social work activities. As a result, a number of Acts were
passed, aiming at protecting against Destitution and Want, but also the other
of the 5 giants identified by Beveridge: the Family Allowance Act (1945), the
National Insurance and Industrial Injuries Act (1946), the National Assistance
Act (1948) as well as the National Health Services Act (1946) and the
Education Act (1944) (Fraser 2003).
In addition to his famous report, Beveridge also had an important impact
upon the development of the voluntary sector with the publication of his
report on Voluntary Action: A Report on Method and Social Advance (1948).
Beveridge, who had worked earlier at Toynbee Hall, one of the well-known
Settlements (Payne 2005) was much in favour of voluntary action:
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Sir William Beveridge, author of the blueprint for post-war settlement,
was himself a firm believer in voluntary action and harked back strongly
to the tum-of-the-century insistence on the importance of the 'spirit of
service'; the good society could only be built on people's sense of duty
and willingness to serve (Lewis 1999:16).
However, voluntary services, since the mid 1940s, have been largely concerned
with home care and meals on wheels (Paynes 2005). Indeed, although
Beveridge perceived the 'voluntary sector as a fundamental ingredient of
modem democracy' its role, from the publication of the report, was
nevertheless limited to acting as complementary to the state, as opposed to an
essential element of its composition (Lewis 1999).
Indeed, following the publication of the Beveridge report, and the subsequent
Acts of Parliament and White Papers that were influenced by it, voluntary
organisations found themselves compromised and began to take on a more
'regional' role and shifted from a focus on health to a focus on social care
(Payne 2005). Titmuss (1987) takes a more radical view and explains that the
Welfare State posed a direct threat to voluntary organisations. Payne (2005:55)
explains,
Major charities such as Dr Bamado's, the Royal National Institutes for
the Blind and the Deaf, the (Church of England) Children's Society and
the (Methodist) National Children's Home all found it difficult to
identify a role, when the public focus was on comprehensive and
developing public services. The London Charity Organisation Society
(COS), able to claim an important influence on the development of
social work practice, found a new and more limited regional role as the
Family Welfare Association.
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The legacy of the Beveridge Report has had a considerable impact on the
quality of life for most people but some areas of the population were still left
untouched by the policy born from it as Younghusband (1978:21) explains:
The standard of living rose markedly between 1950 and 1975 and most
people 'had never had it so good'. But some remained persistently
caught in the trap of poverty, in particular low-paid, unskilled manual
workers, single parent families, old people and the handicapped.
Although the Beveridge Report sets a framework for the Welfare State, the
development of social work remained fragmented until the 1960s when a
movement towards the unification of social services occurred. As Payne
(2005:58) explains,
the legislation of the 1940s was mainly perrmssrve and divided
responsibility at central government level meant that there was no
ministry to take overall strategic direction. However, in the early 60s,
concern about some social issues, particularly juvenile delinquency, did
lead to pressure for the development and eventually to the Seebohm
reform.
Therefore, despite the universal function of the policies inspired by the
Beveridge Report, many people managed to fall through the net, which later
resulted in further policy and regulation.
Social Work from the late 1960s to the end of the century
While social work and the provision of the welfare state since the 1940s was
mostly dominated by the individual approach to understanding social
problems, they began to take on a different hue by the mid 196Os. Both
directions of social work, that is to say, the individualistic social work that
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derived from COS, as well as social work orientated towards social change
that was witnessed during the Settlement movement, become more apparent
in the social work profession.
Firstly, as a result of the problem identified earlier, the inability of policy to
reach everyone, the Seebohm Report was published in 1968. The Seebohm
Report affected the development of both the voluntary sector and of statutory
social work. Secondly, a radical social work movement started to emerge
from the field, challenging social, and in particular class inequality as a central
aspect of the practice (Fook 2002).
The Seebohm Report Local Authority andAlliedPersonal Social Services (1968) set
up the framework of Social Services Departments in local authorities and set
in motion the development of networks of social care support between Health
and Social Service Departments as well as the voluntary sector (Baldwin
2000). Based on the same principle as Beveridge, that is to say 'universality',
Seebohm aimed to establish a unified system of public social services
delivered under the administration of a Director of Social Services appointed
in each local authority (younghusband 1978). This would trigger the
development of a new Personal Social Service (PSS), a service implemented as
a mechanism through which to reach all sections of the community:
We decided very early in our discussions that it would be impossible to
restrict our work solely to the needs of two or even three generation
families. We could only make sense of our task by considering also
childless couples and individuals without any close relative: in other
words, everybody (Seebohm Report 1968 para.32 in Younghusband
1978:233).
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However, while the Seebohm Report, like its predecessor Beveridge, aimed at
putting into place services that would reach all part of the population, only
the needs of a number of groups would be met by such service, such as
children, older people, disabled people and young offenders. Jones and Lowe
(2002:192) explain that although the diverse user groups targeted by the
Seebohm Report and the PSS share more differences than similarities between
them, one core characteristic can be applied to all: their 'lack of political
influence'. Thus, the PSS, despite its universal nature, tends to meet the needs
of those who did not get their services elsewhere.
The Seebohm Report also influenced the establishment of a new generic
training for social work that would be delivered through the Central Council
for Education and Training of Social Workers (CCETSW in Horner 2006). In
particular, the Seebohm Report notes an emphasis on skill and knowledge
training, as well as teamwork and interdisciplinary preparation (Seebohm
1968 in Jones and Lowe 2002:197-198). The Seebohm Report therefore triggers
the development of new generic social work training that reflects the
acquisition of social work skills and knowledge useful to all social workers,
regardless of their field of work.
The Seebohm Report has therefore had a strong impact on the development of
social work practice in Britain. Payne (2005) describes social work activity
during this period in time as being at its 'zenith' and explains that this move
towards the unification of social care services under the new Seebohm Report
leads also to the creation of the British Association of Social Workers (BASW)
in 1970, a attempt to amalgamate different professional bodies such as the
Society of Mental Welfare Officers, and the Association of Psychiatric Social
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Workers (Higman 2006). This amalgamation shows a real focus for social
work to become more generic and unified. Thus, even the social work
definition shows a level of inclusion between the different branches of social
work that had previously developed in England:
... social work extends its interest beyond the immediate issue to
understanding the client's background, social situations, motivation,
attitudes, values, personality and behaviour and attempts to encourage
development and change by a wide variety of methods which amongst
many others may well include the development of strong relationships
with clients, insight-giving techniques, behaviour modification and
practical help (BASW 1975 in Younghusband 1978:26).
This desire for a general social work profession continued until 1982, when
the Barclay Committee reflected on the roles and task of social workers and
carne to the conclusion that social workers' tasks could be categorised
according to two different branches, those of counselling and of social care
planning (Higman 2006). Yet, the conclusions of the Barclay Report emphasise
the individual casework role as opposed to that of social change and
mobilisation.
However, an alternative type of social practice begins to emerge
simultaneously to the publication of the Seebohm Report as Rimmer (2005:6)
explains:
In the 1960s and 1970s, social work became much more concerned with
structural problems and community activism, whereby social workers
should enable service users to 'change their situation by collective
action.
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This re-emergence of the recognition of structural inequality broadens the
social work task as 'radical social work' and develops a counterbalance to the
popular individual intervention and psychosocial approaches to social work.
Rimmer (2005:7) asserts that:
During the 1960s, social work rediscovered poverty and social workers,
who were using solely psychodynamic approaches, came under fire.
How could an individual 'talking session' stop the water coming in
through the roof? (Berm, 1973:36). Many social workers thought that this
kind of social work was soul destroying,
The emergence of radical social work therefore emphasised the social and class
inequality aspect of people's social conditions as opposed to 'blaming the
victim' approach more central in individual casework (Fook 2002). Therefore,
the surfacing of radical social work had an effect of focusing social work
activities on a movement toward social activism.
in the 1960s the emergence of radical critique put the issues of social
context back on the agenda and broadened it to include understanding of
how the socio-economic structure and historical conditions also influence
individual experience (Fook 1993 in Fook 2002:4).
Activities based on radical social work were then taking place mostly within
the voluntary sector. The voluntary sector was also assigned an important role
within the structure for provision of social care services within the Seebohm
Report (Iones and Lowe 2002) and although the relationship between the
statutory and the voluntary organisations tend not to be without conflict
(Sebohm Report p.153 in Jones and Lowe 2003:2009), the voluntary sector once
again continued to evolve around the statutory provision. Indeed, the
Seebohm Committee's report on the personal social services recognised the
importance of the voluntary organisation as pioneers and as a 'watchdog' and
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"encouraged local authorities to include volunteers in their plans, albeit in a
supplementary role." (Lewis 1999a:266). The voluntary sector is thriving, and
many commentators even acclaimed its merits by the end of the 1970s (see
Gladstone, 1979; Hadley and Hatch, 1981 in Lewis 1999a). However, the role
of the voluntary sector remains at most complementary to the PSS during this
period.
From 1991 onward, the voluntary sector tended to take a more important role in
the provision of social welfare in England, when contracting became a major
source of the funding pattern of many of the voluntary organisations (Lewis
1999a). Indeed, as Knapp (1996:167) suggests "many of these organisations are
heavily dependent on government funding". Often, however, the voluntary
agency that agrees to carry out work for local government in exchange for
funding has to adapt its service to the aims of the funders, putting its original
aims at risk (Brenton 1985). However, this is challenged by the Joseph Rowntree
Memorial Trust (1978:68), which asserted that:
it is very difficult to generalise about the extent to which the receipt of
a government grant by a voluntary organisation means that it becomes
subject to government influence or control.
Therefore, although obtaining funding from the local authority may influence
the aims and characteristics of voluntary organisations, this cannot be
assumed for each individual organisation that receives funding from the
statutory sector.
It becomes clear that social work activities from the late 1960s to the end of the
century were still split between different aspects of service provision, with a
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re-emergence of social work oriented towards social change with the rise of
radical social work. By the end of the 1990s social work was not only split
between "two souls" like at the beginning of the last century (casework and
social changes) but as Payne (1997 in Thompson 2005) examined, between
three main trends: the individual reformist (meeting social welfare needs on
an individualized basis) and the reflexive-therapeutic (facilitating personal
growth), more often present within the PSS and the voluntary sector and the
socialist-collectivist (a system to promote co-operation in society so that the
most oppressed and disadvantaged people can gain power over their lives)
which is closely linked to the development of radical social work and social
action work but also present in the voluntary sector. Thompson (2005)
emphasises that these types of social work practice can also be combined, but
this examination is useful to understanding social work as practice at the end
of the twentieth century.
This present research will investigate three sectors of social care practice as
understood at the end of the twentieth century. These three sectors, as briefly
noted in the introduction of Chapter Two are namely the statutory sector, the
voluntary sector and the social action setting. These sectors will continue to
evolve into the twenty-first century, especially in the light of Modernising
Social Services: Promoting Independence. The final section of this chapter will
examine the state of play of social work and social care in England, focussing
especially on the three sectors under investigation in this study.
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Modernising Social Services: Promoting Independence - the state of play in
Social Work in the Twenty-first Century
With the election of the New Labour Government in 1998 and the
operationalisation of the 'third way' for the welfare state, the natures of social
work and social care were again about to change. Explaining Gidden's third
way, Jones (2000:209) asserts that
The Beveridge Report was essentially negative, a matter of combating
the 'Five Giants', but in the future, in a positive welfare policy, Want will
be replaced by autonomy, Disease by active health, Ignorance by
education as a continuing part of life, Squalor by well-being, and
Idleness by initiative.
Social work in the twenty-first century was therefore to develop according to a
philosophy that will not only provide services to people who need it, but will
also aim at promoting independence from services. In 1998, the Government
published their White Paper Promoting Independence, Improving Protection and
Raising Standards, which set the tone for social work to be more accountable and
more efficient by setting targets and measuring outcomes for the provision of
social services (Higman 2006). Indeed, as the Department of Health announces:
High quality and good value services can only be achieved if there are
sound management, information and performance systems in place.
Checks are needed both locally and nationally to make sure that people
are getting modem and dependable social services that they deserve
(DoH 1998:109 in Langan 2000:152).
Modernising social services will therefore provide a platform for the
development of four organisational structures, each having different
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responsibilities, ranging from inspection (Commission for Social Care
Inspection), promotion of best practice (Social Care Institute for Excellence),
Staff regulation (General Social Care Council) and Training (Skills for Care)
(Higman 2006). These four organisational structures have an overall aim which
is to focus on the monitoring of services, inspection, audit and accountability
(Langan 2000).
All the four organisational structures are important, although some of them are
already struggling in terms of organisational changes (Higman 2006).
Nevertheless, an important change to the social work profession is the creation
of the General Social Care Council (GSCC), a government body that aims at
increasing the protection of service users, their carers and the general
public by regulating the social care workforce and by ensuring that work
standards within the social care sector are of the highest quality (GSCC
2006).
GSCC achieves its aims through regulating staff in England by the creation and
maintenance of a social care register, by protecting the title of social worker and
by regulating the training of social workers in introducing a new social work
degree (replacing CCETSW) (GSCC 2002).
The overall modernisation agenda has had many positive effects on the
recognition of social work as a profession, with the protection of the title since
2003, the compulsory registration of social workers since 2005 and the new
social work degree since 2003 (Higman 2006)
However, despite these changes (mainly in relation to registration and
training), the structure of the provision of social care is not likely to change.
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Partly inspired by the earlier values promoted by COS, the deficit model
practised in social care services as well as in aspects of governmental control
related to the profession will still remain as key features of statutory social
work. Bureaucracy has increased by the ever-greater desire to be accountable,
and as a measure of efficiency in the services. As Payne (2005:104) illustrates,
While traditional responses to problems with excluded groups have
often used generic social work with wide professional discretion within
a system of bureaucratic control, new labour policies use limited social
work techniques within highly specified services, reducing the
flexibility and range of the service in favour of the delivery of a specific
political policy.
Consequently, social workers, despite their new training and compulsory
registration, are unlikely to be able to fully practise according to the core
values of their profession". Indeed, as Ferguson and Powell point out, social
workers will be ever more challenged, as they will be:
placing social justice and empowerment at the centre of social work
practice and struggling to reconcile them with the increasing demands
of risk management and checklist practice (cited in Payne and
Shardlow 2002:103).
Social work within the PSS does not only involve 'providing an effective,
family-oriented, community based service, available and accessible to all'
(Homer 2006:91) but also, through risk management, a platform for
controlling members of the society who do not conform to the majority. As
McDonald (2006:28) argues:
3 For an in dept examination of social work values, see Chapter 3 on social work values and
ethics.
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the welfare state strives to regulate social life, particularly in its
attempts to smooth the bumps of capitalism and buffer the citizens.
This projection of the welfare state is partly modelled by the omnipresence of
the residual model that has been shaping social work and social care since the
introduction of the Poor Law and the COS/ even though the Beveridge Report
attempted to re-structure social work into a universal service (Lorenz 1994).
Statutory social work or PSS is therefore understood in this study as being the
principal provider of social welfare in England (Payne and Sharldow 2002)/
although, this has tended to change in the last few years with more and more
services provided by the voluntary and private sectors (Sharldow 2005).
However, the statutory sector still offers a wide range of service, such as case-
work social services, residential care, hospital social work and education
welfare (Dominelli 1997). PSS/ in particular, typically includes childcare,
community care and criminal justice (Thompson 2005)/ which were the focus of
this study.
PSS tends to be difficult to define (Lowe 1993) and this difficulty is even more
apparent with the publication of the new Green Paper Every Child Matters
(2003) and the new Children Act 2004/ which resulted in the end of 'social
services departments' as defined by Seebohm (1968). Indeed, Every Child
Matters brings together all children's services such as, for example, children and
family social work, Connexions and the Youth Offending team, under a
Children's Service Department (Homer 2006). However, this new feature of
'statutory social work' will not be examined as the research project, and in
particular the data collection, took place before 2003 and it therefore did not
influence the direction of the research. The same can be said about the
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proliferation of private social care agencies, which were not considered for this
study.
The second sector under study, namely the voluntary sector, is also difficult to
define. Marshall (1996) claims that the concept of voluntary organisation itself
lacks clarity. As the Wolfenden Committee has pointed out: "voluntary action
in Britain covers myriad different activities and is undertaken from many
different motives" (Joseph Rowntree Memorial Trust 1978:15). The Rowntree
Trust is not the only organisation to affirm that voluntary action and
community organisations are complex and the sector is therefore hard to
define. Kendall and Knapp, almost 20 years later, highlight the ambiguity in
defining the term:
The extent and nature of the voluntary sector's contributions to the UK
economy and society often remain unremarked or are discussed
confusedly because of a lack of clarity on the terminology, definitions
and classifications being (often implicitly) employed. (cited in Davis
Smith et al. 1995:66).
However, definitions of the voluntary sector emphasise the notion of 'spirit' or
'ethos', as opposed to the nature of labour force (Marshall 1996:45), "serving as
mediators between the individual and the state, both holding society together
and lubricating it for social change". Voluntary organisations, as pointed out by
Leat (1996) are therefore mediating structures and vehicles for empowerment.
The voluntary sector is very important in the provision of social care as
Shardlow (2005:97) explains:
during the past ten years, there has been an enormous growth in the
number of private and voluntary social work organisations. Such that
now, and precise figures are difficult to obtain, over half of all
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employed social workers are to be found in the private and voluntary
sectors rather than as workers for the local authority.
The voluntary sector, for the purpose of this research, includes both national
voluntary organisations and small local charities. The key elements for
inclusion as a national voluntary organisation were in relation to staffing and
source of funding:
These have incomes in the millions or tens of millions pounds brackets,
and employ several thousand full-time and part time paid staff
alongside volunteers nationally and locally in the provision of both
mainstream and pioneering services (Kendall and Knapp cited in Davis
Smith et al. 1995:75)
On the other hand, small charities were also included, because although they
have smaller budgets, they may still experience pressure from local
government, as they are often carrying part of their work as contracted
projects or with a service-level agreement which results in affecting the
organisation's values and ethos to a certain extent (Knapp 1996).
Social action, the final sector of the comparative element of this study is often
carried out within voluntary or in some cases, within statutory agencies, but is
different by its emphasis on empowerment as a value base, and on its focus on
structural changes:
[Social action is] about users taking action for empowerment. Our
practice should reflect the fact that oppression, social policy and the
environment are much stronger factors in service user's lives than
personal factors (Social Action Journal 1995:2 in Rimmer 2005:8).
Social action work is composed of both a set of principles and a process that
cannot be separated, as the Centre for Social Action points out:
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Social action is made up of two essential and inseparable elements - the
principles and the process. These do not stand alone, but are
completely dependent upon each other. Combined, they form an
effective approach for working with people and a powerful force for
change (Centre for Social Action 2004).
Social Action work is therefore a 'social work' approach that has a clear
ideological link with the Settlement movement and which is "marked by a
,striving towards an understanding of the relationship between oppression,
power and change'r{Mullender and Ward 1991:13). The emphasis of social
action is therefore oriented towards social change as opposed to adaptation of
individuals in society.
Social action or self-directed groupwork is known as an extremely
empowering approach. Several researchers, professionals and practitioners
have described social action as a very powerful tool to enhance the loss of
power experienced by oppressed people due to inequalities in the societies
they live in (Mullender and Ward 1991; Denney 1998; Croft and Beresford
1989; Solomon 1976; Preston-Shoot 1992; Rimmer 2005). Fleming and Ward
(1997:5) have defined social action work or self-directed groupwork as having
two principal characteristics. The model was specifically designed to distance
social action from the 'deficit' and 'blaming the victim' approaches
(Mullender and Ward 1991). Thus, social action is based on a commitment to
people having the right to be heard, to define the issues facing them, to set the
agenda for action, and most importantly, to take action on their own behalf
and contrasts greatly with social work as practised within the statutory sector.
There are six principles (Centre for Social Action 2004) to adhere to when
practising social action work. A decade ago, Mullender and Ward (1991)
defined five principles for self-directed groupwork (or social action work),
which were later replaced by six principles defined by the Centre for Social
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Action (2004). For the purpose of this research, these six principles will be
used, as they are more up to date and are very closely linked to practice and
research. A full list of principles can be found in appendix 1.
The process of social action can be described as involving five stages,
examining different questions in order to understand the underlying causes of
oppression. The five stages are known as 'what', 'why', 'how', 'action' and
'reflection' (Mullender and Ward 1991; Centre for Social Action 2004). The
'why' stage is particularly important and is often undervalued (Mullender
and Ward 1991). Indeed, a group that does not explore the 'why' question will
not gain a deep enough comprehension of the sources of structural oppression
and will risk falling into the trap of seeing the problem as a personal deficit.
The question 'why' therefore helps the group not only to find other sources of
oppression, but also to realise that the sources of oppression are more
structural or social than personal. Thus, the process of social action, by its five
key questions, aims at facilitating change with the help of a facilitator, where
services users are not just consumers but instead active agents for change
(Centre for Social Action 2004).
The process of social action is circular, in so far that the different stages can be
repeated as many times as the user group needs (Mullender and Ward 1991).
It is through this process that users can achieve structural empowerment. As
Mullender and Ward (1991:13) point out:
some considerable time before the term 'empowerment' became
fashionable, our involvement in developing the self-directed
groupwork model [social action model] marked our striving towards
an understanding of the relationship between oppression, power and
change.
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This in turn explains the relationship between the use of social action
strategies or self-directed groupwork models and the possibility of structural
empowerment and structural changes, because the aim of the model is to
achieve an understanding of the relationship between oppression, power and
change.
Social action work takes place in varied work settings and rests on an ethos as
opposed to a particular organisational context. As discussed above, as a
method of intervention, social action work is well defined in terms of
principles and process. However, boundaries are frequently less clear than
those within a statutory social services framework. Social action workers tend
to work more 'independently' (where no statutory guidelines apply), have
only the principles of social action work for guidance (Centre for Social Action
2004; Mullender and Ward 1991). Consequently, the principles for the practise
of social action work, as a set of values for practising empowerment, can
either fit well within the work setting where it is practised, or not. Indeed,
some of the principles may come into conflict with other requirements of the
organisation where the intervention takes place.
Preston-Shoot (1992) points out that it is rather difficult to be empowering and
therefore practise social action when the practice is regulated, because
regulation can itself be oppressive and disempowering. Therefore, while
social action work is based on empowering principles, these are not always
easily translated into practice.
To conclude this chapter, Thompson (2005) emphasises that twenty-first
century social work still oscillates between two different interpretations. He
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asserts that social work today is still divided between social work as 'an
agency of social stability' (or consensus model) or as an 'agency of social
change' (conflict model) (Thompson 2005:16). These two interpretations of
social work are examples of how an understanding of historical development
of a type of practice helps to situate it in a modem context. Indeed, social
work as an agency of social stability has clear ideological links with the COS
more than a century ago, and is now mainly situated within the remit of
statutory social work. On the other hand, social work as an agency for social
change appeals to the Settlement movement and to radical social work in the
1970s and to social action and some of the work carried out in voluntary
organisations.
The next chapter will discuss two concepts central to social work practice:
empowerment and power. As Becket (2006:125) explains:
Social services are traditionally disempowering. Staff behave in ways
that clientalise the individuals under their care. They no longer remain
authentic citizens after entry to the day centres, old people's homes,
psychiatric hospital.
Adams (2003:183), on the other hand, argues, "empowering individual service
users requires that policies and practices are embedded in the culture of
relevant organisations and professions" (Adams 2003:183)
Consequently, the examination of the term empowerment sterns from a
concern that while the word empowerment has become a "meaningless,
ideological deodorant" (Ward, 1998:36 in Rimmer 2005:20), it is also central to




The International Federation of Social Workers has defined their vision for the
social work profession as one that "promotes social change, problem-solving in
human relationships and the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance
well-being" (IFSW 2001, in Homer 2003:2). Despite the centrality of the concept
of empowerment to contemporary social work, many have commented on the
fact that the term is used to mean many different things to different people and
groups. Ward and Mullender (1991), for example, have observed that the term
has become something of a 'bandwagon', within which so many diverse
agendas have found a home that it is at severe risk of becoming meaningless
(cited in Langan 2002). Empowerment is a concept central to social work
practice, as Thompson points out: "The aim of social work intervention is
empowerment, not adjustment" (2001:59). It is therefore important to define
and conceptualise the word 'empowerment', as its use and meaning often
differs from one context of work to another. As noted by Coulshed and Orme
(1998:64),
It is significant that the social work literature on empowerment (see
Adams 1996; Braye and Preston-Shoot 1995) resists giving simplistic
definitions of empowerment but concentrates on the process.
To illustrate this point, the meaning of empowerment within statutory social
work tends to reflect a personal mechanism, whereas within social action
work and self-directed groupwork, the same word is used to mean cultural
and structural change (Mullender and Ward 1991). The term 'empowerment'
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has therefore become increasingly popular in recent decades and has often
been ill-defined or misunderstood:
The world 'empowerment' has slipped into popular and social work
vernacular. Like most jargonised words, it is in danger of losing clear
meaning. 'Empowerment' is now used to describe just about
everything we do in social work, but everything we do is not
empowerment. (Lee 1991:5)
This finding, however, is unsurprising because, as Morrison Van Voorhis and
Hostetter (2006) point out, little research has been undertaken on what the
term empowerment actually means among social services professionals.
Nevertheless, at this point, it is important to examine the definitions of
empowerment that exist in social work and social care practice. The following
section is therefore twofold: First, it will provide an examination of the
various definitions of the term empowerment and their relevance within
social work and social care. Second, it will examine an overarching concept,
power, under a variety of theoretical tangents and their contributions to
furthering the understanding of empowerment in relation to this research.
Empowerment is a very important concept in social work practice (Sheafor,
Horejsi and Horejsi 1988; Solomon 1976, in Browne 1995; Morrison Van
Voorhis and Hostetter 2006) and is central to the Social Action approach (CSA
2004; Mullender and Ward 1991; Rimmer 2005). There are several definitions
and understandings of empowerment, and the concept is ambiguous and
vague (Hegar and Hunzeker 1988 in Browne 1995). According to the Oxford
Dictionary (2006:379), the definition of the verb to empower means the
following: "i) to give authority or power to; authorize ii) give strength and
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confidence." These two definitions are important, although the second relates
more directly to empowerment within social care practice.
Many authors agree that empowerment should be discussed in terms of
'process' (Gutierrez 1990; Mullender and Ward 1991; CSA 2004; Rimmer 2005)
and intervention (Parsons and Cox 1989; Solomon 1976, in Browne 1995).
Solomon provides a useful definition of empowerment as practised in the
social care profession:
A process whereby the social worker engages in a set of activities with
the client [...] that aim to reduce the powerlessness that has been
created by negative valuation based on membership in a stigmatised
group. It involves identification of the power blocks that contribute to
the problem as well as the development and implementation of specific
strategies aimed at either the reduction of the effects from indirect
power blocks or the reduction of the operations of direct power blocks.
(cited in Lee 1991:8)
In addition to emphasising the importance of 'process', the quotation above
highlights another important concept in relation to empowerment: that of
oppression. Oppression has also been identified by Mullender and Ward
(1991), Thompson (1997) and Browne (1995) as a key component to
understanding empowerment. Browne (1995:360) explains that "a traditional
definition of empowerment focuses on domination and control, individual
gain and upward mobility". Therefore, with regard to this definition, an
empowering practice is about confronting and challenging oppression
emerging from power relationships.
Mullender and Ward (1991:4) describe oppression as something that can be
understood
38
both as a state of affairs in which life chances are constructed, and as
the process by which this state of affairs is created and maintained.
The term oppression highlights an act of exploitation that can take a variety of
forms (such as economic and social) and that has consequences that impact on
the personal level for an individual. It is a process within groups that has
power to limit, in an unjust way, the lives, experiences and opportunities of
groups who have less power. Thompson (2001:34) describes oppression as the
inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals or groups; hardship
and injustice brought about by the dominance of one group over
another; the negative and demeaning exercise of power. Oppression
often involves disregarding the right of an individual or group and
thus a denial of citizenship.
Denney (1998) also refers to oppression as something focusing directly on
power relations, which gives some individuals the power to discriminate
against particular social groups. Power is therefore a key component of
oppression and empowerment and will be examined later in this chapter. At
this point, however, it is important to emphasise that challenging oppression has
been identified by many authors as the most important concept to apply in
terms of an empowering practice (Lee 1994; Breton 1994; Mullender and Ward
1991;Thompson 2006). According to Mullender and Ward, the key purpose of
empowering practice is to decrease and finally avoid any form of oppression.
Thompson (1997) agrees that successful empowerment practice involves
intervening on the cultural and structural level around the user and that
empowerment cannot therefore be achieved while using a one-to-one
intervention exclusively. However, Gutierrez and Ortega (1991) argue that
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empowerment is also possible on the individual or personal level through
one-to-one intervention, although the impact might differ from that identified
as structural empowerment. Therefore, while it may be possible to empower
service users on a personal level while using one-to-one interventions,
working towards cultural and structural empowerment through groupwork
and community work could bring about more sustainable forms of
empowerment, because structural and cultural oppression can be challenged.
LeBosse et al. (2004) identify various types of empowering practice, from
personal empowerment and family empowerment to organisational
empowerment and local community empowerment. Gutierrez and Ortega
(1991), in relation to social work and empowerment, examine the concept
differently, arguing that there are three interlinked levels of empowerment
involving different types of intervention. They write about the personal,
interpersonal and political levels of empowerment. This typology is useful
when taking into account the concepts of oppression and of sharing power.
Indeed, instead of arguing what type of action or processes constitute
'empowerment', this typology helps in conceptualising empowerment as a
continuum of skills and feelings that help service users in their liberation from
oppression, and therefore acknowledges that, although different levels of
empowerment lead to different outcomes, the levels are all legitimate and
necessary. (Gutierrez and Ortega 1991)
The personal level of empowerment could be described as focusing "on ways
in which individuals can develop feelings of personal power and self efficacy"
(Gutierrez and Ortega 1991:24). Personal empowerment is the first step for
empowerment:
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While empowerment is a multilevel construct that may be applied to
organisations, communities, and social policies, psychological
empowerment is the expression of this construct at the level of
individual persons. (Zimmerman and Rappaport 1988:726)
Personal empowerment therefore remains with the person and involves the
client or user gaining a personal feeling of power about aspects of their life. Even
though personal empowerment remains on the personal level, it is
nevertheless important for the client or user to understand the causes of
disempowerment on a higher level. As Lee (1991 :5) adds,
social work practice with people who experience oppression requires
theory that connects the personal and the political.
At this point, however, the concept of personal empowerment implies that a
service user, for example, feels empowered and strengthened with regard to
their personal conditions, but without gaining an understanding of the causes
of disempowerment. It is this form of empowerment that is commonly found
in the intervention plans of social workers from statutory social services
settings (Dominelli 1997).
The concept of interpersonal empowerment builds from the understanding of
personal empowerment: it requires that the individual feels empowered
within themselves, but also emphasises
the development of specific skills which allow individuals to be more
capable of influencing others. Skills development can involve such
things as training in problem solving or assertiveness (Hirayama 1985;
Sarri and DuRivage 1986;Shapiro 1984;Sherman and Wenocur 1983) or
learning how to influence the political process (Beck 1983; Mathis and
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Richan 1986). In some cases developing skills to increase both
interpersonal influence and political power can occur simultaneously
(Checkoway and Norsman 1986; Garvin 1985). (Gutierrez and Ortega
1991:25)
Political or structural empowerment, on the other hand,
emphasises the goal of social action and social change. Political
empowerment is based on both the personal and interpersonal levels of
empowerment, with an additional goal being the transfer of power
between groups in society. (Gutierrez and Ortega 1991:25)
Political or structural empowerment means that, not only do users or clients
feel more empowered personally (at the personal level of empowerment) and
have gained more social skills in order to change their lives, but they also act
collectively to change the power imbalance in society. Power is therefore a key
concept in understanding the term empowerment and will be explored
further below. It is important, however, to note that the literature about power
and its foundations is large, and definitions and conceptualisations often
differ widely. The aim of the next few pages is therefore to examine different
definitions and conceptualisations of power and to discuss them in the light of
the different conceptualisations of empowerment.
As explained above, the concept of empowerment can be defined differently
depending on the author. Staples (1990:30) defines empowerment as the
"process by which power is gained, developed, seized, facilitated," while
Mullender and Ward (1991:6), in contrast, bring a more political element to
the definition, emphasising the concept of change. For them, empowerment is
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not only through winning power - bringing to those who have been
oppressed the exercise of control over what happens to them - but
through transforming it.
The concept of power is central to the concept of empowerment. In the first
definition, Staples (1990) talks about gaining, developing, facilitating or giving
power and therefore refers to power as something that can be held or
possessed. In the second definition, from Mullender and Ward, the definition
of power is different because, instead of talking about possessing power, they
talk about transforming it. These two definitions of empowerment reflect
different understandings of power. The former reflects a one-dimensional or
pluralist view of power, whereas the latter definition, provided by Mullender
and Ward (1991), requires a more macro understanding of power. These two
ways of understanding power are set below and complement other typologies
that were examined during the course of this literature review.
The concept of power is also examined in this section, however, as in addition
to being essential to understanding the term empowerment, power is also
central to social work as a 'profession', Indeed, as Banks (2006:77) points out,
"while I caring professionals' may not be regarded as fully professional in
many people's eyes, and are given less status and recognition than, for
example, doctors, they do wield considerable power, particularly over service
users", and through welfare policy, social workers continue to maintain social
control (Clark 2005).
The concept of power therefore has more relevance than Simply
understanding the process of empowerment from the perspectives of a service
user and a social worker, that is to say, as an element that can result in the
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oppression of the service user by the social worker and, to a certain extent, of
the social worker by its agency (Bar-On 2002).
Barnes (1988) refers to many forms of power, for example political, military,
economic and ideological. He does not provide his own definition of power, but
states that power is "manifest in behaviours". Therefore, for Barnes, power is a
form of behaviour in which human beings engage when involved in activities
such as the army, politics and the economy. To analyse decision-making in
relation to power, Polsby refers to behaviour with a "stress on the study of
concrete, observable behaviours" (cited in Lukes 1974:12). Russel (1986:19) also
classifies power in regard to behaviour, although he expands his definition and
includes power as being "physical", originating from "reward and
punishment" or created through "propaganda". This manner of categorising
power complements the Barnes (1998) model, in that Barnes talks about how it
is applied, whereas Russel (1986) also talks about the setting for its
development. These two understandings of power, however, only cover the
actions and consequences: they omit to inquire about its roots and the ways it
exists in society.
In this respect, Hodas (1999) classifies power as having five sources: reward (in
the sense of withholding or giving something desired); coercive (when it is a
question of inflicting some kind of punishment); legitimate (when it is used in
relation to an institutional sanction, position or authority); referent (when it is
used for personal attraction) and expert (when it derives from superior skills or
competence). This definition of power can, however, only partly reflect the
situation in social work in so far that practitioners rarely use the referent power.
Indeed, most users of social services are not usually 'free' to choose their social
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workers or the service they need (Banks 2006), and therefore, perceiving social
workers as having 'referent' power would be inaccurate in this context. In
addition, social workers abiding by their codes of ethics (BA5W 2002)
emphasise the values 'service to humanity', 'human dignity and worth' and
'integrity', which are not in line with the utilisation of coercive power, although
some social workers may be seen as displaying it by using their statutory
power. Social workers, however, by their "semi-professional status" (Banks
2006) exert expert power over service users as well as legitimate power by the
functions they hold within an agency. Indeed, social workers have power over
service users in so far that they can withhold or provide a service to those in
need. As Rhodes (1986:134) explains in relation to ethical practice,
social workers must continue to make decisions despite inadequate
resources, case overloads, excessive paper work and a labyrinth of rules, all
of which contribute to a sense of helplessness and hopelessness.
Thus, social workers not only exert legitimate power over service users, but are
also operating within the legitimate power of the agency for which they work.
The case of excessive paperwork and rules and regulations emphasised by
Rhodes (1986) links well with Weber's understanding of power and
bureaucracy. For Weber (2002:230),
Bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to
destroy. Bureaucracy is the means of transforming social action into
rationally organized action. Therefore, as an instrument of rationally
organizing authority relations, bureaucracy was and is a power
instrument of the first order for one who controls the bureaucratic
apparatus. [...] Where administration has been completely
bureaucratized, the resulting system of domination is practically
indestructible.
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Bureaucracy and its relationship to power are therefore relevant to
understanding empowerment and disempowerment, especially in the statutory
sector, but are less appropriate in terms of examining these concepts in social
action settings where bureaucracy is less important. Further conceptualisations
of power must therefore be explored.
Wrong defines power as the "capacity of some persons to produce intended
and foreseen effects on others" (cited in Barnes 1988:6). This definition only
considers the personal point of view and neglects the social one, but it could
complement the definitions cited above. In his definition of power, Weber also
puts the emphasis on the personal level, but he adds questions about the
"relationship between individuals" when
power is the probability that one actor in a social relationship will be in
a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the
basis on which this probability rests. (cited in Barnes 1988:6)
Dahl (1957) also defines power according to the effect on a person. For him,
power can be defined in the following way:
A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that
B would not otherwise do. (Dahl 1957:202-3)
These definitions of power can be classified under what many authors call the
one-dimensional view of power (Lukes 1974; McNay 1994). The one-
dimensional view of power implies that only one element or dimension is
taken into consideration in the analysis of power relationships. Possession of
power is the key element of this view. Dahl's (1957) definition of power can be
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included under the umbrella of the one-dimensional view, in that his premise
is that one either possesses power or one does not. However, one-dimensional
views of power are not useful in understanding empowerment in social care
practice, and further definitions therefore need examination.
Polsby (1963) and Wolfinger (1960) also discuss this concept of the possession
of power through observable behaviours and decision-making processes, but while
talking about possession, they talk about a "pluralist view" (Lukes 1974). A
pluralist view, in its general sense, would imply more than one element in the
definition of any concept but stresses the importance of decision-making
(Lukes 2005). In relation to the pluralist view of power, Marshall (1998:449)
argues that
visible exercises of power may disguise the fact that some groups wield
power in less obvious ways and that expressed political preferences are
not necessarily equivalent to objective (or 'real') interests.
In addition, Dahl (1961) suggests that some groups or persons can hold power
in a more covert way, but that this form of power still has repercussions for
the other. Nevertheless, they still talk about possession of power, but add a
dimension that is less visible than the concept Dahl presents. Therefore, two
forms of power exist within these definitions that relate to the possession
itself: actual and potential power (Lukes 1974). Lukes, however, does not
totally agree with the use of the term 'pluralist' in these definitions, as both
forms (actual and potential power) "are capable of generating a non-pluralist
conclusion" (1974:11), since they incorporate only one dimension (possession)
in their conceptualisation of power. In other words, Lukes argues that the
term 'pluralist view' should not be used, as it incorporates only one element;
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it should instead be called a one-dimensional view, In contrast to a trulv
pluralist perspective, which would imply more than one element.
Lukes (2005:19) summarises a one-dimensional or pluralist view of power as
something that "involves a focus on behaviour in the making of decisions on
issues over which there is an observable conflict of (subjective) interests, seen
as express policy preference, revealed by political participations". The
pluralist and one-dimensional views of power are similar, although named
differently; they are often linked with the concept of 'zero sum', in that if one
individual or group or institution possesses power over another, the latter
cannot possess the same amount of power. The one-dimensional and pluralist
views of power (as defined by Dahl, Wolfinger, Polsby and Barnes) are also
closely related, in that they are observable in manifest behaviour and are
tangible or can be possessed.
For an understanding of power in relation to empowerment, the one-
dimensional and pluralist views of power could be acknowledged, as they can
be related to the definition raised by Staples (1990). Staples discussed gaining
power or being given power, where power is something one can possess.
Nevertheless, these definitions and conceptualisations of power are
insufficient for an understanding of structural empowerment (Gutierrez and
Ortega 1991; Mullender and Ward 1991); another level of understanding of
power is needed.
Foucau It (1983:217) argues that power is something social and structural rather
than individual. His notion of power can help in understanding structural
empowerment as presented in the work of Gutierrez and Ortega (1991),
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Mullender and Ward (1991) and the Centre for Social Action (2003).
Foucault's definition of power highlights "relationships between partners [... ]
and an ensemble of actions which induce others and follow from one another"
(1983:217). As Foucault maintains, power is
something externally 'held' [...] embodied in a person, a group, an
institution or a structure to be used for individual, group, organisation or
class purpose, a "system of domination exercised by one group over
another". (cited in Townley 1994:6)
Power is therefore not possessed, but is exercised by occupying a series of
positions within society. Power struggles can be found among individuals in
day-to-day reality, but their sources remain structural. Power struggles share
common characteristics and are not limited to one place or context, although
they will differ in degree and extent:
In practice, for the worker, this [empowering practice] means
undergoing awareness training and learning to deconstruct the
oppressive ideologies which are embedded not only in the attitude
absorbed by users but in their own personal behaviour and
professional practice, and institutionalised in the procedures of their
employing organisation (Mullender and Ward 1995:118).
Foucault (1983:112) states that
the main objective of these [power] struggles is to attack not so much
'such or such' an institution of power, or group or elite or class but
rather a technique, a form of power.
Without giving a definition, Foucault rejects the possessum of power and
emphasises power struggles instead. Although the concept of 'power struggles'
is also examined by conflict theorists such as Marx and Marxist-inspired
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writers (Lukes 2005), what Foucault means in this quotation is that, because
power is not possessed, it is useless to attack someone who seems to have
power, because in fact that person does not possess the power, but instead
perpetuates it within society. This differs from a Marxist view of power that
implies that it is the ruling class that own the means of production that
possess power over the proletariat (Giddens 2006). However, power,
according to Foucault, is something intangible and subtle but does not simply
refer to class struggle. When talking about power, Foucault (1983) does not
talk about possession on a personal level. He stresses the importance of
struggles across different forms of power, rather than possession itself. Social
work has been identified as a form of power by Donzelot (1979), an early
Foucaultian scholar, who asserts that social work and other philanthropic
activities, under a 'preventative' cover, exert power through the control of
marginal families. Indeed, Donzelot (1979:197-8) explains that social services
allow[s] the system to dissolve the resistance of families to the
placements that are imposed, on behalf of the necessary socialization of
adolescents; to interdict the lines of escape that are constituted by
irresponsibility of parents with regard to infant children, on behalf of
the necessity of a familial education; to perfect a new system in the
utilization of the family for normalization practices.
Foucault and other Foucaultian scholars therefore move to a higher level of
analysis. Societies, groups, structures or organisations, where the effects of
power are observable, are in fact not really powerful in the sense that they
'possess' the power: their power is apparent mainly because of the
relationships they have with these institutions or groups. Power is therefore
something that we perceive and experience because of the way society is
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structured. In this sense, Danaher et al. (2000:xiv), interpreting Foucault,
define power as
not a thing that is held and used by individual or groups. Rather, it is
both a complex flow and a set of relations between different groups
and areas of society which changes with circumstances and time.
Power, according to Foucault, is in fact relational and not something that
exists on its own, yet it has a strong effect on people's lives. Foucault can be
useful in understanding power and empowerment as applied to social work
practice (Chambon et al. 1999). Nevertheless, Foucault's understanding of
power carries one particular limitation that is worth noting: Foucault does
not manage to give a full account of both structure and human activity
(Layder 1994). In other words, the term 'power', as understood by Foucault,
allows for little social change, as human beings are perceived as powerless in
the big picture of power relationships. As Layder (1994:103) explains,
The person is a container whose self identity and psychological interior
is largely a product of the relation of power, discourse and practice in
which he or she is enmeshed.
Foucault's understanding of power can therefore undermine the basis for
progressive political intervention (Smart 1985), as actors are seen as bearing
no weight in the balance of power and social action. Empowerment, based on
Foucault's understanding of power, is therefore only possible by increasing
resistance toward the mechanisms of power.
A theory that attempts to overcome the problems between structure and
personal action is Giddens' Structuration theory. Indeed, Structuration theory
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intrinsically related structure to action and VIce versa (Elliot 2001) and
therefore facilitated the notions of challenging structural oppression and of
structural empowerment. Giddens (2002a:238) explains that
The concept of Structuration involved that of the duality of structure,
which relates to the fundamentally recursive character of social life,
and expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency.
Therefore, the constraining structure according to Foucault is rejected and
replaced by a structure that is both enabling and controlling (Giddens 2002a).
As Giddens explains,
power is expressed in the capabilities of actors to make certain
'accounts count' and to enact or resist sanctioning processes.
Empowerment, according to Giddens' Structuration theory, would be made
possible by the social workers' ability to enable the service user to understand
the causes of oppression, and in line with Foucault, resist power relationships.
Giddens, however, brings an emphasis that differs from Foucault's work:
while in Foucault's terms, resistance is the means as well as the end of
challenging power relationships, Giddens emphasises that resistance is only
the means and that the end is a (however slight) change in the structure itself.
Indeed, Giddens (2002a:240) explains that "all social actors, no matter how
lowly, have some degree of penetration of the social forms which oppress
them". Therefore, for Giddens, all social actors have opportunities to make
changes on the structure and therefore also have the possibility not only to
gain power (Staple 1990) but also to transform the system (Mullender and
Ward 1991).
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This chapter has examined various definitions and understandings of the
notions of power and empowerment. However, even though power and
empowerment are central to social work practice, they only constitute one
aspect of the social work values and ethics that underpin professional social
work. The next chapter therefore aims to examine the literature around ethics
and values in social work as well as some of the theoretical foundations that
underpin ethical social work practice.
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Chapter Four
Ethics and Values in Social Work Practice
For decades, ethical issues have been a problem for many social care
practitioners, managers and researchers. In the UK, a variety of resources
have evolved to address the issue of social care ethics. In the 1980s, a
government committee was created to define social workers' roles and tasks
(National Institute for Social Work 1982). A White Paper published in 1998 on
the modernisation of social services in England recommended the
establishment of a General Social Care Council, a governmental body to
regulate the practice and conduct of social workers and social practitioners
(DOH 1998). A code of ethics for social workers has existed since 1975 (BASW
1975), and a new Code of Practice for Social Care Workers is now forming the
basis for social work and social care ethics in social care agencies (GSCC 2004).
Furthermore, many agencies and organisations offering social care and social
services provide their workers with staff handbooks, internal codes of conduct
and ethical guidelines for practice. However, Strom-Gottfried and D'Aprix
(2006) have noted that the plethora of codes of ethics and codes of conduct
have failed to address explicitly the issues faced by those regulated by them.
On the other hand, many books about ethics are available with relevance for
different practice contexts (for example social work, youth and community
work, or counselling)', This includes one volume specific to social action
work, which defines the role of practitioners in this particular setting
.. The following examples of this type of resource were consulted in orderto cast some lighton theethicsof social care:
Ethics and Values in Socialworlc (Banks 1995): Ethical Issues in Social Worlc (Hugman 1995); Ethical Issues in Youth
Worlc (Banks 1999); Ethical Dilemmas in SocialWorlc Practice (Rhodes 1986).
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(Mullender and Ward 1991). The Centre for Social Action was created at De
Montfort University in 1995 in order to develop better practice, research and
knowledge transfer in the field of social action, with emphasis on the principle
of empowerment.
Despite all these resources, social care practitioners have difficulty resolving
ethical issues in their work contexts, and their experience shows that many
ethical dilemmas still occur (Rhodes 1986; Banks 2001; Banks and Williams
2005; Banks 2006). Social care practitioners' roles and conduct do not always
appear to be clearly defined, even when they have recourse to a code of ethics.
Social care practice continues to be ethically problematic. As Balloch et al.
(1999:1) have pointed out,
Scandals given prominence in the media, particularly in child
protection and residential care, have focused attention on the training
and regulation of social care staff and stimulated the demand for
performance indicators, measures of quality and guidelines for good
practice.
This is partly because none of the above documents have focused enough
attention on what makes social care practice ethical. While these publications
do provide general guidelines and typologies of different types of dilemmas
and act as good reminders of professional values, they do not provide
sufficient practical help in solving ethical dilemmas, especially as social care
practice occurs in different settings and is highly regulated.
This study arose from the inadequacy of such broad guidelines in helping
practitioners to resolve the ethical dilemmas they face in their practices. The
main aim of this research project was to investigate and compare
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practitioners' experiences in relation to their ethics and conduct across three
different social-practice settings: statutory social services, non-governmental
organisations (voluntary sector) and social action settings. A further aim was
to identify differences and similarities in practitioners' decision-making
processes in these settings and to explore the issue of the interface between
the three sectors.
This chapter will begin with an exploration and clarification of the key
definitions and theoretical perspectives underlying the research as they were
understood at the beginning of the research process. Concepts of ethics and
ethical dilemmas will be examined, followed by an examination of the
concepts of power and empowerment.
Ethics
For decades, the study of ethics has attracted the attention of the social work
profession, not just in the UK but also internationally. In the English context,
the Care Standards Act 2000, which led to the establishment of the General
Social Care Council, aimed to protect service users, employers and social
workers/social care practitioners through the publication of codes of ethics.
Many authors provide frameworks for ethical decision-making processes
(Legault 1997; Goovaerts 2003; Windheuser 2003), while some others
emphasise the importance of thorough assessments of documentation policies
and procedures (Reamer 2005), with the emphasis on dialogue (Rhodes 1986),
moral reasoning (Kaplan 2006) and reflective and reflexive practice (Banks
2006) for resolving real-life ethical issues. However, the actual situation in
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England remains the same: practitioners work in difficult situations that often
result in ethical dilemmas.
Contributing to this situation is the complexity and diversity of social work
and social care practice. Banks (2001:1) states that
Social work has always been a difficult occupation to define because it
has embraced work in a number of different sectors (public, private,
independent, voluntary), a multiplicity of different settings (residential
homes, area offices, community development projects), with workers
taking on a range of different tasks (caring, controlling, empowering,
campaigning, assessing, managing) for a variety of different purposes
(redistribution of resources to those in need, social control and
rehabilitation of the deviant, prevention or reduction of social
problems).
This is also supported by Rhodes (1986), who adds that special areas of
competence in social work and social care are less well defined than they are
in other professions, such as medicine; indeed, when philosophers refer to the
social realm, ethical issues are perhaps less clear cut than is the case in
medicine. It is usually more straightforward to realise that an ethical error has
been made when looking at physical consequences, rather than emotional or
mental ones. Moreover, because the social welfare system is complicated and
encompasses many sectors (each one employing people with different roles,
competencies and qualifications), the elaboration of a code of conduct and
code of ethics, that is the development of guidelines on ethical decision-
making and frameworks for resolving ethical dilemmas, has always been an
issue in social work and social care practice (Banks 1995).
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Ethics, Ethical Dilemmas, Issues and Problems in Social Work
According to Webster's Dictionary (1998), ethics can be defined as follows: i)
the discipline dealing with what is good and bad and with moral duty and
obligation, and ii) sets or theories of moral principles or values. This definition
does not distinguish between different kinds of ethics or the various specific
fields to which ethics can be applied. Another definition is provided by Banks
(2006), who defines ethics as the study of morals, the behavioural norms
people follow concerning what is right or wrong, good or bad. Both these
definitions are similar and highlight three key concepts: morals, values and
behavioural norms. Philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and Kant have also
defined ethics as the study of rightness and wrongness (Vardy and Grosch
1999). Therefore, the term 'ethics' tends to be defined differently by different
authors, as Bohme (2001:11) notes:
The field of ethics is divided up in various ways. Such classifications
have to do with a degree of universality, for example. Thus one speaks
of general and specific ethics. But distinctions are also made, according
to the addressee, between individual ethics and social ethics, or
according to the type of behaviour, between the ethics of striving or the
ethics of virtue, and regulatory ethics or moral philosophy.
For the purpose of this research, ethics is understood as being not only
comprised of morals, values and behavioural norms, but also of judgements
about what can be considered to be right or wrong, morally acceptable or not,
and of moral philosophy.
Ethical dilemmas are the result of conflicting ethical concerns, and they
emerge because of conflict between different values: they are practical
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conflicts that imply at least two possible courses of action. Banks and Williams
(2005:1006) refer to a dilemma as a "choice between two equally unwelcome
alternatives". The alternatives, even when they take the form of practical
situations, can be understood on a theoretical level in the realm of philosophy,
and therefore ethical dilemmas can be solved by using different moral
perspectives (Rhodes 1986; Banks 2006; Becket and Maynard 2005; Clark 2000;
Hugman 2005), some of which will be covered in the next section. Therefore, a
dominant moral perspective used in ethical problem-solving strongly
influences the decision-making process and therefore the course of action
taken, which might differ if another perspective were chosen.
Ethical problems often emerge from a confrontation of two opposing values
conflicting with one another (Kimmel 1988; Banks 2006; Becket and Maynard
2005). These values can be personal, professional, social or even explicitly
philosophical and taken from a moral perspective. Becket and Maynard (2005)
refer to "values in tension" when societal values, agency values, professional
values or personal values conflict with one another but values in tension
potentially occur in the same category, for example between two different
professional values. Ethical dilemma therefore implies at least two different
ways to resolve a situation that involves two different possible solutions or
two opposite actions. Banks (2001) writes that ethical dilemmas occur
when the social worker sees herself as faced with a choice between two
unequally unwelcome alternatives which may involve a conflict of
moral principles and it is not clear which choice will be the right one.
(Banks 2001:11)
Banks and Williams (2005) make a useful distinction between ethical
dilemmas, ethical issues and ethical problems. While the first is clearly a
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choice between two equally unwelcome alternatives (Banks 1995; Banks 2001;
Banks 2006), ethical problems evolve around a "situation where a decision
had to be made but where there was no dilemma for the person making the
decision" (Banks and Williams 2005:1011). An ethical issue, on the other hand,
arises when a situation again involves an ethical dimension, but when this
dimension is unarticulated by, or even unconscious to, the person
experiencing the situation, and results in no attempt at all to act more
ethically. However, most literature around ethics and social work concerns
the concept of ethical dilemmas where two courses of action are in conflict,
and therefore, at this point, the research focuses solely on the concepts of
ethics and'ethical dilemmas'.
As explained earlier, ethical problems often emerge from a confrontation of
two opposing values conflicting with one another (Kimmel 1988; Banks 2006;
Becket and Maynard 2005). These values, when in conflict, foster the
emergence of ethical dilemmas. However, Rhodes (1986) raises the prospect
that the work of social workers is often influenced more by the organisation's
rules than by the client's needs or social work values. Banks (2006) also
identifies that ethical issues in social work arise in relation to the broader
context when she defines four different areas of professional practice in which
dilemmas take place: social workers are often faced with issues around
individual rights and welfare; issues around public welfare, which include the
rights and interests of non-service users; issues around equality, difference
and structural oppression; and issues around professional roles, boundaries
and relationships. Indeed, the power of the practitioner is an important
element in conflict identified by Rhodes (1986) and Banks (1997). Moreover,
social care practitioners in general have a multitude of roles, and there is often
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conflict between these roles. For example, is it better to adopt an empowering
and enabling approach or a controlling one? This sort of question often leads
to ethical dilemmas. Finally, Banks (1997) identifies that dilemmas often occur
between the values of the person, their professional values, those of the
agency and societal values. Indeed, as mentioned above, many people
employed in social care practice are regulated or influenced by elements
external to them, for example policies and procedures, funding and codes of
ethics. However, the social care practitioner has additional influences, such as
their personal values and professional expertise. These values may often be in
conflict, thus causing ethical dilemmas.
Banks's (1997) explanation of ethics in social care practice is interesting in that
it identifies the dimensions of ethical conflicts and dilemmas and the
important elements of ethical dilemmas but omits to define the primary root
of these elements. Her explanation of the elements of ethical dilemmas is
useful in identifying the situation, but is less useful in weighing up solutions
for the resolution of ethical dilemmas. In addition to examining different
types of ethical dilemmas in social care, another way of examining ethical
decision-making is to explore different moral theories. The next sections will
examine some of the most popular moral theories and their applications to
social work practice.
Moral Perspectives for Understanding Social Work Ethics
For thousands of years, moral philosophers have tried to develop theories that
would accommodate citizens when faced with dilemmas or difficult
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situations." These moral theories are now known as moral perspectives and
can be used to guide people to behave rightly towards each other and also to
influence perceptions about rightness and wrongness. The adherence to
certain moral perspectives as opposed to others also influences the
development of codes of ethics and codes of conduct (Banks 2006), and
therefore, moral philosophies are of particular interest for this research.
Ethical conduct can be defined in different ways depending on the many
traditions in philosophy that can be used to provide an understanding of the
nature of ethics. These traditions have been identified in various ways by
different authors. For example, Wall (1974) isolated eight kinds of ethical or
moral traditions: religious ethics, intuitionism, formalism, naturalism,
emotivism, the 'good reason approach', prescriptivism and existentialism.
Vardy and Grosch (1999) explored ten that are, for the most part, different
from those examined by Wall. The study of ethics has therefore developed
according to different 'tangents' in a similar way to the development of
sociology in relation to the influences of Marxism, structuralism, symbolic
interactionism and so on. Each of these different moral philosophies, as
applied to the study of ethics, has its strengths and weaknesses, and each one
provides guidance in understanding what is good or bad through different
lenses. Rhodes (1986), in relation to social work practice, examines utilitarian
theories, Kantian theories, rights-based theories, Marxist-based theories,
intuitionism theory and virtue-based or relationship-based theory. On the
other hand, Banks (2006) categorises moral philosophies into only two, that is
to say 'principle-based ethics', which includes Kantian and utilitarian theories,
and 'character- and relationship-based ethics', which includes virtue ethics,
5 Examplesof these theories includethe Kantian approach, utilitarian ethics, virtue ethics, ethics
of care, feminist ethics and emotivism.
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feminist ethics and ethics of care. Finally, Clark (2006) explains that social
work ethics is ruled by three families of moral theories, that is to say the duty-
based (Kantian ethics), the outcome-based (utilitarian ethics) and virtue ethics.
The best-utilised perspectives in social work and social care practice are
Kantian and utilitarian ethics (Banks 1995; Wilks 2005), although virtue ethics
and other philosophies deriving from it have begun to regain popularity
during the last decade (Rhodes 1986; McBeath and Webb 2002; Houston 2003;
Clark 2006). Starting from a combination of Rhodes's (1986) and Banks's
(2006) categorisations of moral philosophy for social work, the following
section will explore the fundamentals of Kantian and utilitarian ethics under
the umbrella of 'principle-based ethics' and will then go on to the character-
and relationship-based ethics and examine the rudiments of intuitionism and
emotivism perspectives as well as virtue ethics.
Principle-based Ethics: Utilitarian and Kantian Ethics
Although Hume (1711-1776) refers to "utility" and Hutcheson (1694-1746) to
lithe greatest good for the greatest number" in defining the notions of right and
wrong, it was only from Bentham (1748-1832) that the concept of utilitarian
ethics emerged, in particular in his book A Fragment on Government (Vardy and
Grosch 1999). Many critiques of utilitarianism appeared, including those
written by Mill (1806-1873) and Ross (1877-1971). Although many versions of
this perspective were developed, the essence of utilitarianism influenced many
of the values that were translated into codes of practice and regulations
applicable to the social care profession. Utilitarianism as a moral philosophy is
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categorised under 'principle-based' ethics because the right course of action can
be predicted based on principles of utility.
In a nutshell, utilitarian philosophy is based on the premise that
a particular action is justified as being right by showing that it is in
accord with some moral rules [... ] and that [... ] moral rule is shown to
be correct by showing that the recognition of that rule promotes the
ultimate end. (Urmson, in Foot 1990:130)
This is usually summarised in the phrase, "The greatest happiness for the
greatest number" (Vardy and Grosch 1999:63). As Almond (1985:7) points out,
For a utilitarian, a multiplicity of individual interests - what is good for
each member of society - make up the common interest - what is good
for all, or at least the most. [... ] For the utilitarian, then, the ethically
right action is whatever maximizes the welfare or happiness of the
greatest number of people affected by it. Utilitarianism is a form of
ethical consequentialism, in that it makes right or wrong depending on
the consequences or outcome of an action, as opposed to either the
means by which it is achieved or the nature of the action itself.
The ultimate end in terms of utilitarian moral philosophy is that which serves
the majority of the people involved. Therefore, the utilitarian approach weighs
right or wrong actions by examining the consequences they have on society in
general.
Utilitarian moral philosophy claims that the greatest good for the greatest
number of people would be the right thing to do. The present system of social
welfare is largely influenced by the utilitarian tradition of moral philosophy in
that many social policies and budgets aim to offer services to the greatest
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number of service users. In addition, various codes of conduct are influenced by
utilitarian values (Banks 2006; Rhodes 1986). For example, the following
statement can be found in the draft code of conduct and practice for social care
workers:
As a social care worker you must, to the best of your ability' balance
the rights of service users and carers with the interests of society. This
includes: balancing rights of service users whose behaviour represents
a risk to themselves or other people with the paramount interest of
public safety. (GSSC 2002:4-5)
This ethical tradition, however, often clashes with the user's needs and the self-
determination of the clients or their right to confidentiality (Rhodes 1986),
which is often referred to in terms of Kantian ethics. Therefore, while the
utilitarian tradition has acquired an important degree of influence over the
provision of social care services, it only provides a framework for
understanding ethical decision-making, especially in relation to concepts such
as resource distribution and fairness (Banks 2001) and social problems (Rhodes
1986). In addition, the utilitarian approach to ethics has been criticised for not
taking into account the personal relationship element of social work, and thus,
'pure' utilitarianism regarding social work has not been well developed (Banks
2006).
Kantian ethics, on the other hand, is usually related to concepts such as respect
for the person and self-determination (Banks 1995), and as Hugman points out,
it is also concerned with fairness: "Kant's categorical imperative can be seen as
a statement that implies fairness as a moral good, because it asserts that what
applies for one person should apply for everyone in similar circumstances"
(2005:16). However, Kantian ethics is usually perceived as different to
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utilitarian ethics in so far as it claims that right action is based not on principles
of utility but on principles of good will and self-determination, invariably
regarded as a core social work value (Preston-Shoot 2002, in Ellis and Rogers
2004).
A Kantian approach supposes that the individual should be perceived as self-
determining and fully able to take his or her own decisions (Hugman 2005).
Kant believes in "the assertion that nothing is unconditionally good except a
good will, whose worth is entirely separable from the value of the results it
brings about" (cited in Norman 1985:97). Norman goes on to say that
This initial claim derives its plausibility from the widely held idea that
moral evaluations focus primarily on people's intention. People are not
morally blamed if, through no fault of their own, their good intentions
lead to unfortunate results. (Norman 1985:97)
Rachels (1986:115) adds that, according to Kant,
Humans have an intrinsic worth, i.e. dignity because they are rational
agents - that is free agents capable of making their own decisions,
setting their own goals, and guiding their conduct by reason.
Therefore, according to Kant, if human beings follow their self-determination,
because they know what is good for them, they should thus take a decision that
is good for them. In terms of ethical social care practice, a Kantian approach
would imply that the social worker should respect the user's self-determination
(Rhodes 1986). Kant's moral philosophy is underpinned by an understanding
that "we should treat others as beings who have ends (that is choices and
desires) not just as objects of our own ends" (Banks 1995:28). Therefore, acting
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ethically, according to Kant, is acting for the interests of the user only, not for
the interests of the practitioner or the agency.
An emphasis on self-determination is important with regard to the Kantian
tradition of moral philosophy, but so are the principles of acceptance, a non-
judgemental attitude and confidentiality (Banks 1995). These Kantian principles
were in fact part of the values of social work as defined by the Central Council
for Education and Training in Social Work (CCETSW) in terms of the
requirements for social work training. Indeed, all students studying for the
Diploma in Social Work needed, among other values, to show a commitment to
the
value and dignity of individuals, right to respect, privacy and
confidentiality, right of individual and family to choose. (CCETSW,
cited in Banks 1995:38)
These values are directly inspired by Kant's moral philosophy and are very
important in day-to-day social work:
Kant aims to ensure that we eliminate self-interest in the particular
situation in which we find ourselves. (Vardy and Grosch 1999:57-8)
Nevertheless, social workers and social care practitioners also have to follow
different guidelines and procedures prescribed by their agencies, and issues
may occur in relation to the application of Kant's approach in practice. Banks
(1995) stated that the interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy could pose a
problem for practical ethics because principles of self-determination and
confidentiality often clash with existing rules and regulations. Warburton
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supports the view that Kant's moral principles do not always yield satisfactory
solutions to moral questions.
If, for example, I have a duty always to tell the truth, and also a duty to
protect my friend, Kant's theory would not show me what I ought to
do when these two duties conflict. If a madman carrying an axe asked
me where my friend was, my first inclination would be to tell him a lie.
To tell the truth would be to shirk the duty I have to protect my friend.
But on the other hand, according to Kant, to tell a lie, even in such an
extreme situation, would be an immoral act: I have an absolute duty
never to lie. (Warburton 1999:47)
Kant's moral philosophy may therefore clash with other values of practice such
as confidentiality and other values translated through guidelines, regulations
and internal workplace policies and procedures. As Rhodes (1986) explains,
Kantian ethics does not always fit with the institutions and political structures
in which social work takes place. Webb and McBeath (1990) also agree that
Kantian ethics do not fully fit the social work tasks and roles because of the
relationship of power between the social worker and the service user.
Consequently, despite an important contribution to the fields of ethics,
principle-based approaches do not seem to answer fully the needs of
practitioners faced with ethical dilemmas, mainly because they either omit to
take into consideration the context in which social work takes place or the
relationship in which social work intervention takes place. In addition, many
authors point out that, although the typology used may change slightly, many
ethical conflicts in social work practice evolved between the rights and welfare
of several people against the rights and welfare of one service user (Banks 2006;
Becket and Maynard 2005; Rhodes 1986). Consequently, since different
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principles are sometimes at issue, it is relevant to examine another approach to
social work ethics: relationship- and character-based ethics.
Relationship- and Character-based Approaches to Ethics
The general terms 'character-based' ethics and 'relationship-based' ethics are
usually directly related to the person facing the ethical dilemma as opposed to a
set of 'principles' used to guide the action (as explored in the section above).
Character- and relationship-based ethical systems generally refer to a variety of
moral theories such as virtue ethics and ethics of care, but also include moral
theories such as intuitionism ethics because of the nature of this particular
theory not relying on a set of beliefs that guide the action. Since 'ethics of care'
is usually mainly concerned with 'feminist ethics', and because an examination
of gender is not included in this research, the following section will explore the
two main schools of thought related to character-based ethics, that is to say
intuitionism on the one hand and virtue ethics on the other.
Intuitionism is an umbrella term and refers to various moral perspectives that
believe that there are no rational systems for resolving ethical issues and that
ethical decision-making thus rests on intuition (Rhodes 1986). Emotivism is a
form of intuitionism and can be helpful in order to understand social care
practice. Vardy and Grosch (1999:110) state that
emotivism is probably the best-known meta-ethical theory! in that it
focuses exclusively on the language being used and the meanings
e , Emotlvlsm as a moral philosophy Isclassified within meta-ethics. as it refers to an analysis thattakes place afterthe
ethicaldilemma hasoccurred.
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being suggested, and not at all on the rightness or wrongness of the
character of the person, or the principles and purposes followed.
As opposed to principle-based ethics, emotivism or intuitionism (I shall use the
terms interchangeably) does not try to prescribe the types of behaviour that
could be considered right or wrong, but instead tries to understand that it
depends on the person facing the dilemma. Rhodes (1986:39) explains that "the
appeal of this approach is that it enables us to act flexibly without 'sacrificing' a
client to a moral principle. In some situations, we may have a 'gut' feeling that
we must, say, preserve confidentially, even though we cannot find an adequate
justification." The intuitionist perspective acknowledges that what can be
perceived as good by one person can be interpreted as bad by another. Since the
purpose of the research was to explore the ethical issues experienced by social
care practitioners from a variety of fields, this moral philosophy could be
appropriately used in this particular research context. Macintyre (1999)
embodies emotivism within what he calls "impersonal criteria". He explains
that what is good or bad can be understood as a preference for certain
individuals. He also maintains that what is most important in relation to the
emotivist moral perspective is not what is morally good or bad, but rather what
the 'speaker' or 'hearer' perceives or feels about what is good or bad. For
emotivists, ethics is therefore very subjective and depends on the relationship
between the people involved in the dilemma. Vardy and Grosch (1999:82)
define emotivism as
the moral theory based on people's emotive response to other people
[... ] Emotive response here simply means a person's feelings about
something. Hence emotivism is concerned principally, if not
exclusively, with how people feel about something.
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Emotivism is a philosophy that can help in understanding the experience of
social care practitioners and social workers. Indeed, as mentioned, the system of
social welfare varies throughout England (Banks 2006), and social care
practitioners and social workers generally hold different values depending on
their training, personal histories or fieldwork. Therefore, using emotivism as a
moral perspective to understand ethics in social care practice in England would
enable researchers, practitioners and philosophers to understand that there are
no 'right' or 'wrong' answers and that, instead, what is considered to be right or
wrong depends on personal interpretations of a given situation. However, there
are some weaknesses within emotivism as related to this research, since codes
of practice and codes of ethics would not have much application. Additionally,
because emotivism claims the concept of 'personal preference', it neglects to
take into consideration the culture and structure of the society that shapes
individuals (Thompson 1997). Rhodes (1986:39), in a similar vein, points out
that the weakness of the approach is that "we may find ourselves acting on the
basis of prejudice or personal whim". Therefore, even though ethical
approaches under the umbrella of intuitionism provides an explanation for
ethics and moral dilemmas, it is not very useful when a practitioner is faced
with a dilemma in practice. Another form of a character- or relationship-based
approach to ethics is 'virtue' ethics.
Virtue ethics derives from the works of Plato (c.427BC) and Aristotle (c.384BC),
who defined morality around the question of character (i.e. what sort of person
should one be?) (Vardy and Grosch 1999). Morse (1999:50) explains that virtue
theorists argue that
an individual's action in a given moral situation follows from the character
traits which he or she has developed through the course of his or her life.
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Ideally, a person strives to develop a set of positive character traits which
lead to moral act, and these are known as the virtues.
As Warburton (1999:54) points out,
Unlike Kantians and Utilitarians, who typically concentrate on the
rightness or wrongness of particular actions, virtue theorists focus on
character and are interested in the individual's life as a whole. The
central question for virtue theorist is 'how should I live?' The answer
they give to this question is: cultivate the virtues. It is only by cultivating
the virtues that you will flourish as a human being.
Virtue ethics is a form of moral approach that does not take into consideration
the action and the reason for the action, but instead emphasises the importance
of 'character' and personality, which is the product of a fine balance, a mean
between vice and excess (Hugman 2005). For the virtue ethicist, a good person
will act in a good way, not because of their principles or duty, but because they
are a good person. As Banks (2006:55) comments, a person will not tell a lie,
not because of some abstract principles stating 'you shall not lie' or because
on this occasion telling the truth will produce a good result, but because they
do not want to be the sort of person who tells lies.
Virtue ethics was the main moral perspective until the eighteenth century, but
lost popularity with the emergence of modem moral theories such as Kantian,
utilitarian and, in particular, emotivist moral perspectives (MacIntyre 1985;
Lynch and Lynch 2006). However, it regained popularity from the second half
of the twentieth century with the publication of such books as Modern Moral
Philosophy (Anscombe 1958) and After Virtue (MacIntyre 1985), which claim a
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return to virtue ethics from a reaction against consequentialist and deontologist
moral theories (cited in Vardy and Grosh 1999). Virtue ethics is nowadays
associated with Aristotle and MacIntyre (Lynch and Lynch 2006).
MacIntyre tries to revive 'virtue' ethics, as he believes that previous moral
philosophies have failed to find the truth about rightness and wrongness:
The most striking feature of contemporary moral utterance is that so
much of it is used to express disagreements; and the most striking
feature of the debates in which these disagreements are expressed is
their interminable character. I do not mean by this just that such
debates go on and on and on - although they do - but also that they
apparently can find no terminus. There seems to be no rational way of
securing moral agreement in our culture. (MacIntyre 1985:6)
As noted above in the introduction to the various moral philosophies, each of
the perspectives used poses different solutions and problems in relation to
ethical issues. This is exactly what MacIntyre points out in After Virtue (1985).
From this starting point, he offers quite a different perspective, arguing a case
against the emotivist moral perspective and other moral philosophies
developed during the Enlightenment (including the Kantian and utilitarian
perspectives presented above), because these moral perspectives are studied -
and used to debate ethical issues - outside their historical contexts. He
illustrates his point in arguing that
We all too often still treat the moral philosophers of the past as
contributors to a single debate with a relatively unvarying subject-
matter, treating Plato and Hume and Mill as contemporaries both of
ourselves and of each other. This leads to an abstraction of these
writers from the cultural and social milieus in which they lived and
thought and so the history of their thought acquires a false
independence from the rest of the culture. Kant ceases to be part of the
history of Prussia, Hume is no longer a Scotsman. Far from the
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standpoint of moral philosophy as we conceive it these characteristics
have become irrelevances. (MacIntyre 1985:11)
In addition to opposing the use of modem moral perspectives in ethical
debates, MacIntyre (1985) argues against the notion of right and wrong being a
matter of personal preference (emotivism), or that of ethics being decided on
the basis of the concepts of rights (Kantianism) or utility (utilitarianism).This
rejection is particularly emphasised in his thesis when he discusses that ethics
grounded on an emotivist perspective cannot be understood as being purely an
"expression of personal preference", as human beings, according to him, are
very often involved in manipulative relationships that would affect judgement
about preferences. As a result of this analysis, MacIntyre (1985) emphasises his
claim for a return to virtue ethics, to which virtues, according to him, must be
embedded within "practices" and "traditions" in order to develop morally
good conduct in society. Therefore, in addition to taking into consideration
what he calls the "narrative" or historical context, MacIntyre points out that it is
essential to incorporate the concepts of "practices" and "traditions" into the
development of virtues.
MacIntyre (1985:187) defines practice as
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that
form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve
excellence, and human conception of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended.
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In order to illustrate his understanding of the concept, MacIntyre uses practical
examples:
Tick-rae-toe is not an example of a practice in this sense, nor is
throwing a football with skill; but the game of football is, and so is
chess. Bricklaying is not a practice; architecture is. Planting turnips is
not a practice; farming is. So are the enquiries of physics, chemistry and
biology, and so is the work of the historian, and so are painting and
music. (MacIntyre 1985:187)
Practices are therefore sets of activities that are recognised by groups of people
practising them and that provide internal goods. Goods internal to practice
include elements such as analytical skills, strategic imagination, competitive
intensity and reasoning. Examples of goods external to practice are money,
prestige and power (MacIntyre 1985). Social work could fit into the definition of
'practice' as understood by MacIntyre. First, social work involves a "coherent
and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity"
(MacIntyre 1985:187). Second, it includes goods (or gains) internal to its
practice, such as analytical skills, the capacity to evaluate, self-awareness,
creativity, patience and compassion (Vass 1996). Third, social work is a
profession that strives to excel in its practice: this can be examined through the
multitude of reports on social work practice, the governing bodies and different
practice committees (see chapter one). Finally, there is continuity in the activity
and an underlying historical development in which skills continue to build
from generation to generation "with the result that human powers to achieve
excellence, and human conception of the ends and goods involved, are
systematically extended" (MacIntyre 1985:187). As explored in Chapter Two,
social work practice has taken place within a historical context and has
continued to evolve since the beginning of "modern" social work in 1921
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(Payne and Shardlow 2002). However, practice, in the moral perspective
developed by Maclntyre, is not sufficient for the development of the virtues
necessary for moral practice. In order to evolve, practice needs to take place
within a tradition. MacIntyre does not, however, provide any definition of his
understanding of tradition, as Porter comments:
Clearly, any study of MacIntyre's thought must take account of the
central place that he gives to the concept of tradition. Yet this task is
complicated by the fact that, even though MacIntyre discusses tradition
extensively, he never defines the term nor does he situate his account
of tradition in the context of other recent discussions. (cited in Murphy
2003:38)
Horton and Mendus (1994) elaborate on MacIntyre's conception of tradition.
Indeed, a 'tradition' can be understood as a set of institutions that are the
"medium by which such practices are shaped and transmitted across
generations" (Horton and Mendus 1994:10).
These traditions can be religious, economic, aesthetic or geographical
(MacIntyre 1999). In other words, the concept of 'tradition' as understood by
MacIntyre (1985) forms the structure and culture in which society is shaped.
MacIntyre's main point is that ethics is not only a question of personal
preference, but instead is influenced by individuals as well as the institutions to
which individuals belong and the culture and structure of their society. This
belief reinforces MacIntyre's rejection of emotivism and other modem moral
philosophies, as they do not include any historical context in their uses.
Tradition is therefore very important in MacIntyre's thesis, as it bridges the gap
between the concept of practice (where ethical practice would occur on a
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practical basis) and the concept of virtue (the concept that leads to a morally
good life):
The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustaining those
relationships necessary if the variety of goods internal to practices are
to be achieved and not only in sustaining the form of an individual life
in which that individual may seek out his or her good as the good of
his or her whole life, but also in sustaining those traditions which
provide both practice and individual lives with their necessary
historical context. (MacIntyre 1985:223)
MacIntyre believes in a return to virtue, which is only made possible by taking
into consideration historical contexts and acting within defined practices that
are embedded in traditions. The concepts of practice and tradition are especially
important in trying to conceptualise the appropriateness of virtue within social
work practice. Indeed, a return to the historical roots of social work practice and
an emphasis on the importance of values would enable practitioners to develop
the virtue needed in social work and, consequently, to practise social work
values regardless of the management style, power structures and regulation
cultures that are ever present in social work.
It is important, however, to point out that MacIntyre's After Virtue philosophy is
not one of those most commonly used in current definitions of ethics across the
field of social care practice and that virtue ethics has not received much
consideration in social work (Houston 2003). Most current codes of ethics in
social work are not built on an understanding of emotivism or MacIntyre's
moral philosophy, but rather on Kantian and utilitarian approaches (Banks
1995; McBeath and Webb 2002; Wilks 2005). However, the moral perspective of
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virtue ethics as applied to contemporary social work practice has gained in
popularity during the last decades (McBeath and Webb, 2002; Banks 2001; Clark
2005).
Drawing on a range of social theories," McBeath and Webb (2002) defend a
return to virtue ethics as constituting an appropriate response to the
prescriptive and highly regulated system of social welfare in which social
workers and social care practitioners must currently operate.
One of the critiques of McBeath and Webb's thesis, and generally in relation to
virtue ethics applied to social work practice, concerns the "insufficient attention
given to the problem of how virtue is defined and established in the first
instance" (Houston 2003:819). Houston (2003) suggests a "Habermasian"8
model for developing virtues, while Morse (1999) suggests that virtues or
character traits are developed by the performance of an action that reflects this
trait and that further action reinforces the development of the character. Indeed,
Through habituation over a long period of time, the person acquires the
'virtue' as [a] fixed disposition of his or her character. (Morse 1999:50)
McBeath and Webb (2002) identify elements such as developing analytical
ability and skills as well as cultivating a moral 'character', which, in their
opinion, would enable the social worker to be 'virtuous'. They suggest that
virtues can be developed through experience, reflection and circumspection but
they are unclear as to how this can be successfully achieved in practice. Other
authors attempt to list a range of virtues appropriate to social work practice
7 McBeath and Webb refer to a numberof social theorists in their thesis: examples of theorists
consulted includeAntonyGiddens(1991), Michel Foucault (1977) andJurgen Habermas
(1984).
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(Rhodes 1986; Beauchamp and Childress 1994, in Banks 2001), although Rhodes
(1986) does not develop a virtue-ethics model for social work but instead
questions the relationships between the clients, agency, professional colleagues
and society as a whole (cited in Banks 2001).
Social Work Values and Codes of Ethics
Thus far, the literature review on ethics has provided an opportunity to
examine a variety of conceptualisations of ethical dilemmas in practice, as well
as four different moral perspectives under two broader umbrellas as applied to
the social work context. Because the study aims to explore how social care
practitioners from different work settings behave in relation to ethical issues
and dilemmas in practice, as well as to examine the factors that influence their
decisions on specific areas of the ethical spectrum, the following section intends
to discuss one particular area of the literature on ethics and social work that has
a great impact on the way ethical dilemmas are resolved: codes of ethics and
codes of practice for social work. This section therefore aims to give an
overview of social work values through examining different codes of practice
and codes of ethics and exploring the rationale for utilising such codes in social
work contexts.
The British Association of Social Work (BASW) (1975) defines five core values
for social work, and the ethical principles found in their code of ethics are
derived from these values (Strom-Gottfried and D'Aprix 2006). The values of
'Human Dignity and Worth', 'Competence', 'Integrity', 'Social Justice' and
'Service to Humanity' were the fundamentals of BASW's (1975) first code of
8 A Habermasian model involved groupreflection with the aim of reaching consensus.
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ethics. The International Federation of Social Workers (lFSW), on the other
hand, bases their codes of ethics around 29 standards of conduct (Strom-
Gottfried and 0'Aprix 2006) but, unlike the BASW, does not state a core value
for social work practice. The Central Council for Education and Training in
Social Work (1989) defines five values, whereas the General Social Care Council
(2002) does not define a value base for social work but instead provides six
'headings' for practice that constitute general statements of social work aims.
Despite the disagreement of various professional bodies and social work
organisations on a universal set of values, social work world-wide is based
around two basic principles identified by LYnn (1999) as "personal caring" and
"social justice" (O'Brian 2003). On the other hand, Banks (2006:44-46) explains
that the literature around the principles and values of British social work all
revolve around the concepts of "respect for persons" and "service users' self-
determination", a "commitment to the promotion of social justice", and the
concept of "professional integrity". However, O'Brian adds that, with the rapid
change in British social work through the development of new policies
regulation and guidelines, as
professional judgment becomes circumscribed [... ], the social worker's
role is somewhat different than ones that are based on the two values of
personal caring and social justice. A third value base appears to have
emerged that we might call 'resource and risk management'. (O'Brian
2003:391)
Therefore, the social work value base, although made paramount in many
documents and texts, differs slightly from one author or organisation to
another. Nevertheless, social work values always rest on either the principles
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of respecting the individual, of social justice or of professional competences.
As a result, specific codes of ethics have emerged and need to be examined in
the context of specific social work practice.
Having said that, many authors use a code of ethics as a starting point to solve
ethical dilemmas (Levy 1976; Reamer 1982). As Witkin (2000:198) points out,
the code of ethics serves several functions: providing guidance to social
workers, protecting and reassuring the public, legitimizing our claim to
professional status, and fostering the allegiance of members to the
profession.
Nevertheless, a code of ethics is only a general guideline to help those with
dilemmas to solve them (Reamer 1982). Witkin (2000:199) explains that,
like all dominant discourses, mainstream ethical beliefs tend to function
in ways that preserve the social order. Codes and rules, although
necessary and well-intentioned, have a transcontextual quality that
favours people in socially advantageous positions. For people who see
themselves as victim of that order, ethical prescriptions may seem more
like instruments of control than moral guides.
Before the BASW published their code of ethics, which was the first of its kind
in British social work, Millerson (1964) identified certain factors that
determine the need for introducing a code of ethics in social work practice. He
stated that concepts such as the type of practice (for example those in the
voluntary sector or statutory services), the nature of practice and the
techniques used, must all be comprehended by users for their protection.
However, Millerson (1964) does not suggest ways to incorporate variations in
the practice setting, the nature of practice or the multi-cultural dimension of
the intervention. It is clear that one code of ethics cannot answer all the needs
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emerging from different practice settings, let alone from different types of
professional social care training. Moral perspectives, the values of the
profession, different interests and agencies' core values all influence the
perception of what is good or bad for a client, a group or a population.
Furthermore, Leighton (1985), referring to the practice of social work, argues
that social workers must not only consider the BASW code when dealing with
an ethical dilemma,
because some of the boundaries of social work activities have a
fundamental impact on ethical principles. For example, community
and groupwork must adopt a very different standard of confidentiality
from private psychotherapy. (Leighton 1985:60)
Therefore, Leighton (1985) is clear that one code of ethics cannot meet the
needs of every type of social care practice. However, in 2000, the Department
of Health was producing a new piece of legislation known as the Care
Standards Act 2000, which would recommend the creation of the General
Social Care Council (GSCC). Consequently, in 2002, the British government
announced the emergence of the GSCC, a statutory body that aims to protect
service users, to provide better social services to the population and to
regulate the practice of social care across England by making compulsory
guidelines such as a new code of conduct for social care practitioners as well
as one for employers. The Chair of the GSCC, Rodney Brook, justified the
creation of these codes with the following argument:
These codes are a clear statement of how registered social care workers
and employers should behave. People who work in social care are in a
position of great responsibility, doing work which has a direct impact
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on people's lives, often at times of stress. Now, for the first time, we
have set down clearly exactly what we the public can expect. I hope
this will also lead to a better understanding from the public of what
social care workers can and should do. (Brooke, 2002:1)
The guidelines found in the GSCC codes of conduct were developed to take
into account the varied elements of social work and social care values, such as
respect, confidentiality, skills of listening and communication, judgement in
assessing risk, honesty, reliability in workers' relationships with users,
knowledge about services, and flexibility and fairness in the provision of
services (Brand 1998). The aim of the Council is to become established as the
statutory regulatory body for Personal Social Services (GSCC 2001), setting
and enforcing standards of good conduct and practice. Protection of the
public is ensured in all sectors by publishing codes of conduct and by
compulsory registration of members.
As noted above, two codes of conduct are now available from the GSCC: a
code of conduct for employers and a code of conduct for employees (GSCC
2002). The code of conduct for employers aims to complement rather than
replace existing agency policies with many social care service providers
(GSCC 2002). The GSCC and the social care agencies are responsible for
reinforcing social care practitioners' compliance with the codes (Strom-
Gottfried and D'Aprix 2006). Compliance is also ensured by the process of
registration of all social care workers and practitioners and by close
monitoring of social care practitioners' adherence to the GSCC's six 'headings'
(Department of Health 2002). This reform includes all social care practitioners,
qualified or non-qualified: in other words, the GSCC codes of conduct are for
all workers who provide social services.
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Nevertheless, the codes are set out in terms of general guidelines and expose
the same problems as previously published codes (IFSW, BASW and other
codes of ethics published by social work organisations). The codes suggest
ways to behave, but as Rhodes (1986) argues, bureaucratic norms, when too
strict, can decrease moral responsibility in decision-making and discourage
reflective practice, which in tum can have a negative impact on ethical
decisions and, in a broader sense, on ethical conduct.
So far, this thesis has therefore taken the position that ethics in social work
cannot simply be understood as a rule-following activity based on codes of
ethics and, therefore, can only with difficulty fit all social care settings and
types of practice. As explained above, within the different sectors, there are
great differences in terms of values, but also in relation to the way services are
organised and delivered. Social care practitioners and social workers can only
work within codes of ethics and practice while at the same time integrating





This chapter covers the methodological framework and procedures used to
conduct this research. The chapter is not written using a chronological
presentation of the way the research progressed, but instead examines the
methodological procedure using a logical sequence from the more theoretical
research perspective to the practical examination of research methods.
First, the research paradigm, that is to say symbolic interaction, will be
explored. This chapter will therefore begin with an examination of the
theoretical underpinning of such a paradigm and its application to the
research topic, which is ethics and conduct in social care practice. Second, the
methodology used for conducting the research and analysing the data will be
examined. In this sense, Grounded Theory will be explored as a
methodological process for both data generation and analysis. Third, this
chapter will examine the research methods used to collect the data as well as
outlining the overall validity and reliability of the research. The chapter will
conclude by a section on research ethics, where the principles upheld by the
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) will be examined in the light of
this research project.
Research Paradigm: Symbolic Interaction
In order to fully understand the research process and its theoretical
underpinning, it is important to examine the perspective the researcher has
adopted about the nature of reality (Sarantakos 2005). A research paradigm
85
helps in situating the way 'the world is perceived', Patton explains that a
paradigm proposes
a world view, a way of breaking down the complexity of the real
world, telling researchers and social scientists in general 'what is
important, what is legitimate, what is reasonable'. (Sarantakos 1993:30)
The research paradigm adopted for this research is symbolic interactionism,
which originated from the work of George Herbert Mead (Chicago School of
Sociology 1863-1931) and Herbert Blumer (1900-1986). Symbolic interaction
examines the symbolic and the interactive together as they are
experienced and organised in the worlds of everyday lives. It looks at
how meanings emerge, are negotiated, stabilised and transformed; at
how people do things together through joint actions; and at how
interaction strategies organise such meanings at all levels of collective
life. (Stryker, cited in Plummer 1991 Vol. 2:ix)
Symbolic interactionism is therefore a perspective that tries to understand
behaviour as emerging from interactions between people on a micro level,
taking into account the symbols used that result in defining meaning at the
collective level. In other words, starting from an individual level of
interactions, symbolic interactionism examines situations and proposes
explanations that reach cultural and structural levels. Indeed, Marshall argues
that the use of symbolic interaction
has been to analyse the meanings of everyday life, via close
observational work and intimate familiarity, and from these, to develop
an understanding of the underlying forms of human interactions.
(1998:657)
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Symbolic interactionism tends to analyse behaviour, taking into consideration
interactions between people as well as SYmbols used to shape these
interactions, on a level that begins from the personal one, but which affect, for
example, the extent to how society is shaped:
It is through symbols that they [human beings] are capable of
producing culture and transmitting a complex history. (Marshall
1998:657)
Symbolic interactionism is interested in understanding the interface of
symbols and interactions between people. As Blumer explains,
The term 'Symbolic Interaction' refers, of course, to the peculiar and
distinctive character of interaction as it takes place between human
beings. The peculiarity consists in the fact that human beings interpret
or 'define' each other's action instead of merely reacting to each other's
action. Their 'response' is not made directly to the actions of one
another but instead is based on the meaning which they attach to such
action. Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of SYmbols, by
interpretation or by ascertaining the meaning of one another's action.
(1969:78-9)
Symbolic interactionism is one level of understanding that can be used in
research. Since the research is not interested in pathological explanations, but
rather in people's understandings of ethics and conduct, SYmbolic
interactionism is appropriate to this paper. The understanding of ethics as
explained through different perspectives in the literature review may be
understood differently from one person to another. It is therefore the
interactions between the people that make the perspective accepted
collectively as the rules to follow. Using a symbolic interactionist perspective
enables us to understand the field of ethics (and its relevance to social care
87
practice) in terms of the influence of the environment on which decisions take
place. As Blumer (1969:87-8) explains,
From the standpoint of Symbolic Interaction, social organization is a
framework inside of which acting units develop their actions.
Structural features, such as 'culture', 'social systems', 'social
stratifications,' or 'social roles', set conditions for their actions but do
not determine their action. People - that is, acting units - do not act
toward culture, social structure or the like; they act toward situations.
Social organization enters into action only to the extent to which it
shapes situations in which people act, and to the extent to which it
supplies fixed sets of symbols which people use in interpreting their
situations.
Yet social care practitioners make ethical decisions based upon different
elements, for example codes of conduct, agency settings, professional values
and personal values, and their final decisions are made according to the
significance and interpretation of each of these elements. These elements are
perceived as symbols, and the decision-making will be carried out in relation
to the interactions between the symbols.
Symbolic interactionism was influenced by a reaction against the idea of
positivist methods. For symbolic interactionists,
the social world is a dynamic and dialectical web, situations are always
encounters with unstable outcomes, and lives and their biographies are
always in the process of shifting and becoming, never fixed and
immutable. Attention is fixed, not upon rigid structures (as in many
other versions of sociology), but upon streams of activity with their
adjustments and outcomes. (Marshall 1998:658)
Symbolic interactionism is not against scientific methods per se, but against a
positivist view of social behaviour that ignores meaning. Symbolic
interactionism shifted social research from a positivist to an interpretive
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paradigm, focusing on the symbols and meanings that explain human
behaviour rather than on the'objective' behaviours themselves. In this view,
human beings behave in a certain way due to social interactions with each
other and due to the symbols (formal and informal conventions) people
adhere to and which are commonly understood in a society:
Field researchers do not claim to discover the 'true meaning' of
behaviour, but try to uncover, by observation of words and action, the
meanings of behaviour to informants. (Fine and Kleinman, cited in
Plumer 1991:105)
The meanings of behaviour in the context of this research are therefore
understood as forming through interactions between actors. Indeed, for
symbolic interactionists, human behaviour cannot be examined in the same
way as in the fields of natural sciences such as chemistry or physics (positivist
approach), because the different situations may produce different behaviours
(Sarantakos 1993; Winch 1964).
Indeed, Winch (1964) argues that, in many cases, the regularities of social life
are not the same as those of the natural sciences. In the social sciences, there
are certain rules similar to the natural sciences, but these rules are influenced
(and can be changed) by various aspects of social life, such as the ways that
human beings perceive a situation or a symbol. Symbols are constructed by
human beings in response to different aspects of everyday life.
Without rejecting positivist methods, symbolic interaction takes the position
that what is perceived by one person can be perceived differently by another.
Cuff et al. (1998:119) suggest that,
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as members of society, we are aware of these patterns [of behaviours],
but we do not find them out by studying concurrent events and
seeking to infer causal connection between them. We become aware of
these patterns and of the point of a particular activity within that
pattern by being taught the rules.
For example, norms and morals can be seen as sets of rules or symbols that
are developed by people and to which people respond according to different
situations. What might be totally acceptable for one group of people could be
seen as wrong by another group. Therefore, the notion of 'radical' truth has to
be rejected, because even though there are actors who define social rules,
these rules can be understood differently across various contexts; they can be
adhered to in one context and broken in another context by the same
behaviour:
it is up to each individual or group to decide for themselves what is
true, and that their decision settles the matter. (Cuff et al. 1998:122)
This is an important proposition for the research, which aims to study ethical
behaviour through an examination of practitioners' experiences and
perspectives, rather than through an examination of codes of ethics. We often
hear of social care practitioners breaching confidentiality or being disciplined
for misconduct. This is because societies and organisations create rules but
individuals can always decide for themselves whether or not to follow those
rules (Cuff et al. 1998). Therefore, a study of codes of ethics would not reflect
actual behaviour, because these rules can always be broken. A symbolic
interactionist perspective for exploring practitioners' understandings enables
the researcher not only to understand the rules, but also to understand the process
of reasoning behind the behaviour that leads to a particular course of action:
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The methodological position of Symbolic Interactionism is that social
action must be studied in terms of how it is formed. (Blumer 1969:57)
Symbols are constructed and institutionalised in society through formal and
informal conventions. In this research project, formal conventions can be seen
in the representation of behaviour through various codes of ethics. Informal
conventions, on the other hand, are behavioural norms that are not necessarily
written down, but are adhered to by members of a society.
On a global level, language is known as the most important symbolic system
(Winch 1964; Sarantakos 1994). Indeed, as Stone and Farberman put it, it is
"through communication processes, [that] people transform themselves and
their environment and then respond to those transformations" (cited in
Maines 1977:235).
There are a number of reasons for choosing symbolic interaction as an
appropriate perspective to explore the various types of ethical reasoning
across different fields of social care practice. However, when I started to
formulate the research proposition at the beginning of the project, I did not
immediately link this perspective to my research. I read widely on different
methodologies and perspectives to identify the one that best reflected my
understanding of the world around me and the nature of this particular
research focus. I linked symbolic interaction to my research only after the first
stages of data collection (for more information on the research process, see
Figure 1 further below), when the focus of the research became concerned
with examining the way that ethics and conduct was understood by social
care practitioners. From this stage, it became apparent that symbolic
interactionism was an appropriate approach to use, as the research process
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aimed, from that point on, to provide an understanding of the interactions
between people in relation to ethical conduct by analysing the symbols used
to define and resolve a situation.
Using a different research perspective from the start would have led to using
a different research methodology as well as interpreting the data differently.
For instance, if a critical-theory perspective were to be used from the start, the
emphasis would have been on power relationships and inequalities within
society. In relation to ethical conduct, such a perspective might explore the
differences between men's and women's ethical reasoning and the ways
gender can influence the process. Symbolic interactionism does not segregate
groups by gender, age or sexual orientation for example, but instead tries to
understand the reasoning process behind different sets of rules and symbols.
In fact, this is a weakness of the symbolic interaction perspective as applied to
this research, because understandings of ethics in social work may indeed be
influenced by the gender of the practitioner (which critical theory would
address) or by the past experiences of individual social care practitioners
(which a psychosocial perspective would consider).
Finally, symbolic interaction was chosen as the research perspective because it
is appropriate to use while adopting a Grounded Theory methodology, since
both are concerned with the same type of phenomena (Cuff, Sharrock and
Francis 1998; Layder 1982; Dey 1999). Layder (1982:105) comments that
"Symbolic Interactionism/participant observation are seen to constitute the
research tradition par excellence" when researching on the basis of Grounded
Theory. Indeed, Grounded Theory aims to "understand the actions of
individual or collective actors being studied" (Strauss and Corbin 1994:274)
92
and it "focuses on how individuals interact in relation to the phenomenon
under study" (Dey 1999:1). Grounded Theory as a methodology focuses on
the actions and relations of individuals and communities, and thus it takes
into consideration interactions and symbols. Benoliel (cited in Dey 1999:18)
has also commented that the goal of Grounded Theory is to explain how
social circumstances can account for the behaviour and interactions of the
people being studied. Therefore, while symbolic interactionism has been
chosen as the most appropriate overall research perspective for examining
ethics and ethical conduct in social care, it also fits well within a Grounded
Theory methodology.
Research Methodology: Grounded Theory
This research is exploratory and aims to investigate the experiences of
practitioners in England working for statutory social services in comparison
with practitioners using social action principles and those who work for the
voluntary sector, in relation to their conduct and ethics.
The choice of Grounded Theory as a methodology was justified from the
outset because of a lack of focused resources about ethics in social care
practice and in particular a lack of information, literature and articles about
ethics in social action work. As Dey (1999:4) explains,
An effective strategy is, at first, literally to ignore the literature of
theory and fact on the area under study, in order to assure that the
emergence of category will not be contaminated by concepts more
suited to a different area.
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The limited availability of resources on the topic was therefore calling for a
methodology "that generate[s] ideas by the evidence itself" (Dey 1999:4).
Grounded Theory is particularly appropriate for this research project because,
as Dey (1999:3) adds,
the main point is to avoid "preconceived" ideas. In Grounded Theory,
Glaser and Strauss argued, "initial decisions are not based on a
preconceived theoretical framework" (1967:45). The idea was to start
instead with a general subject or problem conceived only in terms of a
general disciplinary perspective.
As the introduction explicitly states, this research project emerged from
personal and professional experience of social work practice and the
utilisation of empowerment as a central principle for intervention. The use of
personal experience is important in relation to Grounded Theory, as
everyday knowledge is an unrenounceable resource, which this theory
sets to make a central element of its structure and approach. Primary
experience is very significant for the development of Grounded
Theory. (Sarantakos 1993:269)
Moreover, as explained above, Grounded Theory as a methodological
framework sits well with the SYmbolic interaction research tradition:
Grounded Theory refers to theory (or analytic knowledge) generated
out of research data, particularly of the qualitative sort. As such
Grounded Theory has been predominantly associated with the
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Symbolic Interactionist 'version' of sociological analysis, which derived
in large part from work of Cooley and Mead. (Layder 1982: 104)
Grounded Theory is therefore a methodology that consists in building an
explanatory theory mainly on the basis of data that was in turn generated by
previous data. Glaser and Strauss (1967) explain the use of Grounded Theory
in relation to qualitative data. They define Grounded Theory as follows:
generating a theory from data means that most hypotheses and
concepts not only come from data but are systematically worked out in
relation to the data during the course of the research. (Glaser and
Strauss 1967:6)
Grounded Theory is therefore a methodology for research that uses the data
to produce new data through the validation of the previous data. Grounded
Theory is therefore a cyclic process in so far as each individual stage of data
collection and analysis serves to produce a new stage that furthers the
investigation until the research reaches saturation.
Grounded Theory methodology was used as the sole methodological process
throughout the research. In particular, Grounded Theory was essential in
developing the data-collection tools and the analysis of the collected data and
was therefore central to the whole study. The research therefore began with
an open agenda and, after each stage, theories emerged from the data
collected and informed the next stage of data collection until an explanatory
theory had emerged.
Kemshall (1998) partly explains Grounded Theory as a systematic method of
data collection and an interpretative method of analysing data based upon an
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inductive approach. The inductive approach can be described as one that
examines particular aspects of social life and creates theory in relation to
previous data collection. Therefore, research comes before theory according to
an inductive approach and seeks to generate theoretical propositions from the
data collected. However, Kemshall (1998) continues by explaining that
Grounded Theory becomes more deductive later in the process: first it
considers a general picture of social life and then it investigates a particular
aspect to test the strength of the theory. Kemshall (1998) refers to the process
of passing from deductive to inductive and vice versa by the concept of
retroductive methodology. The concept of retroductive methodology is also
used by Shepperd (1995) and Layder (1985) while referring to this process in
relation to Grounded Theory. Sarantakos (2005) and Sousa and Hendriks
(2006) also refer to Grounded Theory as a continuous process that evolves
from inductive and deductive approaches and ends with verification that
refers to "testing of the validity of these hypotheses" (Sarantakos 2005:118).
Figure 1 on the page 98 shows the retroductive aspect of the Grounded
Theory process from the beginning to the end of the research. The figure also
illustrates the overall research design, outlining the various stages from
inductive to deductive approach, until the research reached saturation of data
through validation of the final proposition (the figure was adapted from
Eckett 1988).
The research began in 1998 with an exploration of some of the literature that
covered the various aspects of the topic being researched. The literature
consulted at that time included books, and policy and government documents
as well as journal articles, and constituted a relatively important source of
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information to get the research started, as the researcher was new to the country
and, therefore, to English social work practice and research. This preliminary
exploration of literature (see below for further information on research
methods) aimed at gaining a basic understanding of the structure of social
services in England, ethical conduct, social work roles and responsibility as well
as moral and legal duties surrounding the social care profession in Britain as a
whole. As Sarantakos (2005:350) indicates in relation to beginning a research
based on Grounded Theory, "knowledge of the context is most useful in this
process". Simultaneously, four unstructured interviews were conducted with
practitioners from different sectors of social care practice, with the aim of
gathering some initial data in relation to the initial research proposition.
Data from the four interviews were analysed (first-stage analysis - Open
Coding (see below for an explanation of this», and the research proposition
was changed in the light of these preliminary data. The preliminary data were
also used as a basis for collecting data that would constitute the second stage
of data collection. This second set of data collection was actualised through
working with three focus groups that aimed at examining practitioners'
understandings of ethics and conduct and protection safeguards in their
respective fields. The data was then analysed (second-stage analysis - Open
Coding) and examined in parallel with existing literature on ethics and
regulations of conduct. The emerging themes were then used to develop the
questionnaire that would be used as a way of collecting the data for the third
stage of the research project.
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The research became inductive and aimed to explore the elements influencing
the decision-making process of the practitioners in three determined fields of
practice. The data were analysed following an axial coding method (third-stage
analysis), and the categories and codes that emerged were central to revising
the previous proposition and consequently adopting a deductive approach to
the inquiry. In the light of the data accumulated through the questionnaires,
semi-structured interviews and vignette-based interviews were developed in
order to test the emerging hypothesis. Data were collected among six
practitioners and analysed using a selective coding procedure. The data reached
saturation at this point, and consequently the research ended.
This example of applied retroductive methodology (Kemshall 1998; Shepperd
1995; Layder 1985) shows how the research focus moved from deductive to
inductive and vice versa. From this process, we can therefore talk about a
retroductive approach to data collection. This form of research is also viewed
as being efficient in terms of the validity of the research (see the section below
on validity and reliability issues).
In addition to being a retroductive methodology, Grounded Theory is also
known as a methodology that uses constant comparative methods in data
collection and analysis. Indeed, Sarantakos (1993:270) states that one of the
main procedures of the qualitative research based on Grounded Theory is that
of making comparisons.
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Since the aim of this research project was to explore the differences and
similarities between social action work, the voluntary sector and statutory
services in relation to their ethics and conduct, a comparative method was
essential. The process of comparative analysis is examined in Chapter Six -
Data Analysis. However, at this point, th~ comparative methods used within a
Grounded Theory framework can be summarised as follows:
We shall describe in four stages the constant comparative method: (1)
comparing incidents applicable to each category, (2) integrating
categories and their properties, (3) delimiting the theory, and (4)
writing the theory. Although this method of generating theory is a
continuously growing process - each stage after a time is transformed
into the next - earlier stages do remain in operation simultaneously
throughout the analysis and each provides continuous development to
its successive stage until the analysis is terminated. (Glaser and Strauss
1967:105)
Various types of coding are used in Grounded Theory research in order to
achieve constant comparisons (Sarantakos 2005). The full coding procedures
used in this research can be found in Chapter Six - Data Analysis. However,
at this point, it is important to define what is understood by coding when
Grounded Theory methodology is concerned.
Coding /Iconsists of assigning codes to the collected elements" so as to /Iask
questions about categories and their relationships" (Sarantakos 1993:213,272).
Simply put, coding is a process that consists of giving labels to situations
emerging from the data collections or findings. Strauss and Corbin (1990:57)
explain coding as
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the operations by which data are broken down, conceptualised, and
put back together in new ways. It is the central process by which
theories are built from data.
Coding is an important aspect of Grounded Theory, as it constitutes the main
process in data analysis, and it is this that leads to the discovery of the
explanatory theory (Sarantakos 2005). It is through constant comparative
methods that the research can achieve saturation point, which constitutes the
end of the theory-building process (Strauss and Corbin 1991).
Sarantakos (2005) explains that Grounded Theory methodology involves three
stages of coding, of which the level of abstraction increases as the research
progresses. The three levels of coding are contested in the literature because,
while Sarantakos (2005) refers to the three coding stages developed by Strauss
and Corbin (1990), Glaser and Strauss (1967) have previously argued that
there were actually four of them (LaRossa 2005). However, this coding within
this research is based on Strauss and Corbin's understanding, and therefore
the explanation of coding will be given in terms of 'open', 'axial' and
'selective' coding only.
The first level of coding is 'open', followed by 'axial' coding, and ending with
a process of 'selective' coding. Open coding involves identifying a first set of
code from the emerging data and examining which ones are important and
deserve further investigation. Strauss and Corbin (1990:62) explain open
coding as a procedure where "the data are broken down into discrete parts,
closely examined, compared for similarities and differences, and questions are
asked about the phenomena reflected in the data" (cited in LaRossa 2005:841).
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For example, during the first stage of data analysis, the information obtained
by the interviews and some of the literature consulted were broken into
different concepts such as 'statutory social work', 'code of conduct' and 'social
action.
Axial coding is the second stage of coding and entails interconnecting the
previous codes in order to achieve a higher level of abstraction (Sarantakos
2005). Therefore, in relation to this research, axial coding uses concepts of
ethics and power as opposed to the original code of conduct and statutory
social work.
Finally, selective coding involves "identifying the higher-order core category"
(Sarantakos 2005:350), which means "searching for the central phenomenon
and the central category" (idem). As LaRossa (2005:851) explains,
the core variable (or central category) is the one variable among all the
variables generated during the coding that, in addition to other
qualities, is theoretically saturated and centrally relevant.
In relation to this research, the core variable, or core category, was identified
as the concept of 'power'. Details of the procedure for data analysis and the
use of different types of coding can be found in Chapter Six: Data Analysis,
along with an exhaustive list of codes developed during each of the stages of
coding.
Theoretical saturation occurs when the three stages of coding have ended and
when no new properties emerge, with the same properties continually
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emerging instead, ensuring theoretical completeness (Glaser 1978, 2001, cited
in Sousa and Hendriks 2006). According to the Grounded Theory founders,
the research can end only when it reaches saturation (Glaser and Strauss 1967;
Strauss 1987). The theory generated at the end should explain what has been
found in the data collection:
Since no proof is involved, the constant comparative method in
contrast to analytic induction requires only saturation of data - not
consideration of all available data, nor are the data restricted to one
kind of clearly defined case. (Glaser and Strauss 1967:104)
The process of Grounded Theory, when reaching saturation of data, leads
toward the formation of an explanatory theory. This will be examined in
chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis.
Although Grounded Theory can be used both within qualitative and
quantitative research designs (Pfeifer 2000, cited in Sarantakos 2005), this
research project was generated with a qualitative approach rather than a
quantitative one. It was hoped to use informants' own understandings of
events in analysing a social setting. In qualitative analysis, the researcher's
identity, values and beliefs have to be taken into consideration and cannot be
entirely eliminated from the process.
This kind of research is therefore highly subjective. However, while this
aspect can be perceived as a weakness of Grounded Theory for some
commentators (Lamneck 1988, cited in Sarantakos 2005), Glaser and Strauss
(1967) and Glaser (2002) refer to the understanding of subjectivity from the
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researcher as being very important, as it generates richer data. Indeed, they
point out that researching using a Grounded Theory framework
does not imply that researcher approach reality as a tabula rasa. If they
have a perspective, this will help them to see relevant data and abstract
significant categories from the scrutiny of the data. (Glaser and Strauss
1967:3)
Therefore, a qualitative framework of Grounded Theory methodology was
used during the whole of the research process. The following section will
examine the research methods used for the collection of data.
Research Methods
Methods can be considered as the tools for the collection of data. In social
research, methods "have to be open in the sense that they can be changed and
adjusted while they are employed and while data are being collected"
(Sarantakos 1993:153). May (1997) sets out four types of research methods that
are used for the collection of data: questionnaires, interviews, observation and
documents, all of which can be split into different SUb-groups of data-
collection tools. The main types of data-collection methods used in this
research were questionnaires and interviews. Documentary methods and
focus groups were also found to be good sources of information and formed
part of the methodology applied in this research project.
Layder (1982) argues that, while participant observation tends to be the
research method par excellence for a Grounded Theory framework and a
104
symbolic interaction perspective, it is also appropriate to use a number of
methodological adjuncts to, and extensions of, the pure Grounded Theory
research methods. The following few sections will focus on the different
research methods that were used during all stages of the Grounded Theory
process.
Document Studies
The study of documents was one of the first methods used during the
research process as a complement to the first set of interviews for the first-
stage analysis (see below for information on interviews). Glaser and Strauss
indicate some reservations in using documentary methods during the first
stage of the research process. Indeed, they point out that
An effective strategy is, at first, literally to ignore the literature of
theory and fact on the area under study, in order to ensure that the
emergence of categories will not be contaminated by concepts more
suited to different areas. (Cited in Dey 1999:..J.)
However, Dey (1999:4) points out that this "ignoring" of the literature does
not mean not using it at all. On the contrary, as Goulding (2002) argues, the
use of literature is a way of strengthening both the quality of the data and the
ideas extracted from them.
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In this light, the literature was consulted in order to gain familiarity with
various elements underpinning the research, such as the concept of
empowerment and social action work, as well as to become acquainted with
the context of social work and social welfare in Britain. Sarantakos (2005)
explains that a basic analysis of documents is useful at the beginning of the
research in order to gain a representation of life as well as to provide detailed
information on specific topics before proceeding further with the research.
However, as the research progressed, literature was consulted further and
used in relation to the emergence of new codes and categories:
As discovered, Grounded Theory, then, will tend to combine mostly
concepts and hypotheses that have emerged from the data with some
existing ones that are clearly useful. (Glaser and Strauss, cited in Dey
1999:4)
However, the study of documents during the whole research process
remained at a descriptive-analysis level (Sarantakos 2005) in so far as it was
"rather elementary and entailed summarising data, identifying main trends
and presenting descriptions" (Sarantakos 2005:294).
From a more general point of view, there are many advantages related to the
use of documentary methods. Denscombe (1998) lists a number of these,
including cost effectiveness and broad access to information. Therefore, from
the beginning of the research, government documents such as White Papers,
internet publications and news releases related to social welfare were used to
gather data about the research topic. Studies of such documents were very
efficient because they allowed the researcher to define and resolve basic
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concepts and to integrate up-to-date material around issues of social policy
and social welfare changes taking place during the study. A record of every
document was kept, and notes were taken to ensure the validity of the
research (Denscombe 1998).
Focus Groups
Three focus groups were conducted during the second stage of the data
collection (see Figure 1 for the research process). The focus groups were
jointly facilitated with another researcher who had been commissioned by the
Department of Health to carry out a study about roles and regulations for
health support workers in the UK. Since the other research was based upon
proposals to create a regulatory body for health services in the UK, it touched
upon related aspects of the codes of ethics and regulations. The other research
team allowed for participation as well as the collection of data through their
focus groups, which consisted of health- and social care support workers in a
variety of sectors.
Three group interviews were conducted: one with mental-health support
workers from the voluntary sector, one with community health support
workers within the NHS and one with domiciliary care workers from the
private sector and the local authority. These three group discussions were
chosen to access diverse perspectives about a code of conduct and a national
professional regulatory body for all health- and social care practitioners (see
Appendix 2 for the focus-group interview schedule).
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The focus group is a method of data collection that can be defined as
group discussions that are organised to explore a specific set of issues
and involve some kind of collective activity. (Becker and Bryman
2004:394)
Focus groups therefore consist of discussions that take place in a group and
that are guided by a researcher on particular topic (Sarantakos 2005). As
Munday (2006:95) explains,
by skilfully moderating the groups, the researcher is able to elicit
objective facts about the attitude and opinions of the members of the
group. The researcher is seen as being able to access the 'true' nature of
the reality of the participants.
The focus group method therefore sits well within the symbolic interaction
perspective used for this research. However, particular problems can occur
with the use of focus groups. For example, the group can bias the opinions of
individual members, the recording can be difficult to achieve, there is the risk
of non-participation of some members and the discussion can diverge from
the main topic (Sarantakos 1993). However, the disadvantages are
counterbalanced by the advantages because, as May (1997) mentions, the use
of group interviews helps in producing different perspectives on the same
issues. Sarantakos (2005:196) adds that another advantage of using focus
groups in research is that
it is expected that, through mutual stimulation, a group environment
will encourage discussion; increase motivation to address critical
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issues, enable the facilitator to lead the discussion towards focal points
and topical issues; and allow significant points of view to be presented
in real, emotional and summated form as spontaneous expression.
Focus groups were therefore very appropriate for the research topic, as one of
the aims of the research was to gain an appreciation of how ethics and ethical
conduct were understood by social care practitioners. Using focus groups,
according to Crawford and Acorn (1997, cited in Webb 2002), also allows for
the discussion of the views, beliefs, opinions and perceptions of members,
which is also particularly relevant when exploring topics such as ethics and
conduct.
Data collected through focus groups were used for the development of codes,
which consequently informed the development of questionnaires that were
used to build explanations on ethics and to explore new ideas in relation to
the topic. However, because of the focus groups' "inability to reach in-depth
information" (Powell and Single 1996, cited in Webb 2002:30), and because of
the Grounded Theory framework involving "constant comparison between
the data finding and the emerging concepts and properties" (Sousa and
Hendriks 2006:323), the research process continued by using a different
research method: questionnaires.
Questionnaires
Questionnaires were also used in this study as a means of data gathering (see
Figure 1 for the full research process). Questionnaires were used after
analysing data collected within the focus groups and were developed to
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examine practitioners' understandings of ethics and values in social work and
social welfare further. Indeed, questionnaires "offer a considered and
objective view of the issues" (Sarantakos 2005:263) and therefore allow the
refinement of some of the data collected during the previous stage (focus
groups). The use of questionnaires within this project was very successful and
allowed the development of new codes and categories (see Appendix 3 for a
copy of the questionnaire used).
There are many advantages to the use of questionnaires, but they were
particularly appropriate for this project in that they were sent by post and
therefore offered respondents time to reflect on the topic and even to consult
documents (such as staff handbooks or codes of conduct) if necessary
(Sarantakos 2005). Moreover, questionnaires can be viewed as a stable,
consistent and uniform system of measurement without variation, an aspect
that focus groups cannot offer, because of the interactions taking place
between the group members (Webb 2002). The questionnaires also produced
quick results that allowed the research to penetrate more deeply during the
interviews that followed (Sarantakos 2005), which was very useful for the
development of codes using Grounded Theory. Finally, the questionnaires
offered the kind of wide coverage that interviews would not have allowed,
because of financial constraints (Sarantakos 1993).
To ensure that the respondents remained anonymous, each was given a
unique code made up of a letter followed by a number. There were some
limitations with the use of questionnaires, such as the lack of clarification of
questions and the possibility of partial answers being given (Sarantakos 2005).
However, the use of interviews as a subsequent data-collection tool redressed
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this situation, as it allowed the researcher to place emphasis on certain matters
that needed clarification (Sarantakos 1993).
In total, 60 questionnaires were sent to practitioners from the different sectors
(statutory, voluntary sector and social action), and 32 were returned.
Reminders were sent once by post (Sarantakos 2005), and the remaining non-
respondents were contacted by telephone. All the other questionnaires were
chased, but none came back, even though the deadline was extended.
For this stage of the data collection, 30 social care practitioners from different
fields returned completed questionnaires, which were analysed. Two
questionnaires were discarded, as they were incomplete. Although 30
respondents out of 60 represents only a 50% response rate, the amount and
the quality of the data found in them was sufficient for the research analysis.
In relation to qualitative data, Sarantakos (1993:269) explains that
the centre of its [qualitative research] interest is not on collecting
volumes of data but organising the variety of thoughts and experiences
the researcher gathers during the analysis of data.
The questionnaires used were semi-structured, giving the opportunity to
gather precise data at the same time as offering depth to the answers. The
sampling for the distribution of questionnaires was carried out using a
purposive method. Sarantakos (1993:138) describes purposive sampling as a
technique whereby
the researchers purposely choose subjects who, In their opinion, are
thought to be relevant to the research topic.
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The purposive method was used in order to successfully build a theoretical
sample (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Sarantakos 2005), which was aimed at
building a comparative element with practitioners from different fields of
social care practice. Theoretical sampling refers to the "process of data
collection for generating theory" (Glaser and Strauss 1967:-!5) and is
determined by the knowledge that emerges during the study (Burgess 1984;
Strauss 1991, cited in Sarantakos 2005). This method of sampling was also
chosen because social care practitioners from the three different fields were
difficult to reach. Therefore, various social care practitioners were called and
asked if they would be interested in participating in the research; where this
was the case, a questionnaire was sent.
Snowball sampling (May 1997) was also used for the distribution of the
questionnaires because there are few social action practitioners in this field
and they often practice without labelling their work as social action. It would
therefore have been difficult to establish the sample in another way, and it
was constructed as follows: First, a list of well-known social action workers
and researchers was provided by the Centre for Social Action. Each social
action worker was called and asked to participate in the research; at the end of
the telephone conversation, they were asked to give the contact name of
another practitioner/researcher in social action work. These people were then
contacted and asked to participate by completing a questionnaire, and they
were also asked to provide further contact names.
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Interviews
There were two distinct stages of the research process when interviews were
used as a tool for data collection. The first set of data was collected by using
unstructured interviews. This first set of interviews took place at the very
beginning of the research. A second data-collection point, based on another
type of interviews, was conducted at the end of the research process during
the fourth stage of the data collection: a combination of vignettes and semi-
structured questions formed the basis for this second interview stage.
May (1997:112) suggests various reasons for the use of unstructured
interviews, such as the fact that this tool "provides qualitative depth by
allowing interviewees to talk about the subject in terms of their own frames of
reference". Unstructured interviews are also a useful technique to consider at
the beginning of the research process, as they are useful tools with which to
build a broad picture, which is helpful when the research is still exploratory
(Kane and O'Reilly-De Brun 2001). Consequently, the use of unstructured
interviews at the beginning of the research was relevant for finding out about
the general views of different practitioners in relation to ethics and the codes
of conduct within their agency (see Appendix 4 for the unstructured interview
schedule).
The sampling used for selecting participants to the unstructured interview
was purposive, that is to say, participants that were "relevant to the project"
(Sarantakos 2005:164). Indeed, because the study began with a proposition
that intended to examine the roles and values in statutory social work with
the roles and values in social action groupwork, participants from both areas
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were chosen. Consequently, four unstructured interviews were conducted at
the beginning of the research: the interviewees were a practitioner from the
voluntary sector, a manager from the voluntary sector, a director of a
voluntary organisation having spent much of their working year in statutory
social work, and a statutory social worker.
Vignette-based and semi-structured interviews were also used later in the
research process and proved to be an effective tool for data collection. In total,
seven vignettes and semi-structured interviews were conducted in the
practitioners' workplaces (see Appendix 5 for interview- and vignette-based
schedules).
These vignettes and semi-structured interviews were conducted in different
ways with different respondents and for specific reasons. Indeed, the
interviews (including the vignettes and semi-structured interviews) were
lengthy in duration, and respondents were at risk of being exhausted and
giving less clear answers towards the end of the interviews. Kane and
O'Reilly-de Briin (2001 :204) explain that semi-structured interviews use
questions that are "tailored to the individual or category of person and to the
circumstances". Therefore, some respondents began with the semi-structured
interview, exploring different issues from their practice, while others began
with the vignette and finished with the semi-structured interview.
The semi-structured interview was organised mostly around open questions
aimed at examining a participant's characteristics that influence the
occurrence of ethical dilemmas in work settings. However, the interview
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schedule also included a section where participants had to comment on
different elements affecting ethics in practice. This combination offered a wide
range of material that fit well within the semi-structured interview schedule,
and which May (1997:111) qualifies as allowing
people to answer more on their own terms than the standardised
interview permits, but still provide a greater structure for
comparability over that of the focused interview.
The semi-structured interview method appeared to be relatively efficient for
this type of research, although the limitations must be highlighted. First, as
the interviews and vignettes were very time-consuming, some respondents
did not finish the whole interview with the same enthusiasm. However, to
overcome this, some respondents answered the vignette first and then
proceeded with the interview. All the interviews were tape-recorded and
transcribed onto the computer to facilitate the data analysis. Though
respondents were free to refuse to be taped, none of them refused, and all the
scripts were therefore analysed.
The other part of the interview was built around the use of 'vignettes'.
Hughes (1998, cited in Hughes and Huby 2002) explains that vignettes add a
significant focus for discussion during individual interviews, and therefore,
vignette techniques were very useful within this stage of the data collection.
Finch (1987:105) describes a vignette as
short stories about hypothetical characters in specified circumstances,
to whose situation the interviewee is invited to respond'. In other
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words, the participants have to give their opinion on different case
studies of possible ethical dilemmas to analyse and understand how it
would be resolved for the person, and within the sector of social care
practice. (Barter and Reynolds 2000:2)
Vignettes can be used within both a qualitative and a quantitative research
framework. Taylor (2006) shows the many strengths of using vignettes in
quantitative social work research, but Barter and Reynolds (2002) assert that
vignettes are also appropriate within qualitative research frameworks, as they
allow participants to
respond to a particular situation by stating what they would do, or
how they imagine a third person, generally a character in the story,
would react to certain situations or occurrences, which often entail
some form or moral dilemma. (Barter and Reynolds 2000:2)
Indeed, vignettes are an efficient tool for gathering data, as this technique
does not generate socially desirable responses (Hughes and Huby 2002).
Vignette-based interviews also provide the opportunity for comparison of the
practice of ethical social work in each sector. As Finch (1987: 111) describes,
vignettes
offer the opportunity to explore normative issues in a way which
approximates to the complexities with which such issues are
surrounded in reality, or at least, comes closer to reflecting those
complexities than other techniques commonly used in surveys.
However, Faia (1980), Farkinson and Manstead (1993) and Kinicki et al. (1995)
voice notes of caution about the use of vignettes and warn that they can never
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fully represent the reality of people's lives (cited in Hughes and Hub)' 2002).
Nevertheless, the use of vignettes allows the researcher to access data that
could not be gathered by questionnaire (Gould 1996, cited in Hughes and
Huby 2002). Vignettes are often used as complementary techniques alongside
other research methods of data collection (Hazel 1995; Hughes 1998) and can
be employed "either to enhance existing data or to generate data not tapped
by other research methods (such as observation or interviews)" (Barter and
Reynolds 2000:2). The interviews ended when the research arrived at
theoretical saturation: "When additional analysis no longer contributes to
discovering anything new about a category" (Strauss, cited in Denscombe
1998:216).
The method of choosing respondents was agam based on the concept of
theoretical sampling, as introduced by Glaser and Strauss (1967:45):
Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating
theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his data
and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order
to develop his theory as it emerges. This process of data collection is
controlled by the emerging theory. (Cited in Dey 1999:5)
In other words, determining the sampling strategy for participants in the next
stage of the research was only possible in the light of the previous phase of
data collection (the questionnaires). Respondents were chosen in the same
way, regardless of their field of social care practice.
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Of 30 respondents to the questionnaires, 12 agreed to interview. From these
12, six respondents were chosen according to their field of practice and their
answers. Because Grounded Theory incorporates the research of exceptions or
negative cases (Strauss and Corbin 1990), participants offering different points
of view were invited to interview. As it had already been identified from the
questionnaires that there are similar ethical dilemmas across different fields
and similar elements that underpin the decision-making processes of
practitioners, practitioners with answers different to the majority of
respondents were invited to share their views about ethics and ethical
dilemmas as experienced within their practices.
Validity and Reliability of the Research
Validity and reliability are two very important elements of good qualitative
research. Kirk and Miller (1986:19, cited in Sarantakos 1993) explain validity
and reliability with an interesting metaphor:
A thermometer that shows the same reading of 82 degrees each time it
is plunged into boiling water gives a reliable measurement. A second
thermometer might give variations around 100 degrees; the second
thermometer would be unreliable but relatively valid, whereas the first
would be invalid but perfectly reliable.
In terms of research, this analogy could be illustrated in a set of interviews
conducted by a researcher. If the researcher gains similar answers for each
question asked, their instrument could be considered to be reliable. However, if
the way they ask the questions is biased, the answers could appear reliable but
would not be valid. Validity and reliability are therefore two very important
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elements in the research process. The next section will examine the elements of
validity and reliability in the present research report.
Validity
There are several ways to test the validity of research, though in this
particular case, the triangulation method was chosen (Denzin 1970;
Denscombe 1998; Dey 1993; May 1997; Strauss and Corbin 1990; Sarantakos
1993; Pandit 1996; Layder 1982). Triangulation ensures the validity of the
research and is important because
each method approaches the collection of data with a certain set of
assumptions and produces a kind of data which needs to be recognised
as having certain inherent strengths and certain inherent weaknesses in
relation to the aim of the particular research and particular constraints
(time, resources, access) faced by the researcher. (May 1997:84)
In other words, it allows the researcher to look at things from different
perspectives. Questionnaires bring a degree of uniformity to the data, as each
respondent has to answer the same set of questions. On the other hand,
interviews allow the researcher to go into greater depth with regard to certain
elements. Consequently, using different methods produces different data
(May 1997). The research can be validated by inter- and intra-method
triangulation (Sarantakos 1993).
Inter-method triangulation involves the use of three methods of different
methodological origin and nature, for example interviews, questionnaires and
documentary methods. Intra-method triangulation uses three techniques
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within the same method, for example semi-structured interviews, vignette-
based interviews and focus groups. These research methods are employed
together for the validity of the research because each element complements
the others and each has its advantages and limitations. As Sarantakos
(1993:155) argues,
normally, the research will employ one basic methodology and one
basic method, but if the research condition requires it, a combination of
methods of data collection will be employed. Triangulation of methods
is therefore used for the validation of the data because it allows a
variety of information on the same issue, uses the strength of each
method to overcome the deficiencies of the other, and to overcome the
deficiencies of single method studies.
However, triangulation of methods is not sufficient for validating the
research. Silverman (2001:166) suggests that "data triangulation and member
validation are usually inappropriate to validate field research", He suggests
that testing propositions and generalising to a larger population can be
claimed to be more appropriate. Moreover, triangulation for the purpose of
validating research has been criticised by Grounded Theory authors (Glaser
and Strauss 1967; Dey 1999). They have claimed that, because the research
passes from inductive to deductive (and vice versa), triangulation is not
necessary for validation. Consequently, inter- and intra-method triangulation
were both used during the research for validity, although communicative
validation was also applied.
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Communicative validation means returning to the field and asking
respondents to comment on the results. Communicative validation is outlined
by Sarantakos (1993:76), who states that
the validity of the findings can also be ensured through additional
questioning of the respondents; the researcher is then expected to re-
enter the field and collect additional data.
An applied example of communicative validation can be illustrated by
vignette-based interviews. From the third-stage analysis, a temporary
explanatory theory was discovered and then tested with the use of vignette-
based interviews.
The sampling for the vignette-based interviews was constructed from
respondents to the questionnaires. Of the six respondents, three had given
different answers to the majority of respondents. For example, among the
statutory social workers, a newly qualified respondent gave different replies
to those given by the other social workers. This respondent's overall value
position was that the organisational context of work (one of the themes) was
not having an impact on her work. This respondent was therefore chosen to
verify the answers given in the questionnaires, as communicative validation
means returning to the respondents to check previous data.
This research does not claim to be representative in terms of population or in
relation to the views of all social care practitioners. Instead, the study aimed
to explore the experiences of social care practitioners from different fields of
practice. The explanatory theory outlined in chapters Seven and Eight is more
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than likely applicable to all social care practitioners from the three sectors, but
in order to demonstrate this, another research project would need to be
developed, incorporating a broader sample. However, this study is still valid
and reliable for the population studied.
As Reason and Rowan (1981) argue,
good research goes back to the subjects with the tentative results, and
refines them in the light of the subject's reactions. (Cited in Silverman
2001:159)
This technique was used within the research; through the vignette-based
interviews, this form of validation was achieved. From the data gathered from
the questionnaires, an interview schedule was built, incorporating both
vignettes and semi-structured questions to ask respondents their opinions in
relation to the data previously gathered during completion of the
questionnaires.
As explained above, the research moved from deductive to inductive and vice
versa. Silverman (2001) suggests that analytic induction research based on
comparative methods and research into deviant cases is a good way to avoid
over-simplifying the research. From the third-stage analysis, a temporary
explanatory theory was raised, which was then tested through the use of
vignettes and semi-structured interviews. After gathering data by vignettes
and semi-structured interviews, and then transcribing them, the data from the
respondents were analysed in relation to the impact of the organisational
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context of the work. This was also part of the validation process of the
research.
Reliability
The reliability of the research is as important as its validity, as explained by
Kirk and Miller's (1996) metaphor. However, in the social sciences, reliability
does not mean the same in quantitative and qualitative research (Sarantakos
1993). Reliability in social research implies consistency and objectivity,
coherence and openness (Denscombe 1998; Sarantakos 1993). Sarantakos
(1993:78) suggests setting up a list of possible errors or distortions that can
occur during the research process so that reliable results can be ensured.
The potential distortions in this research were the following:
English as a second language. The researcher's mother tongue is French, and this
has probably slightly influenced the data analysis. For instance, with regard to
an interview transcript, some "glossing over" was done. However, this flaw
was overcome by seeking help from English colleagues when a sentence was
not clear during transcription. In addition, the research has benefited from the
input of proofreaders to read through the thesis and discuss some changes
with the researcher. However, the original ideas of the researcher were always
present, even after proofreading.
Different cultural background. The cultural background of the researcher is
totally different from the respondents' cultural background. It is important to
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note that, although Canadian culture shares some similarities with British
culture, the overall socialisation and training of the researcher is different to
that in Britain. One of the possible consequences is distortion in the analysis of
the data. For example, while undertaking the vignettes and semi-structured
interviews, humour could be misinterpreted as a serious statement by a
researcher with another cultural background. However, the researcher (being
conscious of this) asked the respondent to explain their answers in more
depth by asking "can you tell me more about that?", by asking "why"
questions and by summarising and repeating the respondent's ideas back to
them.
Subjectivity with regard to the topic. The researcher had experienced some of the
ethical dilemmas raised in the research and, therefore, even while trying to
keep an open mind during the research process, assumptions could threaten
to overtake the analysis of the data. However, being conscious about this
possible flaw, the researcher tried to achieve detachment from the data and
remove bias, although Glaser (1969) would argue that this is not possible and
even that it is preferable to be involved in the topic.
Building the sample. Qualified and unqualified workers took part in the
research at different points, which could have caused problems in terms of
sampling. Indeed, as the title 'social worker' was not protected in the UK
when the data collection took place, the researcher could not choose the 'social
workers' for the statutory sector sample solely by the qualifications held by
respondents. Instead, many social care practitioners were calling themselves
'social workers' without having formal training in the social work field during
the data-collection stages, until April 2004 when the title became protected in
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England and Wales. However, as their training and the interpretation of their
professional values base were identified as important elements of ethical
dilemmas during the data analysis, general understanding of the profession
appeared to be more important than formal qualifications. Consequently,
choosing respondents regardless of their qualifications appeared to be a
strength rather than a weakness, because of the range of answers provided.
However, during the data analysis, the training of the participants was taken
into account because this may have had an impact on their understanding of
professional values.
Another point to make in relation to building the sample concerns the
difficulty in accessing respondents, especially those working within statutory
social work. Indeed, some city councils would not allow the researcher to
contact the social workers directly; therefore, permission had to be sought
from the Director of Social Services before distributing the questionnaires.
Consequently, some respondents from the statutory social work section were
not briefed about the questionnaire and were thus returned incomplete.
Changing social care services in Britain. Another methodological issue occurring
within this research was the fact that, since the beginning of the research in
September 1998, the government has restructured social services in Britain
with the creation of the General Social Care Council and its related
organisations for Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. As described in
Chapter Two, the publication of the new White Paper on the modernisation of
social services in Britain and the formation of the General Social Care Council
for the regulation of social services practice in England have affected attitudes
towards the practice of ethics within the social care sector. However, the
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impact of the new regulations do not affect the overall explanatory theory (see
chapters Seven and Eight), as the conclusions of the research are more
concerned with the elements that influence ethical practice in social work and
the impact of regulation on social care practitioners than with the application
of one particular Act or Code of Ethics. Therefore, the changes occurring in
social care practice should not influence the ideas explored and analysed
within the discussion chapter (Chapter Eight).
Research Ethics
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has published a Research
Ethics Framework (REF) to be used by students and researchers in order to
comply with nationally recognised ethical guidelines for research, effective
since the 1st of January 2006 (ESRC 2005). This section on research ethics will
examine the possible ethical issues related to this research using the ESRC
framework.
Research proposals must usually be assessed by an ethics committee unless the
research has been identified as posing minimal risk to participants. The
category 'minimal risk to participants' would be granted on the grounds that
the research does not involve
vulnerable groups identified as 'children, and young people, those
with learning disability or cognitive impairment, or individuals in a
dependent or unequal relationships; on the ground of research
involving sensitive topics (sexual behaviour, their illegal or political
behaviour, their experience of violence, their abuse or exploitation,
their mental health or their gender or ethnic status), or research
involving groups where permission of a gatekeeper is normally
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required for initial access to member (for example ethnic of cultural
groups, native peoples or indigenous communities); involving
deception or which is conducted without participant's full and
informed consent; Research involving access to records of personal or
confidential information; Research that would induce psychological
stress, anxiety or humiliation; and finally, research that would involve
intrusive intervention (such as administration of drugs or other
substance. (ESRC 2005:8)
When the research began in 1998, no such guidelines existed in relation to
research ethics in the social care sector. However, this research project would
probably have been approved as presenting 'minimal risk to participants'.
Nevertheless, this section will examine some of the research ethics implications
and the ways they were addressed at the time to ensure that the research was
conducted ethically. The ESRC REF (2005:25) identifies six core principles of
ethical research that must be fully considered before undertaking qualitative
social research, which are discussed in tum below.
Integrity and Quality of the Research
To ensure the integrity of the research, many steps were taken, and these will be
explored further under the various ethical principles below. However, quality
was ensured by the way that the research was undertaken and designed and
finally with the use of reviews. The research was conducted using a clear
methodological framework and was based on a solid research perspective,
which ensured that flaws were avoided and that the validity and reliability of
the research was questioned (and therefore ensured) as part of the process.
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Informed Consent and Voluntary Participation
The notion of informed consent was paramount during the whole research
process. For example, before filling in the questionnaire, the content of the
research was verbally explained over the phone, and participants were invited
to ask questions about the process. Those who verbally agreed to participate in
the research process were then sent a questionnaire with a cover sheet
explaining the aims and purpose of the research a second time (and in writing);
they were also told that their participation should be voluntary. Consent was
also sought from the statutory social services departments, and emphasis was
given to the confidentiality of the data. Finally, it was made clear that
participants were free to opt out of the research process at any time, and no
form of incentive was given to any of the research participants.
Confidentiality and Anonymity of the Data
Steps were taken in order to ensure the confidentiality of the data collected
during the research process through anonymisation of the research results. For
example, each participant was given a unique code made up of a random
number (from 1 to 10) and a letter indicating their field of practice ('S' for the
statutory sector, 'C' for the voluntary sector and'A' for social action settings).
No names, organisations or personal details that could lead to the respondent
being recognised were added to the data-collection tools, and all raw data were
kept safely locked in a filing cabinet at the researcher's home. The raw data
(paper and tape-recorded) will be safely discarded at the end of the research
process. The data will also be anonymised when the research results are
published.
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Avoiding Harm to Research Participants
The research process did not discriminate against participants from any race,
age, disability, ethnicity, religion, culture, gender or in relation to any other
characteristics (ESRC 2005). Participants were chosen according to their
suitability for the sample, which included men and women from various parts
of the UK. Because the research deals with the sensitive topic of ethical practice,
some minimal risk to the participants could have been an issue. Indeed, as
ESRC (2005) explains, risk to participants can occur when delicate topics are at
the forefront of the research objectives. However, all respondents were adult
and had to give their informed consent in order to participate in the research,
and therefore, participants were fully aware of their choice to participate.
Consequently, the researcher did not judge that major harm could arise for the
participants and felt that, if a low level of risk was present, that "minimal
personal risk could produce results that will have longer-term benefit to the
respondent and others" (ESRC 2005:25).
Possible Conflicts of Interest
No conflicts of interest were envisaged during the research process, because the
funding was provided by an independent overseas source.
This chapter explored the research perspectives and the methodologies used
to conduct this research project. It has discussed the data-collection tools and
briefly explored the data analysis processes (these will be further detailed in
the next chapter). It has also questioned the validity and reliability of the
project.
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The next chapter, outlining the data analysis, complements the methodology
chapter in illustrating some of the analysis techniques that were paramount to
achieving saturation and completing the research process. It contains the
discussion of the data analysis and will cover all the data gathered during the




This chapter has two aims: to present the methodological procedures while at
the same time following the Grounded Theory methodology, and to present the
data accumulated during each stage of coding. This chapter follows the
sequence used during the data collection, and each section will begin by
examining different approaches to coding and will then be followed by an
examination of the data collected during the research process. The first stage
analysis comprises data collected from the preliminary interviews and the
background literature review. This will be followed by the second-stage
analysis, where data were collected by focus groups and a return to the
literature. Third-stage analysis will consider the data collected through the use
of questionnaires, and finally, the fourth-stage analysis will examine the data as
it reaches saturation while being collected by semi-structured interviews and
vignette-based interviews. Different methods of coding will be examined
concurrently with the data at each stage of the data analysis.
First-Stage Analysis: Preliminary Interviews Analysed through Open Coding
Methodological Procedures: Open Coding
The first step in analysing data using a Grounded Theory framework is to
examine data through an 'open-coding' procedure. Sarantakos (1993:272)
describes open coding as a process that "serves to initiate coding, is rather
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'open' and general, and allows further refinement and reinterpretations".
Strauss and Corbin (1990:61) define open coding as "the process of breaking
down, examining, comparing, conceptualising and categorising data". Glaser
(cited in Dey 1999:10) explains open coding as involving "coding of the data
in every way possible [... ] for as many categories that might fit".
Open coding is the first step in data analysis using Grounded Theory and can
be achieved through breaking down the first set of data in order to create as
many codes and categories as possible, keeping a record of all the words used
by people or literature in relation to the research topic. Open coding is the first
step in the comparative method of data analysis and can be described as
"comparing incidents applicable to each category" (Glaser and Strauss
1967:105).
Codes can be described as words that indicate different elements of the
general topic. Glaser and Strauss (1978:70) explain open coding as in vivo in
that it is very close to the original data (cited in Strauss and Corbin 1990).
Codes are also complemented by different themes, which can be considered
as 'labels' and aim to give an explanation of the codes. Sarantakos (1993:272)
explains that
coding refers to asking questions about categories and their
relationship. It consequently helps to discover categories and
subcategories, which are then named and further processed.
Open coding was used within the first-stage analysis (see Figure 2) and was
done via line by line and sentence analysis of data from the first set of
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interviews and then compared in the light of the background review of the
literature (Strauss and Corbin 1990). The main aim of open coding is to
generate as many codes as possible (Gibson, cited in Miller and Brewer
2003:133). This first step of open coding used in the first-stage analysis
provided a series of codes representing words or themes expressed by the
interviewees and/or found in the literature at the time consulted.
Figure 2, below, outlines the first set of codes that appeared during the first
stage of data collection and analysis:
Figure 2: First-Stage Analysis
Statutory Social Work
General Social care Council
Welfare State
Government policy and regulations
Assessment of needs
Modernisation of the social welfare
system
Staff handbook
Social relation in intervention
Protection of the public
Social work values
Professional interests




































































Good / bad behaviours
Boundaries
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... Codes in italics are solely from the review of the literature on the topic
Theoretical sensitivity was also important in the first stage of analysis, as
some codes were created on the basis of the personal experience of the
researcher.
Personal and professional experience is another source of [theoretical]
sensitivity, if a researcher is fortunate enough to have had this
experience. (Strauss and Corbin 1990:42)
Therefore, all the codes were identified through the preliminary interviews,
the literature review and the personal and professional experience of the
researcher. As many of these codes had similar meanings, the codes from
Figure 1 were classified under three main categories: 'Statutory Social Work',
'Social action Work/Voluntary Sector' and 'Ethics and Conduct', which
constituted the first-stage analysis.
A category is defined as a classification of a concept. Strauss and Corbin
(1990:61) explain that
this classification [category] is discovered when concepts are compared
one against another and appear to pertain to a similar phenomenon.
Thus the concepts are grouped together under a higher order, more
abstract concept called category.
Categories are therefore broader names that regroup codes following a logical
procedure. The names for the three categories below were chosen on the basis
of the concepts people referred to during the preliminary interviews and on
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the literature as well as on the researcher's own understanding of the
material. Glaser and Strauss (1967:17) support the personal understanding of
the researcher in the definition of categories:
As categories and their properties emerge, the analyst will discover
two kinds: those that he has constructed himself; and those that have
been abstracted from the language of the research situation.
Therefore, the categories of 'Statutory Social Work' and 'Ethics and Conduct'
emerged from comparing the data with the literature, but the category 'Social
action Work/Voluntary Sector' was given by the researcher as a means of
categorising the codes under a broader meaning." This is partially due to the
fact that no social action projects were visited but some organisations
nevertheless based their intervention under the social action principles. A
symbolic interactionist perspective also supports the involvement of the
researcher in the research and coding process, as Blumer (1969:86) explains:
To try to catch the interpretative process by remaining aloof as a so-
called 'objective' observer and refusing to take the role of the acting
unit is to risk the worst kind of subjectivism - the objective observer is
likely to fill in the process of interpretation with his own surmises in
place of catching the process as it occurs in the experience of the acting
unit which uses it.
The three preliminary categories as illustrated in Figure 1 were therefore
constructed from the analysis of the data as well as from the examination of
9 Dey (1999:67) explains that categories are "always approximate, provisional and relative to the
particular context of confusable alternatives encountered to date", In the light of the corrections
made to the thesis in 2006, I have decided to leave the categories of this 1sl stage of data
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the literature, but also from the researcher's own perspective on the research
statement, which involves an examination of boundaries between service
users in statutory social work and in social action settings.
The following section of this first stage of data analysis will examine the data
that emerged from the interviews with the participants from both the
statutory and the voluntary sector. The data will be presented using the three
main categories illustrated in Figure 1.
First-Stage Analysis: The Data
The first stage of data collection was completed using a set of questions
constituting a preliminary interview schedule with four respondents and
aimed to explore the initial proposition. This consisted of verifying whether or
not the proposition was acceptable: 'roles and values in statutory social work are
different from those in social action groupwork and therefore new guidelines must be
developed specifically for social action groupwork'.
Purposive sampling was used to make up the first group of respondents
(Sarantakos 1993); practitioners' names were suggested by the first and
second PhD supervisors and then chosen according to their type of work
(statutory social services and voluntary sector / social action setting). Of the
respondents, one worked as a statutory social worker within the'Access' team
of a social services department, two worked for national voluntary
analysis In their original state (1999) as opposed to changing them in the light of new
knowledge acquired since then.
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organisations but had several years of experience within the statutory sector
and were identified through the Centre for Social Action and one was
working in collaboration with the Centre for Social Action.
The interview questions explored different elements of practice, such as the
work setting, fit between work title, role and task of the respondent, and the
place of anti-oppressive practice and empowerment within the organisation's
core values and principles (Appendix 4 contains the interview schedule). All
the interviews were relatively short in duration; most participants agreed to
have the interview tape recorded and then transcribed, apart from the
interview with the statutory social worker, where only written notes were
made.
These preliminary data were analysed by open coding and mainly served to
build the second stage of the data collection. The following section aims to
examine the data collected during these preliminary interviews. The data are
presented in various categories, as shown in Figure 1 above.
Statutory Social Work
Statutory duties were considered very important for the social worker working
within the Access team of an adult social services department area office.
Among the legislation used within her work, the Community Care Act was
considered fundamental, but the respondent also referred to the 'Staff
Handbook' as well as the 'Provision for [city name] Social Services' documents
as being important within her work.
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For the participants coming from the voluntary sector, however, the concept of
statutory social work, statutory duties and regulations were considered less
important in their day-to-day work than in the work of the statutory social
worker, although it did have an impact to some extent, as a manager of a
national voluntary organisation explained:
I think with the recent legislation, the Children Act has been important to
us because it has brought a clear separation of what is the responsibility
of Social Services, basically to supervise and assess child protection
issues, whereas before, perhaps, the role was somehow more blurred.
Organisations like us can find themselves being asked to do that sort of
work by the Local Authority social services offices, but we have a
different identity.
From the interviewee's comment, it therefore appears that, although statutory
duties do not have the same impact for workers from the voluntary sector than
from the statutory sector, they nevertheless affect their day-to-day work. The
impact of statutory duties did not feel as something imposed upon them, but as
rendering their roles clearer. However, the interviewees from the other
voluntary organisations felt that statutory duties did not affect their work, as
the director of a national voluntary organisation explained:
We have got nothing to do with the State.... We don't work for local
government or for the National government it is a charity and the
services are provided to families by volunteers .... So not only are we a
voluntary organisation, the services are also provided by volunteers.
Nevertheless, two respondents expressed that statutory duties and other
external pressures such as independent and state funding, in the context of the
work carried out by the voluntary sector, could sometimes appear to hinder
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some of the organisation's values. For example, a manager of a national non-
voluntary organisation explained:
They [big organisations] might want to be led by their values but they
also want to remain the biggest. If you are the biggest, it is like Tesco ....
So they are pushed in some ways by their size to remain big. " because it
is getting money from people as well as government.
Therefore, the need for funding, according to this participant, had the potential
to impact upon the organisation's values. Nevertheless, there are still great
differences between the voluntary and the statutory sector in terms of the
impact that statutory duties have overall upon the organisations and the way
work is carried out. A participant explained the difference he perceives:
I was a director of social services so I used to run the whole of the social
services department for [name of the county] ... and I was very much
caught up in Government regulations and child protection procedures ...
and everything was so prescribed ... the rules and regulations set by the
national government. In [name of the current organisation] apart from
child protection what we do isn't prescribed at all ... there is no
regulation, there is not a piece of law that says what we have to do and
that is why it is so special because our volunteers can be themselves ...
they can be human beings ... they don't see themselves as social workers
... they see themselves as human beings working with some parents.
(Director of a national voluntary organisation)
Therefore, from the data presented above, it can be summarised that, while
statutory social work within social-service area offices are largely influenced by
legislation and statutory duties, this impact is lessened among voluntary
organisations. That said, statutory duties can have an impact on the work
carried out by some of the big voluntary organisations, especially in terms of
child protection and funding.
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Codes of Ethics and Codes of Practice
As for the application of statutory duties and regulations, the application of
codes of ethics and codes of practice differed slightly from one sector to
another. While the interviewee from the statutory sector did not refer to a
particular code of conduct or code of ethics, she was clear that the
organisation's staff handbook was affecting her practice greatly. The
participant explains that, as her role was to assess new cases within the Access
team, it was difficult to refer to a code of ethics for social workers. This
difficulty, according to her, was partly because of the nature of the work,
which involves a very limited contact with service users, but also because
only 20% of the workforce that constitute the Access team were qualified for
social work. Therefore, the participant explained that she did not perceive the
unqualified staff as having the need to refer to the code of ethics. However,
the participant explained that the Access team staff were provided with a staff
handbook in order to help them to deal with ethical dilemmas. The
participants explained, however, that, when an ethical dilemma occurs, for
example in the case of a client who has needs that do not meet the criteria, the
social workers have to follow the rules of the organisation instead of the
client's needs. The participant explained that, if a client has an important need
but does not fit the criteria provided by the local authority, he or she will not
be able to receive the service needed and will therefore be referred somewhere
else.
In regard to the other sector, none of the three organisations visited during
these preliminary interviews based their practices upon recognised code of
ethics to guide their work. However, all voluntary organisations visited also
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produced at least a staff handbook that included, for example, the values of the
organisation and various internal policies. The reasons for not using a code of
ethics such as that produced by BASW differed from one organisation to
another. A project worker explained their reasoning for not using such a code:
We don't use the BASW code of ethics because until recently it was not
even updated and the 1975 edition is extremely sexist because it is
written like if all social workers were men where the vast majority of
social workers are women so it is unusable.
Other participants explained that their staff handbooks were appropriate to
the type of work they did and that they were more specific to the context in
which intervention took place as opposed to a general code of conduct. For
one particular organisation, the organisation's value base was more important
than formal guidelines found in codes of conduct. As the director of a
voluntary organisation explains, "we are not looking for our volunteers to be
all the same, we are looking for diversity".
Another interviewee explained the importance of core values as opposed to a
simple code of ethics:
We are very keen that there is a very clear ethical and anti-oppressive
practice strand in [our work] so people actually know where it is and
people are very clear about what it means so they can actually put in
into practice instead of just finding it on a piece of paper. Our code is
not written down - it is implicit rather than explicit. (Project worker for
a voluntary organisation)
Similar to one of the reasons given by the statutory social worker, a voluntary
organisation explained they were not using a code of ethics such as the one
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produced by BASW, because the majority of their employees were not
qualified for social work. Indeed,
no 'social workers' are employed - some of the organisers are social
workers but we are looking in the qualities of organisers, not their
qualifications. Non judgment, good managers, and some of the people
who are employed are nurses, teachers, social workers, hair dressers, a
housewife, but it is the human qualities that they have rather than the
professional qualification that we look for. (Director of a national non-
governmental organisation)
Therefore, for the voluntary sector organisations, a value base, as opposed to a
code of ethics, was perceived as being more appropriate and useful for the
type of work carried out by their organisations.
Nevertheless, from the data gained during this first set of data, and regardless
of the sector, it was clear that, while staff handbooks and value statements
were important to their unique social work practice, codes of ethics and codes
of conduct were considered less of a foundation on which social work roles
and duties were based. However, it is important to note that the data were
collected in 1999, before the launch of the General Social Care Council and the
compulsory codes of practice for employers and employees published in 2002
and that the information collected could possibly have changed since.
Social Action and the Voluntary Sector
Each of the organisations visited had a set of values specific to their
organisation. The organisations from the voluntary sector were mainly based
on values of social justice and on principles such as confidentiality, empathy
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and being non-judgemental, whereas the statutory social worker mentioned a
similar set of values but with additional components: dignity and equality,
social justice, integrity and sustainability.
None of the interviewees from either sector referred to their project or
organisation as being one based on social action. However, all organisations
from the voluntary sector included the value of empowerment and social
justice as being central to their work. Nevertheless, some voluntary
organisations felt that their intervention was not always fostering the
development of empowerment or anti-oppressive practice in every situation:
Our record on equal opportunity and anti-oppressive practice is
perhaps not as good as it could be ... most of our volunteers and most
of our organisers are white ... and most of them are women ... and we
now want to encourage more black people to become organisers or
volunteers and more men... not primarily because of equal
opportunity, but because as an organisation we want to reach all
sections of the community. (Director of a national non-governmental
organisation)
One particular interviewee felt that, although working within a social-justice
value based organisation, upholding a high priority on values such as
empowerment and anti-discriminatory practice was sometimes difficult to
achieve:
I try to highlight that it may be difficult to promote anti-discriminatory
work and sometimes it can be a huge problem. In many groups, there
is a big gap between talking about it [empowerment and social justice]
with people from ethnic minorities or disabled children, for example,
but often the actual work does not achieve that. (Manager for a national
non-governmental organisation)
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This was particularly felt by a worker employed by a Christian organisation
where, for example, employing gay and lesbian people was perceived as
problematic by the organisation's management.
However, values such as empowerment, social justice and anti-oppressive
practice were paramount to the voluntary sector organisations' value bases.
As a manager from a voluntary organisation explains,
we make sure that all the bits of work we do incorporates anti-
oppressive practice throughout everything we do.
One particular organisation did not only aim at empowering service users,
but also at empowering workers and volunteers as well. This was illustrated
by the interviewee telling the researcher about many volunteers and
employees taking steps in order to gain qualifications as a result of their
positive work-experience for the organisation:
First, the volunteers themselves get something out of the service. It is
not only the service user who gains in the service. Some of the
volunteers go on to training to become social workers or teachers.
(Director of a national voluntary organisation)
In addition to a focus on empowerment for volunteers and employees, this
same organisation felt that voluntary organisations in general tend to promote
service users' empowerment more than is possible within the statutory sector:
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There are some advantages in the voluntary organisation ... from the
family point of view it feels much more comfortable to them, people
don't get visits because they are inadequate parents. Social services in
the UK have become very stigmatised since maybe 5 or 10 years. It is
not seen as a good thing to have a social worker. Because there have
been quite a few bad cases where social workers were seen as
'snatching' children away from their home. (Director of a national
voluntary organisation)
The concept of 'not labelling' was therefore an important value that was
underpinned by the value of empowerment and anti-oppressive practice.
Another concept that emerged from the data was that of 'relationships' and
'boundaries' between the service user and worker. One particular voluntary
organisation mentioned the importance of relationships built between the
worker and the service user:
The actual chemistry of the relationship is unique to 'that' volunteer
and 'that' family and that is what makes it work very well indeed.
(Director of a national non-governmental organisation)
It was also pointed out, however, that there are limits to the relationships
between service user and worker and that perhaps some codes of conduct
would be valuable in certain cases:
We would not match a single male volunteer with a single mother.
There have been a couple of cases where the volunteers were visiting
couples, and the mother felt in love with the volunteer and the
relationship broke down [... ] but there is no code of conduct. (Director
of a national voluntary organisation)
145
Therefore, while some voluntary organisations do not use a code of conduct or
a code of ethics, or are not affected by statutory duties or regulations, it appears
that some service users may be more at risk in certain situations. On the other
hand, having rigid handbooks, guidelines or statutory duties can hinder the
social care practitioner's work, as illustrated by the social worker from the
Access team above. Indeed, the social worker mentioned that she felt she had to
follow the rules of the organisation instead of the client's needs. Ethics, conduct,
and right or wrong behaviour seem to be understood differently by the
participants of this first set of interviews.
Consequently, in the light of these data, the research calls for further
questioning: how are ethics and ethical conduct understood by social care
practitioners? Therefore, the second stage of data collection and analysis will
aim to examine the social care practitioners' understanding of guidelines, codes
of ethics, codes of conduct and other mechanisms for the protection of the
public and the worker.
Second-Stage Analysis: Focus Groups Analysed through Open Coding
Methodological Procedures: Open Coding
As the research continued, more data collections took place. The literature
was explored further, and focus groups were initiated to add depth to the
previous data analysed through the preliminary interviews and the first
literature review. Because new codes appeared during the data collection
from the focus groups, some codes from the first-stage analysis were
regrouped with new codes from the second-stage analysis. Some codes were
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eliminated because they were unrelated to the main research topic (Strauss,
cited in Sarantakos 1993:272). The categories were also renamed, as the names
from the categories from the first-stage analysis were too broad (see Figure 3
for these new categories). Strauss and Corbin (1990) support the concept of
renaming categories during research and changing the originals for more
appropriate ones.



















































The procedure for data analysis, that is to say 'open coding', was repeated.
However, the following changes were made between the first and second
stages of analysis: From the first-stage analysis, statutory services was replaced
with regulations and vested interests of the policy maker during the second-stage
analysis because the first category could lead to confusion with the 'sector of
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social care practice' and could also incorporate codes from other categories.
The category social action work from the first-stage analysis was replaced with
empowerment during the second-stage analysis because some codes from the
first-stage analysis could then be regrouped in different categories, such as
statutory services. An example of this is anti-discriminatory practice: this code
could be placed in statutory services, social action work or even ethics, as anti-
discriminatory practice is a value base for many social care practice settings.
Fielding (1993) states that codes must be mutually exclusive. This means that,
for example, the code vested interest was not allowed in more than one
category. However, during the first-stage analysis, some codes were found
under different categories: for example, codes such as 'vested interest',
intervention', and'anti-oppressive practice' could not be placed under a sole
category. In order not to replicate codes from one category to another (Glaser
and Strauss 1967), the names of the categories were thus changed during the
second-stage analysis.
After putting the new codes into different categories, the next step was to
conceptualise - in other words, to build up explanations for the labels. During
the second-stage analysis, many new codes had appeared, and some codes
had merged with the new ones. These new codes led the researcher to adopt a
more inductive approach. The researcher recognised at this stage that the
previous research proposition was too strict and that a more open approach to
the research had to be considered. From the different codes gathered during
the second-stage analysis, a new data-collection tool was developed in the
form of questionnaires, so as to explore the codes further.
148
Second-Stage Analysis: The Data
The second-stage analysis aimed to explore the following reformulated research
question: 'How are ethics and ethical conduct understood by social care practitioners?'
This new question emerged from the analysis of the interview scripts (first-
stage analysis) and constituted the second-stage analysis of the research project.
The focus-group technique was employed to gather the data, and the sampling
method used was 'opportunistic'. Indeed, an opportunity had arisen to join
existing focus groups that had been organised in order to identify the roles of
health and other care support workers. The research project in question had
been commissioned by the Department of Health (DOH) with the aim of
reviewing health support workers' roles and responsibilities and exploring
regulations that might be appropriate for the health care workforce. This
adjoining project was conducted between October 1999 and April 2000 (Better
Regulation Task Force 1999). The researcher used three of the eight focus
groups consulted for the DOH research project (these groups consisted of about
eight social care assistants/support workers). The other five groups were not
consulted in regard to this particular research because they were mainly
composed of health professionals as opposed to social care workers. Specific
questions related to the present research were incorporated in order to gather
the data specific to this research project. For example, although the groups were
set up to discuss a number of topics (see focus-group schedule in Appendix 2),
the researcher joined these focus groups exclusively to gather data around
codes of conducts, voluntary registers, external inspections/regulations and
complaints procedures (exercise: protecting the public). This joint focus-group
tactic was organised in order to minimise the respondents' involvement within




Codes of conduct were considered important in shaping the culture of the
workplace and the values of employees by laying down basic standards of
attitude and behaviour. Setting principles for confidentiality and for the
respectful treatment of service users was an important aspect, and there were
general rules about such matters as smoking, language and dress. Because the
code had to be sufficiently flexible to cover all groups of employees, detailed
guidance about practice was not generally included, nor was it felt to be
appropriate. Most of the focus group participants had become familiar with
their own code of conduct at induction, although few claimed to have consulted
it regularly once they had become established within the organisation; they
nonetheless felt it to be a valuable reference point for themselves and for people
receiving the service. The importance of publicising the code to service users
and carers was therefore recognised, and this was felt to be adequately achieved
through the distribution of leaflets and handbooks prominently displayed.
Although the code of conduct was not a robust safeguard in its own right, it
was seen as an essential component of a safe working environment for the
social care workers.
Voluntary registers
There was very little knowledge or experience of voluntary registers among the
focus group participants. When examples of such registers were given and their
operation outlined, the general view was that, although useful in those
instances where both applicants and employees had chosen to use the register,
they would provide an extremely limited safeguard for the workforce as a
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whole because of their optional nature. There were questions about the
standards adopted for operating these registers and concerns that, if poorly run,
unsuitable people might be included. Questions were raised about the sanctions
available: being'struck off' a voluntary register would have little meaning for
the person who could immediately gain employment elsewhere.
Complaints procedures
Rather like codes of conduct, while complaints procedures were not at the
forefront of attention from day to day, they were seen to be important in setting
the tone of the workplace or service. They signalled to users and their families
that they had an independent right to question what was being provided. The
support workers said that, although it was not always easy to view complaints
positively rather than defensively, it was important that the staff learned to do
so. To this end, it was essential that senior management took a strong lead and
promoted the procedures through notices, brochures and leaflets. Several
workers said that, although they would try to deal with issues informally in the
first instance, they would have no hesitation in encouraging users to make a
formal complaint if appropriate. Complaints procedures were seen to work
most effectively in user-sensitive and well-run environments. Where conditions
were poor and the needs of users given low priority, the procedures in
themselves were thought unlikely to provide much protection.
External inspection
Many examples of external scrutiny were given (for example, Investor in
People, NVQ assessment, and health and safety). At the more formal end were
the local authority inspections, the monitoring reports that a voluntary
organisation had to provide for its funders, and health and safety inspections
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and audits. Formal inspection was generally viewed as necessary and fair and
as a vital safeguard for the public; however, one group pointed out that they
would welcome formal inspections as long as they encompassed a flexible
approach and that their organisation's values would not be undermined. For
this particular group, it was therefore important that the organisation's value
remained central to the work carried out.
Examining the case for an additional regulatory mechanism
The participants were asked whether the existing employment safeguards, if
properly implemented, were sufficient on their own to protect the public
against abusive individuals and incompetent practice or whether an additional
level of regulation, probably involving a register of workers, was needed. The
balance of opinion across the three focus groups was in favour of
supplementary regulation, although levels of support varied. Participants
qualified their support with a range of questions and doubts.
For example, a national system could be good to protect the public and
maintain standards of practice, but participants also raised questions such as
• Would the system be accessible and user-friendly for service users and
carers?
• Who would pay?
• What would be the basis for registration?
In addition, if there were to be a detailed code of practice and standards of
training, some smaller and more specialised organisations, particularly in the
voluntary sector, could go under. There could thus be the danger of
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undermining choice for service users.
To sum up, while most participants welcomed the principle of supplementary
regulation, they recognised a number of issues around its implementation that
would need to be carefully worked through if the benefits of a new system were
to justify the cost.
In the light of this data collection, a number of new concepts (codes) emerged,
such as the perceived importance of regulations and safeguards for the
protection of the public or the public interest, and the organisational and
professional values.
Each code accumulated during the first two stages of the data collection and
analysis so far served as the basis for the development of the questionnaires,
which constituted the third-stage analysis. Since the first and second stages of
analysis were considered to be preliminary data, the focus of this chapter will
be aimed at the third and fourth stages of analysis, as explored below. For an
exhaustive list of the codes that informed the development of the
questionnaires, see Figure 3 above.
Third-Stage Analysis: Questionnaires Analysed through Axial Coding
The data for the third-stage analysis were collected using a questionnaire that
was designed in the light of the second-stage analysis. The preliminary data
accumulated during the first two stages of analysis had shown differences in
understandings of ethics, values and empowerment, and also in public
protection, regulations and the utilisation of guidelines. The decision was then
taken to collect data in various fields of social care practice and to analyse the
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data according to field of practice and by comparing the data between the fields
in order to identify differences and similarities. It was decided, at that stage, to
determine three distinct sectors of the provision of social services where data
was to be collected: the statutory sector remained the same as for previous data-
collection points, but a distinction would be made between the voluntary sector
(which includes small groups and national charities) and specific social action
projects, which can take place in either statutory social services projects or
within a voluntary organisation but that are characterised by the strict
adherence to social action values (see Literature Review: Social action Setting
for further details).
As already explained in the methodology chapter, over 60 questionnaires were
sent out; 32 were returned and 30 were retained for analysis, with 10 usable
returns from each sector studied (statutory social work, voluntary sector and
social action settings).
Methodological Procedures: Axial Coding
From the data collected via the questionnaires, a third-stage analysis was
developed. At this stage, a different type of coding was used: 'axial coding'.
Axial coding is defined as a method of data analysis that "concentrates on
issues related to the axis of a category, and involves more intensive analysis"
(Sarantakos 1993:272). Strauss and Corbin (1990:96) explain axial coding as
a set of procedures whereby data are put back together in new ways
after open coding, by making connections between categories. This is
done by utilising coding paradigms involving conditions, context,
action/interactional strategies and consequences.
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In other words, the codes and categories themselves are not only analysed in
terms of meanings, but are also compared with one other. The three sectors
examined during the research were statutory social services, voluntary
organisations and social action settings. In order to achieve axial coding, the
codes were not only compared in terms of categories (as with the open coding
at the earlier stage), but were also examined in relation to the different sectors.
Figure 4 illustrates the axial coding constructed in the third-stage analysis.
Again, as for the second-stage analysis, some of the category names were
changed for more appropriate labels. Additionally, some of the codes were
regrouped to form sub-categories. Because of the nature of the axial coding,
codes and categories were also analysed according to social services sector
(statutory sector, voluntary sector and social action). Figure 4 below explains
how the axial coding was achieved:










































































































































































































































































The axial coding was achieved by examining each code for each sector,
developing an understanding of the concept within the sector and comparing
each code between different sectors. For example, the concept of power and
empowerment was examined in relation to the statutory sector, but also
compared with the examination of the concept of power and empowerment
within the voluntary sector and social action settings. As Strauss and Corbin
(1990:97) stress, axial coding "puts those data back together in new ways by
making connections between a category and its subcategories".
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The analysis by axial coding was carried out to discover whether there were
any links, patterns or relationships between each code (or the sub-categories)
and the categories from different sectors of the provision of social care
services. Because the main methodology used was Grounded Theory, the
search for exceptions or negative cases within the comparison was considered
to be essential:
It is just as important in doing Grounded Theory studies to find
evidence of differences and variation, as it is to find evidence that
supports our original questions and statements. The negative or
alternative cases tell us that something about this instance is different,
and so we must move in and take a close look at what this might be.
(Strauss and Corbin 1990:109)
Special attention was given to the negative cases during the analysis of the
questionnaires (in the third-stage analysis) and served in building the
interview schedule and vignettes that were used during the fourth stage of the
data collection (see below). The vignettes and interviews were also developed
through axial coding; indeed, questions and vignettes were developed to
validate the new codes and categories from the third-stage analysis.
Third-Stage Analysis: The Data
Statutory Social Services
All the respondents were based within a social services area office and worked
within the remit of Personal Social Services (PSS), as discussed in the literature
review. All called themselves 'social workers'. Most of these participants were
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qualified to the DipSW level or equivalent, apart from two (of whom, one had a
Youth and Community Work Diploma, while the other had no qualifications
relevant to social care practice). Only two of the respondents belonged to the
BASW, and of these two, only one used the title of 'social worker'. One
respondent used the title without being qualified to the DipSW level (note:
these data were collected in the year 2000, before the General Social Care
Council came into force and recognised the title of 'social worker').
Their day-to-day work was similar to their job descriptions, and they had all
been given either a staff handbook, a code of conduct or policies and
procedures to follow within their work. Their agencies' internal regulations
were said to have a very important impact on their practice. One respondent
noted on the questionnaire:
I follow them all the time but mostly from memory. The things I look up
are usually to do with the more politically sensitive areas e.g.
mistreatment of older adult, guardianship under the Mental Health Act,
access to record. (Statutory social worker - adult with disability/older
adult)
Each respondent was also strongly influenced by at least one of the following
items of legislation: Community Care Act 1996, Chronically III and Disabled
Persons Act 1976, Mental Health Act 1983, Carer and Disabled Children Act
2000, and Children Act 1989.
Practitioners understood the concepts of ethics and ethical dilemmas as being
influenced by regulations such as agencies' internal policies and regulations,
statutory duties and admissibility criteria. Respondents to the questionnaire
noted, for example, that ethical dilemmas occurred "when your personal belief
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system tells you what is the right course of action but it conflicts with your
statutory duties" (statutory social worker - children and family) or "when you
are required to take a particular course of action that conflicts with your own
personal values or belief" (statutory social worker - residential care). One
respondent noted that an ethical dilemma was when one has to make a decision
that affects "whether you keep your job or not" (statutory social worker -
intensive support team). This comment emphasises the importance of the
internal policy, regulation and overall work settings on the understanding of
ethics and ethical dilemmas.
Examples of conflict between professional values and the use of statutory duties
were often used to illustrate the kinds of ethical dilemmas that emerged from
their practice. Among the elements that were said to cause ethical dilemmas,
participants mentioned
• conflict between their professional values and the agency's policy,
• conflict between users' wishes and risk assessment,
• conflict between budget restrictions and users' needs,
• conflict in regard to flexibility and fairness in providing services
(including admission criteria), and
• tension between their roles (enabling or controlling).
According to participants, the most important elements to consider in resolving
ethical dilemmas were statutory duties and regulations, agency policies, risk for
the user, their own values or their professional values, and others' opinions.
One respondent, in relation to resolving ethical dilemmas, commented:
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I suppose I would adopt the Standard Service 'mantra', 'everyone has
choice', 'you could have done this differently'. I sometimes may not
believe it but I suppose I would end up using it to cover-up my own
sympathy with their predicament. (Statutory social worker - probation
services)
Legal duties and agency policies were highlighted as having the most impact on
their practice.
The term 'empowerment' was understood on an individual level (Gutierrez and
Ortega 1991). Respondents perceived empowerment as being translatable into
practice by offering choices, sharing power with the service user, providing
information and resources, and enabling and promoting independence.
Examples of definitions provided by the respondents included the following:
Assisting people to make choices, giving people information, listening to
what people say, working with people, enabling independence,
increased confidence and self-esteem. (Statutory social work manager -
older adult)
Empowering practice I feel is where you encourage the service user to
take control of any assessment procedure/meeting that they are taking
part of. It should not be a process that I, as a social worker, am in charge
of. It is an equal partnership where the service user should be enabled by
practitioner to take control of their life. (Statutory social worker - adult
commissioning)
These definitions of empowerment therefore highlight the personal level
without any reference to social changes as suggested by Mullender and Ward
(1991).
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All respondents perceived themselves as 'empowering practitioners', but they
also mentioned that many aspects of their work had a disabling effect on their
ability to work in the way they wished. One newly qualified social worker
noted:
I do try to be an empowering practitioner - being newly qualified I feel
gives me the opportunity to emphasise the rights of the service user
whereas I have actually witnessed older, longer qualified workers to be
more discriminatory in their manners. I try to evaluate the service user[s]
to express themselves freely in my assessment process but inevitably,
when completing paperwork as mentioned previously, negative [aspects
of the client's life] have to be cited in order to get the most appropriate
service. (Statutory social worker - adult with disability/older adults)
Therefore, the organisational context of social services, for example the policies
and the agency's values, seemed to be the foremost cause of ethical dilemmas at
this point in the research. This was a result of the 'internal and external
regulations' that social care practitioners had to comply with and that were
qualified as being either too numerous (and therefore leading to confusion), or
being too prescriptive (and consequently not allowing them to take full account
of the needs or rights of individuals using the service). Nevertheless, social care
practitioners identified that ethical dilemmas often took two forms: on one
hand, struggles between their professional values and the agency's values and
procedures, and on the other, struggles between users' needs and the agency's
capacity to respond to identified needs.
The Voluntary Sector
All the respondents were paid employees working for a voluntary organisation:
eight of them worked for a national voluntary organisation, while two practiced
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within small local charities. Six respondents were DipSW qualified, and four
had no formal qualifications relevant to social care practice. Half the
respondents believed that their job description was different from their day-to-
day work. None of them belonged to a professional organisation that provided
guidelines for ethical practice (for example, the BASW). Internal guidelines
were often provided by their agencies, and these guidelines were said to have a
strong influence on their work. This was particularly the case among workers
from the national voluntary organisations. Most of the practitioners who
participated in this study as part of the 'voluntary sector' group were regulated
to some extent by statutory duties.
Participants understood the concept of ethics as being concerned with conflicts
about moral judgements and standards of practice and also with respect,
individual needs, rules, principles and boundaries. A respondent expressed
their understanding of ethical dilemma as
having to make a choice between undertaking a course of action that
could be contrary to your beliefs, values or morality - or principles.
Doing something that may have benefits for ourselves but costs for
others. The conflict between the 'rightness' of a course of action and its
potential 'benefit'. The sense that one'should' do something means that
you 'ought' to do it - the moral imperative. This also relate to power and
authority. That you can do certain things, but should you really? (Project
Leader from a national voluntary organisation)
When respondents reflected on their experiences of ethical dilemmas, half
believed that agency policies were very important to consider when making a
decision over an ethical dilemma. One respondent noted that
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personal values, personal and professional judgement, user's needs,
agency policy, code of conduct from my agency, although personal
values should always be excluded when being objective in providing a
service. Important that agency policy is taken into account so I am
covered if there are difficulties. User needs should be at the forefront.
(Mental-health worker within a small voluntary organisation)
It is important, however, to point out that they mentioned their adherence to
agency policies, regulations and values as being driven not by obligation but by
belief in the values of the organisation. Nonetheless, the concept of rules and
principles was said to have an important impact on their decision-making in
relation to ethical dilemmas.
There was no apparent agreement between practitioners from this sector as to
what the concept of empowerment meant. Nearly half the respondents
understood empowerment on a personal level, while the other half understood
it on a structural level. A respondent explains that empowerment ought
to enable people to make independent choices, whilst at the same time
being aware of the consequences of those choices both for themselves
and other people. (Social worker within a small voluntary organisation)
Another practitioner comments that empowerment is a practice that
enablers] the service user to control the situation and that develop a
sense of power. It focuses on society rather than on the individual.
(Worker within a local project attached to a national voluntary
organisation)
Practitioners from the voluntary sector perceived the organisational context of
their employing agency to be an important element in relation to achieving or
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not achieving empowerment. However, most of the respondents perceived
themselves as empowering practitioners.
Practitioners identified several areas where ethical dilemmas were likely to
arise in relation to the concept of empowerment. The most important dilemma
was identified as occurring in relation to the 'agency's expectations'. The
emergence of this dilemma implied that, within the voluntary sector,
empowerment can only be achieved if the agency supports and promotes it in
practice. Other areas where ethical dilemmas occurred (in relation to
empowerment) were identified as relating to confidentiality, boundary issues,
fairness in the provision of services and budget constraints. Therefore, many of
the areas identified as including dilemmas related to empowerment were areas
of interaction with external factors, such as agency policies and regulations.
Social Action
Ten practitioners using social action work completed questionnaires: four of
these filled in postal questionnaires, and six provided a tape-recorded interview
based on the same questionnaire. All the respondents worked for the
independent sector, apart from one, whose project was directly funded by the
local authority. However, despite the fact that the majority were working for
the independent sector, many of these projects were partly funded by the local
authority, even though the participants were not directly employed by the local
authority or statutory social services. One respondent had social work
qualifications, nearly half had youth and community work qualifications (BA
Hons or MA) and one had no particular qualifications in social work/social care
practice. None called themselves 'social workers'. None of these practitioners
belonged to professional organisations such as the BASW.
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Nearly all the respondents were working within 'guidelines' provided by
their agencies. All the respondents who had such guidelines said that they
had an influence on their work. Nearly all the respondents stated that the
guidelines supplied by the organisation provided them with the agency's core
values, for example social action principles (or values derived from them),
confidentiality policies, and anti-oppressive practice and equality of
opportunity statements. They mentioned that these guidelines were not
generally perceived as being too prescriptive. One respondent noted:
We have not got a 'handbook' but we have a team meeting every week
where we talk about the practice and what's happening with the
group. It is a kind of brainstorming session. We have got a kind of code
of practice if you like, we do our core value exercise e.g. confidentiality
statement. So we have processes which have been developed within
the last 7 years. I try to keep that but there is nobody to 'kick my ass'
and I would perhaps need it because if I don't make sure it is not kept,
nobody can help it. We also have a values exercise and everybody
needs to unanimously agree for a value to be accepted and if someone
does not totally agree, it becomes a secondary value. (Project manager-
youth project)
Statutory regulations (such as the Children Act) were often mentioned, but
were not perceived as having an important impact on their work. Social action
workers stressed the importance of focusing on users' needs instead of merely
following the guidelines given to them. A youth worker commented in
relation to child protection:
I think generally we do good practice and it is sort of pain to have to do
a checklist before going to see a young person. I don't think these
regulations have been a major problem really. With child protection for
example, we have got the duty to report, but our values are about
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working with the young people first ... stuff around confidentiality,
data protection ... but if we see something we think it has to be
reported, we talk with the young person first. We decided not to get
involved with 'inter agency' as we feel uncomfortable with that ... I
think it keeps us out of all these duties really. (Project manager - youth
project)
Dilemmas around the disclosure of information and statutory duties were
identified as being the most common among practitioners from this sector. In
particular, because social action workers were not compelled to work directly
with statutory duties, they needed to ensure that their actions were
professional and accountable. A youth worker explained:
A lot of people were telling us they were going around this man's
house and he is 50 or so. And nobody seems to know why young
people wanted to go to this house so we got suspicious that he was
giving them money, sweets and stuff like that, buying clothes so social
services started to ring up about that. We tried to find out more about it
through the person who was telling us, but we have to be careful
because this estate runs on gossips! Gossips are really interesting! But
you have to be careful because they are often a lot of crap. So we
always try to find more about that before we do something. However,
we are not supposed to do that ... we would be supposed to chop them
away but if we did that, it would not help our reputation in any good.
Another type of dilemma faced by the social action respondents was in
relation to funding. Indeed, it was often felt that, even though they worked for
the independent sector, the source of their funding was often an issue,
because the aims and objectives of the organisation that provided the funding
did not always fit with the values of social action work:
We want the active involvement of the community in the project that
we do and we believe that the community can change things for
themselves. But we do it within a very strict time frame and I think
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personally that in some occasion, I have created some enthusiasm
within the community without having time or money to finish
everything. Sometimes you get people started, you created excitement
and then, contract is finished and you have to leave them. The real
ethical dilemma in that is how quickly you forget about that. (Project
worker - independent sector)
Although funding was identified as an important source of ethical dilemmas
for most participants, dilemmas around their roles and the boundaries with
service users were also mentioned by some participants.
Social action workers understood the term 'empowerment' as being part of
social action or self-directed groupwork principles. They positioned the concept
of power and empowerment on a structural level rather than on a personal one.
For them, empowering practice was about "making changes and working for
social justice" (housing support worker - independent sector). However, one
practitioner mentioned that empowerment was sometimes hard to achieve in
reali ty because of their agency's policy:
It is sometimes difficult [to be empowering] because of the agency
policy, but I try to put young people's needs first and listing to what they
have to say. (Project manager - youth project)
Despite identifying funding as a block to empowerment, most respondents
believed that their agency promoted the empowerment of users.
In the light of the data collected so far, and the axial-coding analysis, it appears
that some differences can be perceived regarding the ways that ethics,
empowerment, regulations, interests, dilemmas and values were understood by
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social care practitioners from the different fields. The following list gives a
summary of the key points that emerged from this analysis:
• Understandings of ethics and empowerment are influenced by the
organisational context of the employing agency and the ways that
regulations are perceived and understood by practitioners and then
applied in practice;
• The more an organisation is regulated, the more empowerment will be
achieved on a personal level;
• Practitioners from all sectors feel that most of the ethical dilemmas are
provoked by something external to them or the user;
• Even when the practitioner works within a small organisation without
apparently oppressive structures, the funding element of the project
has the same impact as the organisational context of work within more
regulated agencies such as social services.
The key points above served to inform the construction of the interview
schedule and the vignette-based interviews used for the fourth-stage analysis.
Fourth-Stage Analysis: Semi-Structured Interviews and Vignette-based
Interviews Analysed through Selective Coding
The fourth-stage analysis was the final phase of the Grounded Theory process
before the research reached saturation. One interview schedule was developed
and piloted, which incorporated two well-defined sections: an interview based
on four vignettes, and several semi-structured questions. An important aspect
of the Grounded Theory process in relation to sampling concerns identifying
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and researching negative cases. The sampling for this stage of the data
collection was carried out by contacting participants who had previously
participated by filling in the questionnaire and whose answers were marginally
different from the majority of practitioners in their respective settings. This
constituted an important element of the Grounded Theory process.
The following section intends to examine the methodological procedure used in
order to analyse the data on the one hand and, on the other, to summarise the
data that appeared during analysis of the answers to the vignettes and semi-
structured interviews. This second section on the presentation of the data will
cover the data collected from the vignette-based questions, and the second part
will focus on data gathered in the semi-structured interviews. Again,
comparative methods were used to examine the data, and selective coding was
used to analyse it.
Methodological Procedures: Selective Coding
Selective coding was used to analyse the data gathered by vignettes and semi-
structured interviews. Selective coding can be described as an approach that
"concentrates on coding key categories" (Sarantakos 1993: 272). Strauss and
Corbin (1990:116) describe selective coding as
the process of selecting the core category, systematically relating it to
other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories
that need further refinement and development.
Because the data from the vignettes and semi-structured interviews validated
the data gathered through the use of questionnaires, only the key categories
were analysed. The pattern of data analysis used for the fourth-stage analysis
was the same as that used at the third stage (see Figure 5), although different
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names were given to some categories, and some other key categories were
merged together.
















Organisational context of work
Organisational context of work
Therefore, during the third-stage analysis, a number of codes (understanding,
values, dilemmas, empowerment and vested interests) became the sub-category
practitioner, and the codes regulation and code of ethics from the third-stage
analysis became organisational context of work for the fourth-stage analysis.
Figure 6, below, shows the codes that further merged into sub-categories.
The categories practitioners and organisational context of work merged during
the third and fourth stages of analysis into that of power.
There are therefore only two main sub-categories and one core category (story
line) (Glaser and Strauss 1967) for the fourth-stage analysis; these are as
follows:
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Core category (story line):
5ub-categories:
Power
Organisational context of work
Practitioner
In order to arrive at the final results for the fourth-stage analysis and therefore
to achieve saturation, the remaining codes were allocated to different sub-
categories, and both sub-categories were regrouped under one core category:
power (Figure 6 above). Indeed, as will be explained in the next chapter -
Theorisation of the Core Category (Chapter Seven) -levels of power between
organisational contexts of work and practitioners create different types of
ethical dilemmas.
The fourth-stage analysis was therefore conducted through selective coding.
The codes were used for the main comparison, and the themes were used to
gain a clearer understanding of the codes.
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The following section intends to examine the data as it appears in the light of
the interviews and vignette-based interviews.
Fourth-Stage Analysis: The Data
Data from the Vi~ettes
From the analysis of the questionnaires, seven core categories were discovered:
understanding of ethics, values, dilemmas, empowerment, vested interests, regulations
and codes ofethics. From a general point of view, it was also identified that social
care practitioners were affected on a day-to-day basis by statutory duties and
the organisational context of work (in its broadest sense). Therefore, while
developing each vignette, an attempt was made to include elements from the
organisational context of work and statutory duties in relation to the work of
social care practitioners from various fields of practice.
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From the analysis of the questionnaires, it appeared that 'regulation' and
'statutory duties' were not separate from the concept of the 'organisational
context of work'; all three were therefore amalgamated under the term
organisational context of work. Indeed, all the concepts above appeared to have
the same impact on the day-to-day work of practitioners. For example, statutory
duties did not appear to have more impact than agency constraints and the
organisational context of work in general.
Each of the vignettes used during the interviews incorporated one or more of
the elements identified as the seven core categories that had emerged during
the analysis of the questionnaires. Regulation and vested interests were most
often presented as dilemmas that could trigger different courses of action.
Particular attention was also paid to analysis of the impact of the organisational
context of work on workers' decision-making processes. Vignette A was
developed to measure the impact of statutory duties and child-protection issues
on the proposed dilemma. Vignette B was constructed to measure the impact of
budgets and the importance of the agency's expectations on the worker's
decision-making process. Vignette C was developed to measure the impact of
statutory duties on the proposed situation. Finally, Vignette D did not have any
elements relating to statutory duties, but could trigger issues with regard to
funding and equal-opportunity policies.
Each vignette was accompanied by a set of questions for respondents to answer.
This aimed to verify the remaining codes that had appeared in the third-stage
analysis:
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Question 1: What do you think [name of the worker] should do?
This aimed to verify the respondent's spontaneous decision on the dilemma and allowed
the researcher to monitor changes in the answers according to the different values
exposed in questions 2, 3 and4.
Question 2: According to your personal values only, what would you do in
[worker's] situation or a similar situation?
Question 3: According to your professional values only, what would you do in
[worker's] situation or a similar situation?
Question 4: According to your agency's expectations, guidance and core
values, what would you do in [worker's] situation or a similar situation?
These questions aimed to gather data in order to compare the impact of different values
in the decision-making process. The following third-stage analysis codes were
examined: values, dilemmas, vested interests, regulations and codes of ethics.
Question 5: Do you perceive this vignette as an ethical dilemma?
This question aimed to discover the respondent's understanding of ethics and ethical
dilemmas and to reveal their perception of the vignette.
The following section presents the main findings from the vignette-based
interviews, compared across the sectors.
VIGNETTE A
Self-determination of the user, protection of the user, statutory duties
Statutory duties were identified as an important cause of ethical dilemmas
during the analysis of the third-stage categories. Vignette A was specifically
designed to explore the issues of self-determination of the user and
empowerment against protection of the user (enabling versus protecting) and
the effects of statutory duties on the decision-making process.
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They are very young ... so ethically ... the welfare of the children ...
I'm not tempted initiate to quickly procedures that once you initiated
you can't go back on '" and also she might be out for a very good
reason ... you have to believe what the children say ... they don't know
where she is and they don't know when she will be back so I think we
need to believe what the children tell us ... yeah ... if she went to get a
coffee down the road, she would probably have said 'I'll be back in half
of an hour' ... yeah. (Voluntary sector worker)
When social care practitioners considered their agency's expectations, the
answers given by respondents from the three fields of practice were also similar
to those given previously: an expectation that they would initialise formal
procedures in order to ensure the safety of the children. Safety of the children
was considered to be paramount for all the agencies involved. Two respondents
(one each from the voluntary and statutory sectors) mentioned that the agency
would probably be concerned about media attention in this case. These
respondents thought that they would have to intervene quickly to protect the
interests of the agency and their profession as well as the children.
All the respondents thought that this situation was difficult because of a conflict
between applying the 'rules' (and consequently initiating formal procedures in
order to protect the children) and their professional values, which would then
lead them to keep a good relationship in place and empower the service user
(Vicky, in this case). This vignette was identified as one posing an ethical
dilemma for the respondents from the voluntary sector and social action
settings, but not for the statutory social workers:
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The conflict of values in this dilemma would be about protecting the
children ... and it would also be about not putting somebody into
trouble. (Social action worker)
She is a new single parent and this role is very, very stressful. You
know, if you do that [initialising formal children protection
procedures], you will probably damage the relationship pretty quickly
... but you can't walk away and leave the children locked up in a house
... so it is to find the balance as an individual worker ... and I would be
prepared if I had to take some action ... but it may break the
relationship ... but policy are rules in a sense ... they are not there to
attack the worker or agency ... they are there to give guidance so at the
end, the individual always has to make some decision ... and weigh
them up. (Voluntary sector worker)
Statutory social workers, on the other hand, did not perceive the situation as an
ethical dilemma because their agency was providing them with very clear
procedures and guidelines to intervene in similar situations to the one exposed
in the vignette.
No, it would not be [an ethical dilemma] because I would follow the
agency procedures ... I sound like a robot, don't I? You know, I know
exactly what procedures I have to follow ... she knows that I am not a
friend. (Statutory social worker)
I would feel very disappointed if she didn't feel able to talk to me .. ,
but the children are not old enough to look after themselves ... so they
would need protection ... She is old enough to look after herself ... the
children aren't. (Statutory social worker)
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The difference between the statutory social workers and the voluntary and
social action practitioners, in terms of identifying the vignette as an ethical
dilemma or not, was very important. Statutory social workers did not perceive
the vignette as an 'ethical dilemma', because there was an absence of choice in
the course of action due to the procedures and policies expected by their
agencies. They did not perceive the situation as an ethical dilemma, as their
course of action would be prescribed by the agency rather than them having to
make the decision. However, taken out of a work context, the vignette would
have been resolved differently by respondents from the statutory sector and
thus could have posed an ethical dilemma:
Me, as a person, if I was going there ... if I was not working for the
Local Authority, then I would be more sympathetic .... She is a single
parent ... she probably just nipped to the shop or done something
really quickly. I think personally it is not appropriate to do what she
has done, but I could maybe understand why she had to do that. ...
Personally, I would not report her if it was ... you know ... [if it was not
from the Local Authority]. (Statutory social worker)
Although not all social care practitioners from the different sectors would
follow the procedures and guidelines 'by the book', they were all influenced by
them to different degrees. Because of the procedures they have to follow within
their work, statutory social workers did not express concern in resolving the
situation, but did mention a certain degree of awkwardness in carrying out the
decision, because their personal and professional values sometimes conflict
with the regulations.
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On the other hand, social care practitioners from the voluntary and social action
sectors faced a dilemma, because their decisions were not imposed by
guidelines and procedures, and therefore they had to decide how to intervene
in balancing "two unwelcome courses of action" (Banks 1995).
As a social action worker, you have got so much responsibility, because
there are no structures in terms of social action that give you any kind
of guidance at all ... and you could be a social action worker working
with deprived children or single mums on an estate ... and what if
there is an issue of child protection there? What happens? As a social
action worker, you won't have all the structure and legislation to hand
that a social worker would have ... you know? Where do you go back?
You can't go back to the process because the child's life is involved ...
and you can ask 'what, why, how, action, and reflection', but it can
blow up in your face! Social action workers have none of that [statutory
duties] and that's why it crosses over a very dangerous territory.
(Social action worker)
VIGNETTE B
Organisational context of work and empowerment of the users
As discovered during the third-stage analysis, budget and organisational
context of the work were important elements leading to ethical dilemmas. This
vignette was developed in order to explore decision-making processes when
the organisational context of the work and budget corne into conflict with user
empowerment. The same questions as those in Vignette A were explored.
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or from national organisations. Respondents from the voluntary sector
responded similarly in that they would challenge the organisation and continue
to support the young people.
John should not try to negotiate with the group I think so ... John
should be there to support the group I mean I think if the group
wants to protest, they should protest they have the right to do that
... it is what happens with our groups ... the organisation doesn't
know what the groups are doing in this area ... the organisation
commit, they say we want to work with you and in the middle of the
agenda, they ask the group to leave. (Voluntary sector worker)
Social action respondents all agreed to continue to support the young people in
their decision, as long as this was done through peaceful action. One
respondent showed further support to the young people by supporting them in
going back to the process of social action and developing their tactics for getting
their resources.
John [the worker involved in the vignette] should work with the group
and refine the tactics! Yeah! The demonstration is good ... but they also
need to get some petitions up ... yeah ... they need to go to action more
than that! So work with them around the process... what... why...
how... action... reflection ... that is what he needs to do! And it is the
only way for them to see that John is supporting them. It is the only
way to get back to that kind of trust and the relationship! I can only tell
you something ... my line manager would not be happy! She would
tell me 'you are better off now!' (Social action worker)
This respondent therefore mentioned that the situation would cause personal
problems with the agency. However, none of the respondents saw the action as
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wrong, and they all thought that it would be important for the group to carry
on with their project.
I would try to engage with them and I would say 'identify your issue'
and if the group want to take action, I don't think there is anything
wrong with that, as long as it is done in a reasonable way and that they
don't inflict danger or damages to somebody else. I don't see anything
wrong with that ... because they are voicing their concerns and I think
everybody should voice their concerns. And sometimes, people don't
listen to you until you do something like that ... so I don't think it is a
big thing! (Social action worker)
Supporting the young people was therefore at the forefront of their
spontaneous decision-making.
In terms of personal values, regardless of their sector of practice, respondents
mentioned that they would support the young people and that empowerment
was at the forefront of their action.
So personally, if I was not involved or employed, I would empower
them to do as much as they can. (Statutory social worker)
Personally, I would create so much trouble ... so much trouble ... that I
would get sacked! (Statutory social worker)
I would really encourage them to demonstrate and to take the action
that they decided to take! As a social action worker, I probably have to
work with them to come to this decision and you know, to drop them
down ... (long pause) ... I think this is where social action falls down in
many ways. Wherever you work, for a small charity, a statutory
organisation or a non-government organisation, they are always bound
by their rules. But as a social action worker, you come from the other
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end of the ethical spectrum ... you are there to work with young
people ... and if you read literature about social action, a lot is about
revolution ... it is about revolution for making things happen! So for
me to dump the young people in the shit ... telling them "I've got a
new job with the under 5s so f**k off' I would not feel comfortable at all
in doing that ... ethically '" and I think the social action process work
... I think it is a good process ... so yeah, I would help in organising the
action! (Social action worker)
Personal values, in this case, would influence the workers to take a different
course of action to the one the agency would want them to take. This finding
supported some of the findings from the third stage of data analysis, in that
empowerment can be difficult to achieve within an organisation driven by
budget.
In terms of professional values, both qualified social worker respondents
thought that they would still have to support the group towards their goal.
However, they said they would need to be careful, as if they went along with
the group too much, they could get into trouble themselves. Both said they
would go to challenge their line manager and try to get recognition by
campaigning for the group.
I would still more less do the same .,. but I would do it probably in a
more professional way ... yeah ... If I could not get any satisfaction
from my line manager, I would do a presentation for his line
manager .... I would do anything to get recognition really ... because I
think this decision is wrong ... yeah ... professionally, I would do that!
(Statutory social worker)
Workers from the voluntary sector and social action workers said that they
would take the same action according to their personal values. Therefore, on
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personal and professional values-based decision-making, both respondents
from the statutory sector, in different ways, said that they would support the
group of young people.
When respondents had to make a decision solely based on their agency's
expectations, the course of action was slightly different. Respondents from the
three sectors all thought that they would continue to work with the young
people, but that they would also have to challenge the agency they worked for
in order to do so. Some respondents thought that they would have to be careful
in their actions, because they could cause some trouble for themselves.
I think I would face serious difficulties with the agency ... because ... if
you are seen as supporting the agency, the young boys, the young
offenders would see you as letting them down ... I think I would have
to go with the young people I work with this time ... I don't think I
could support the agency ... I would support the young offenders .... if
I didn't have choice to follow my agency, I think I would have to make
sure that the agency knew that I am very unhappy and I would have to
take it further. (Voluntary sector worker)
Another respondent remarked:
I would attempt to persuade my own organisation and erm ... that
they need to talk to the young people ... I mean there may be a real
issue about funding I don't know .... but I suppose if you feel very
strongly about it at the end you have to put yourself personally on the
line ... but depends how strong you feel.... These organisations are
normally supposed to work for social justice ... that's an issue of social
justice. (Voluntary sector worker)
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In the example above, even though the respondents had to respond only with
regard to their agency's expectations, their personal values were still very
strongly present in the answers given, and they said that they would not simply
do what the agency asked them to do.
If they [the agency] already decided they shut it [the project] and that
they want to go for another project ... they might not like that you are
co-ordinating some campaigns against them... but you see what I
mean He needs a job ... but I think the agency has got a problem
really but then it is their problem and it is for this reason that we
need to support the young people. (Social action worker)
Respondents from all sectors agreed that their actions, although influenced by
the agency's expectations, would still aim at empowering the young people.
Social workers from the statutory and voluntary sectors thought that the
vignette was an ethical dilemma. Indeed, their personal interests were at stake.
Going along with the young offenders would cause them trouble with the
agency, while going along with the agency would make them feel bad about
letting the young offenders down. The organisational context of work was
therefore an important element in their decision-making process. The elements
mentioned in their decision-making were about their responsibility towards the
agency and the fact that the agency pays their wages, but also concerned the
users' needs and the empowerment of the group of young offenders.
It is an ethical dilemma because I can see the position that John's in ...
but I can also see the position and the need of the young people really
... what they are currently saying ... erm ... I think it is [an] ethical
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[issue] because again, they set these people up and then they withdraw
the budget ... the money ... to end it ...so that's [an] ethical [issue]
because you promised something and it is not delivered ... and I know
that it happens all the time ... you know ... you can't give them any
choices. (Statutory social worker)
Therefore, the main conflict occurs between the users' needs, the personal
interests of the worker and the agency's policy.
It [the vignette] would end up as a kind of ethical dilemma because it
would end up like ... possibly being in a big conflict situation ... you
know when you work for an organisation you normally believe in
principles ... cause what happens is that you start with an issue that
comes out from here ... and then you talk about it and do a bit of
discussion ... and it comes a little bit further .... It comes a bit closer to
you and then you try something and you realise that it hasn't worked
... so at the end you are left with your own ... yourself ... aren't you ... it
is just you at the end so what happens in a lot of those situations is
that you strip away kind of professional ethics ... standards ... and
policy ... at the end you are the person that make the judgement.
(Voluntary sector worker)
On the other hand, the social action workers did not think that the vignette
posed a straightforward ethical dilemma. For them, it was normal to encourage
the young offender to carry on their actions and to support them, even though
the agency was asking them to behave differently. The elements in their
decision-making process were that it was wrong to go with the agency because
it would only reinforce the young people's views about adults not providing
services for them, plus the empowerment of the users. Social action workers
were aware that the situation could cause trouble for them, but their personal
and professional values were more important than the agency's expectations in
this particular case. For social action workers, the personal and professional
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values (social action principles) were more important than their own personal
interests.
Therefore, there is a difference between the social care practitioners from the
voluntary sector, the statutory sector and the social action settings. Social care
practitioners from the voluntary sector and statutory social workers would
want to protect their interests as well as empowering the young offender, and
so would find themselves with a very difficult ethical dilemma to resolve,
whereas the social action workers would not feel an ethical dilemma in this
situation, because of their beliefs in social action principles, but they would
probably have to live with the consequences of their choices.
Again, from this vignette, it can be concluded that the organisational context of
work is a very important cause of ethical dilemmas in the social care profession.
Even though the ethical dilemma is not apparent to the same degree and extent,
it is still there, and it leads the social care practitioners to a dilemma between
two unwelcome courses of action, or knowing what direction to take but having
to live with the consequences of such actions.
The responses to this vignette highlighted the fact that the decision-making
process is based on a wide range of interests. Although policy and regulations
influence the ways workers solve ethical dilemmas, they are free to choose what
seems to be ethically just for them, but that can put them in conflicting
situations.
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Spontaneously, workers from the voluntary sector replied that they would
think about disclosing the information to Laura if Mark did not do it himself.
Respondents from the voluntary sector agreed that there are limits to
confidentiality and that it would be their duty to disclose the information to
Laura if, after some discussions with Mark, Laura was still unaware of the
situation.
I think I would try to work with Mark on the fact that if he really
values Laura's life ... it is working through the emotional thing and if
he really loves her then he wants the best for her and that perhaps he is
being a bit selfish ... try to work it around that way ... you know try to
talk about the emotional side of the relationship, love, and what it all
means ... and ... but ... I would have to say that because in social work
... confidentiality can only be conditional ... so I think I would have to
set out the boundaries erm ... Set out the boundaries and try to work
with Mark to again try to persuade him to tell her but I think I
would have to say that if he won't, as a professional, I would have to
do that ... and also that he will have trouble if he infected her with the
law. (Voluntary sector worker)
Tell Laura ... this is my immediate response! (Voluntary sector worker)
Answers differed in the field of statutory social work and in the social action
settings, where most of the respondents agreed that they would not breach the
confidentiality.
I would probably talk to Laura.... In one to one intervention ... about
relationships ... having sex... etc. Without mentioning that he has got
HIV ... and if you are having all these chats with her ... he will
probably think that you told her anyway.... It is a bit like the school-
yard syndrome ... if they see you having a chat with someone ... they
think that you give away something about them ... so I think you've
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got to be very clear about what you are doing. But 1 would not tell
her.... 1 would give her information about the fact that it is illegal to
have sex before she is 16.... 1 would get a bit of time here. (Statutory
social worker)
1 would consider some groupwork sessions around sexuality ... a
whole group .... 1 would discuss HIV and AIDS as part of that. Because
Mark talked to me in confidence ... confidentiality is important ... so 1
would try to get around it without going to tell Laura. [... ] So 1 would
try to arrange a session around sexual health, and try to make sure that
both of them are there ... that would be the ideal situation ... and
because it is about sexual health, encourage Mark to talk to his GP
about it .... Encourage him to come back to me to talk about it ... but [I
would not tell] not telling Laura. (Social action worker)
However, one social action worker said that, after agreeing an ultimatum with
Mark, they would feel forced to disclose the information.
When respondents were asked about how they would solve the dilemma
according to their personal values, their professional values and the agency's
expectations, all respondents maintained the same course of action as that
mentioned in their spontaneous decisions.
So we have a real issue of confidentiality ... and an issue like that ...
and on the other hand, you've got some personal ethics ... and a very
personal issue like that bring to ... you need to act very, very quickly...
but 1have to say 1make the assumption ... my reaction to Mark would
be ... if at the end of the process of talking through he would still not
do it ... there are limits of confidentiality ... this is my personal ethic.
(Voluntary sector worker)
However, there were some uncertainties about how some of the agencies who
employed the statutory social workers would expect them to intervene in such
a situation. It was not clear whether or not the agency would ask them to report
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it as a child-protection issue, although their answers were the same for every set
of values explored.
I think if it is perceived as a Child Protection issue because of the age of
Laura ... then my organisation's policy ... I would have to take some
actions on this. If it is not perceived as a Child Protection issue ... I
don't see how it cannot be perceived as a Child Protection issue ... but
then, I think my organisation would ask me to be a bit more liberal
about how to approach it ... in the way to have some discussion ... to
resolve it. (Voluntary sector worker)
The organisational context of work and statutory duties did not seem to
influence dramatically the answers of the respondents from each sector. Issues
of confidentiality therefore appeared, in this particular case, to be related to
professional and personal values rather than to the organisational context of the
work. Yet, confidentiality issues cause ethical dilemmas for respondents,
regardless of their sector of practice. Confidentiality is an important element
causing ethical dilemmas. Although not all the respondents resolved the ethical
dilemma in the same way, elements such as openness, transparency and
awareness of the confidentiality issues were present in all sectors.
VIGNETTE D
Welfare of several users versus an individual's welfare, anti-oppressive
practice, and empowerment
Vignette D was developed to assess the importance of concepts such as anti-
oppressive practice and users' needs in relation to dilemmas between the
welfare of one user and the welfare of several people. Under the same
framework as the vignettes above, respondents had to reflect on solving the
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leave, depending on how they actually use the group ... it is their
decision really. (Statutory social worker)
I would probably get the group together I would educate them ... I
would first ask if it is all right with Rachel I would ask her if it is OK
to explain a bit more about the operation how she felt ... I would ask
her if it is ok for her to share it with the group .... Because I feel it is
important that everybody is included ... but I would try a sort of
education like this because quite often people are frightened about
things they don't know ... things they don't understand. (Statutory
social worker)
Social action workers said they would prioritise the group rather than Rachel,
making sure that other resources were available for her. They would, however,
try to include her initially before moving on to any other types of intervention
with her.
You know, they [members of the group] might exclude Rachel because
someone in the group was abused by her husband, you know, it could
be any of these things that go on in the group. (Social action worker)
Another respondent discussed the concept of oppression from another
perceptive:
Basically, although it is about gender issues, they [members of the
group] are discriminating in regard to gender and I would remind
them of that.... If I was satisfied that there isn't a discrimination issue,
then I would plan to work with her on an individual basis because
obviously, Rachel needs some help and support. (Social action worker)
Discrimination issues were therefore identified as being important for social
action workers. Nevertheless, they said that they would not stop working with
the group, even though some members expressed their disagreement with
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working in the same group as Rachel. As an alternative, they would explore the
issue of discrimination with the group, asking "why" and going through the
social action process. Through the process, respondents mentioned that it
would perhaps become possible to include Rachel.
Talk to the group first ... and look at the issues ... look at why they
have a problem ... kind of using the social action approach ... What is
the situation, why is it a problem ... how can we take it forward. (Social
action worker)
Workers from the voluntary sector were unclear about what course of action to
take spontaneously. However, they identified some elements that were making
their decisions uneasy, such as Rachel's lifestyle, as well as her gender identity,
the group dynamic and its ground rules, and the fact that no other resources
existed in the area. Their chosen course of action became clearer when different
values were explored in isolation. When they were asked to explore their
personal values base only, they thought that they would try to support Rachel
within the group and that, even though their personal values were not
necessarily telling them to do so, they would still include her.
I would try to work with the group to see ... although they might not
like this person's lifestyle ... Rachel ... that as a person she is valued
even you think about somebody's lifestyle .... My personal values are
that I don't really approve of gender change or things in that book
because it is my own religious belief, but at the end of the day, I think
my values are about valuing the person despite the lifestyle ... so it
would be the same. (Voluntary sector worker)
Despite deciding to include Rachel in the group, respondents were aware of
personal values that would make their course of action different. However,
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from the respondents' answers, it was clear that they would not act upon only
their personal values in this particular vignette.
Respondents from the other sectors (statutory and social action) maintained
their spontaneous answers when asked to decide on a course of action based
upon their personal values. They thought that both parties had the right to be
included in the group. However, priority was still given to Rachel, and if other
members wanted to leave the group, it was seen as their choice. Social action
workers, on the other hand, all said that they would work with Rachel at the
same time as working with the group, but would continue the group and not
try to force members to include Rachel. For them, the group was very
important, especially because of the duration of the group (which had been
running for two years).
Differences in the answers given were not marked when exploring each sector's
responses with regard to professional values. A different course of action was
marked when respondents explored their agency's expectations.
Social workers from the statutory sector thought that the agency's expectations
would have a lot of influence in this particular case. Because of the pressure of
funding, respondents mentioned that they would probably have to exclude
Rachel from the group. The agency would ask the workers to get as many
people as possible and, therefore, to exclude Rachel from the group if the
members did not accept her after discussion.
I would be panicking that everybody wanted to leave ... but I know
that the agency would put me under a lot of pressure in my group to
function with full group members ... otherwise ... if I say 'Oh... it is
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your choice don't come', I would just be in so much trouble with the
line manager so that would be ... for them ... for the agency ... their
priority would be ... to keep as much people as possible ... so I would
be struggling. (Statutory social worker)
Even though the agency would pressurise the worker to recruit and maintain
enough participants for running the group, they could not discriminate against
Rachel, because of the Equal Opportunity Policy (EOP). The only action that the
agency could take to counteract the EOP would be to withdraw the funding,
which would, indirectly, put the interests of the worker and the viability of the
group at risk.
It is funded by the Local Authority ... erm ... Local Authority would
probably want as many people as possible to attend the group
otherwise they would withdraw funding ... So it might be slightly
different if you as a worker know that ... the amount of women who
left the group ... your funding ... your job ... would be put on the line
... so the agency would probably want to say good bye to Rachel.
(Statutory social worker)
Therefore, the agency's expectations, as explored with statutory social workers,
conflicted with the workers' decision-making in this case. Funding appears to
be a big issue in this ethical dilemma, as it leads the workers to decide on a
course of action against their personal values and reasoning, since their jobs
could be compromised. However, even though the other interviewee raised the
same issue, she said she would not go with the agency in relation to this case.
I would go with Rachel though ... but I would do it in a very positive
way ... in a right way ... because my agency could not discriminate
against Rachel.... So I would make sure that if they discriminate
against her ... I would make sure they can't do that ... I would make
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sure they are not allowed to do that ... yeah ... I can be pretty loud
when I need to be. (Statutory social worker)
The workers from the voluntary sector also thought that the agency might not
want to get involved with Rachel, but this was because of religious rather than
budget issues. However, even though the exclusion would not be for the same
reason, it can be concluded that the organisational context of work would also
impact on the decision of the workers from the voluntary sector.
I think my agency would be fairly similar to my professional values
really ... but... I don't know how some people in the agency would
respond ... to Rachel ... to the issue really (long pause). Well, it is
associated with the Christian faith ... there are a lot of issues about gay
and lesbian carers ... and this may raise a lot of other issues really ...
yeah ... well I think the policy would probably say ... well I hope the
policy would probably say to try to work these issues through and try
to resolve it. (Voluntary sector worker)
The social action workers' decision-making was about staying with the group
and finding another resource for Rachel. They did not think that the agency
would have a great impact on their decision. Since they would try not to
discriminate against Rachel, the agency could not influence their decision-
making by using the EOP. This course of action would be similar to those
suggested by the voluntary and statutory sectors, as it would be in the interest
of the agency to function with full members.
Respondents from the statutory and voluntary sectors perceived Vignette D as
an ethical dilemma. The main elements identified as causing the dilemma were
about their responsibility towards Rachel and the other members of the group.
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The welfare of one user versus the welfare of the majority of users is therefore
an ethical dilemma that is present in practice in the provision of statutory social
services. Anti-oppressive practice seems to be a priority for both practitioners,
but budgets and funding can be a barrier. Respondents from the social action
settings did not see the situation as posing an ethical dilemma, because they felt
clear about their course of action.
Data hom the Interviews
In addition to the vignettes presented above, interviewees were asked specific
questions that constituted the semi-structured element of the interview. Within
these interviews, respondents were invited to comment on elements that were
said to cause ethical dilemmas and that had emerged from the third-stage
analysis. They were also given the opportunity to explore the impact of the
organisational context of work and statutory duties on their work in general, in
the specific context of ethical dilemmas and in relation to empowerment (see
Appendix 4 for the interview schedule). This section presents the findings that
emerged from data collected via the semi-structured interviews.
Ethical Dilemmas in Social care Practice
Budget and funding was not only recognised as the most important element
that hinders the empowerment of the user, but was also identified as the most
important cause for ethical dilemmas within the different fields of social care
practice.
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Budget and funding ... erm ... I think it is the biggest cause for ethical
dilemmas '" because that's what we are driven by! We are supposed to
be user-led and needs-led services ... we are not! We are driven by
budget! So even when we are assessing a user who needs a service, if
there is no money in the pot, they don't get it ... there is no service
available. (Statutory social worker)
A social action worker explained their position:
You are working within a society which is based on market principles
... you have to deliver a service, but you have a budget plan and that
budget is for everything. Sometimes, because of budget, users are
offered options that are not the best for them ... and a lot of
organisations are controlled by funding, social services are controlled
by funding ... but you can't say to an organisation that pressures you
because of money 'let just talk about the process. Give us a whole year
... you will see it is marvellous to empower young people.' It is not
going to happen ... it is not possible! So I think it has a hell of a lot to
do with ethical dilemmas because my principles say 'f**k the money
and lets work with the young people', but because I am so pressured
by the money and the time, there is only a certain level of stuff that you
can do! (Social action worker)
A worker from the voluntary sector also explained their perception of the
budget as having an impact on the emergence of ethical dilemmas:
Who controls the organisation? Who wants to take the decision? It is
not controversial when we start a group discussion.... It gets
controversial when a senior manager will say'stop the discussions.' So
I would say that [name of the organisation] has been a positive
organisation ... so it tries to develop, it has been innovating in
practice. .. and let projects develop yeah ... so I would be positive
about the organisation but also recognise that like in any organisation
it has some big limitations.... Finance bit is a big, big one! And
sometimes you will get into conflict. (Voluntary sector worker)
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Budget and funding have an impact across the different sectors of provision in
social services and often lead to the emergence of ethical dilemmas. This was
identified during the third-stage analysis and has been confirmed by
respondents across the three fields as being an important cause of ethical
dilemmas.
Lack of clarity about roles and conflicts between professional expertise and self-
determination of the user were two causes of ethical dilemmas that were also
identified during the third-stage analysis.
Social workers did not identify 'lack of clarity about role' nor'conflict between
professional expertise and self-determination of the user' as a cause of ethical
dilemmas, as they felt very clear about what they had to do within the remit of
their work. For example, they were clear about the fact that they control the
services, and therefore they perceived themselves as 'gatekeepers' at the same
time as enabling service users in their interventions.
Social action workers and workers from the voluntary sector thought that the
above elements were present in their day-to-day practice and were indeed
causing ethical dilemmas. Practitioners from both fields perceived themselves
as trying to enable service users, but they felt very restricted in their action
because of certain elements in the organisational context of work, which made
them act more as the controller in certain cases. This controlling role was felt
particularly strongly when practitioners were faced with dilemmas that
occurred in relation to resource allocation.
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However, workers from the voluntary sector and social action settings
expressed the view that the dilemmas also occur in relation to the very nature
of the work they do.
Lack of clarity about role ... again I would say that it could be linked
with professional expertise and self-determination of the user.... Again,
if you take example of managing risk ... for instance, particularly with
mental health, you know that the person you know might hurt
someone else obviously you might have to take more of a
controlling role particularly if they are not taking any medication or
things like that but other times we can enable I think it just
depends .... I don't think that role will ever be clear there will always
be times where you have to take a more controlling role and other
times where you will be more enabling and I think that will always be
the case. (Voluntary sector worker)
Therefore, these two identified causes of dilemmas are, to a certain extent,
linked with the overall organisational context of work, but they also occur in
relation to the very nature of social work and social care practice. An
illustration would be that the Code of Practice produced by the GSCC (2002)
states, in Principle 3, that "as a social care worker, you must promote the
independence of service users while protecting them as far as possible from
danger or harm". This principle clearly reflects the respondent's reflection
above. Indeed, social care practitioners want to be enablers for the service users,
but also have a duty of protection that leads them to adopt a more controlling
role from time to time.
Disclosure of information was perceived differently across the different sectors
of social services. For the statutory social workers, disclosure of information
was not perceived as being a possible cause for ethical dilemmas, as they were
clear about they way they work. For the workers from the voluntary sector,
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disclosure of information was not seen as an important cause for ethical
dilemmas, as long as they were careful about what they disclosed to whom. For
them, disclosure of information was a matter of reflecting on the possible
consequences of their actions. However, for the social action workers,
disclosure of information was identified as a definite cause for ethical
dilemmas. For them, maintaining the relationship with the service user was the
most important element to consider in making their decision, but in some cases,
they were aware that not disclosing could also affect the way that they are
perceived by the agency in terms of accountability, going against the law or
even affecting their own interests. A respondent explained how important the
relationship with the service user is within their work:
I will not break my relationship with the young people because it took
me 1 year to built this relationship and now they trust me ... and if I do
this, all the relationship is going out of the window, and it doesn't only
affect me and the young people, but also all the rest of the team ... this
project is supposed to be different from social services and built upon a
good trust relationship and you want to break this relationship? ... You
will have to sack me! (Social action worker)
Another social action worker illustrated their experience in relation to
disclosing information and the importance of the relationship with the service
user:
I caught a young person skinning up [making a cannabis joint] and he
was terrified that I was going to tell his mother! But I didn't tell his
mother and that helped the future relationship .... Maybe he was doing
something illegal and perhaps I should inform his mother but I don't
see the point in that ... because it is following the law for the sake of
following the law ... It will not do your work any good. (Social action
worker)
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Disclosure of information is therefore a very important cause of ethical
dilemmas among social action workers. It was not, however, identified as an
important cause by workers in the other two sectors.
Pressure of the outcomes and expectations from the agency were identified as
important causes of ethical dilemmas within the social care profession, but their
impact was felt differently from one sector to another. Statutory social workers
did not identify them as key causes of ethical dilemmas during the interview.
They identified that they came across this in their practice from time to time,
but because they were clear about their role within social services and what
they can offer as a service, pressure of the outcomes and expectations from the
agency were not identified as causing many ethical dilemmas. However, during
other parts of the interview, statutory social workers mentioned that the
guidelines and procedures had led them to experience very awkward
situations.
You know, personally I find that just unacceptable. I go home and I
worry about people ... and what's going to happen to them .... I think
the system is poor ... but how I get around that ... I make people fill in
complaint procedures ... and they don't attack me as a person, they try
to show that the system is unfair because they are frustrated that they
can't get what they want ... We don't do any preventive work ... we
don't do anything like that ... so ethically ... I mean personally ... I
find it very difficult ... difficult to go to see someone to tell them that
they don't meet the criteria. (Statutory social worker)
204
Another social worker expanded on this:
We have ethical dilemmas but I think the policy makes us very clear
about what we have to do and what we don't do ... , If vou are not there
and not seeing people that you've got to see, then it is quite easy to
make that decision. What's hard is when it comes to us .. , when we've
got to go out and say, "sorry you can't have that". But how we get
around that is because we don't make that decision ... my manager or
her manager ... we ask them to say no ... I am not doing that any more.
(Statutory social worker)
These'awkward situations' were defined by the respondents as not all ethical
dilemma (unclear course of action resulting from a conflict between unwelcome
alternative courses of action), but as a personal dilemma (the consequence of
having to take a course of action based on already agreed guidelines, even
though another course of action would have been more beneficial for all parties)
instead. This difference will be explored further in the discussion in Chapter
Eight.
On the other hand, workers from the voluntary sector expressed a different
opinion with regard to the pressures of the outcomes. For them, it appeared to
be an important cause of ethical dilemmas, as all their work is outcome-
orientated:
Pressure of outcomes ... and expectations from the agency... I think
yeah .... Sometimes if you ... erm ... it is like sometimes if they are
expecting you to get so much work done ... you know that you need to
take time to build a relationship with that person otherwise you will
not get much information out of them and you are certainly not going
to establish their needs. (Voluntary sector worker)
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For the social action workers, pressures of the outcomes and expectations from
the agency can also lead to ethical dilemmas. However, they did not see the
pressures of the outcomes as being the most important cause of ethical
dilemmas in the social action settings.
There is always pressure on people I think ... people who have to
follow the criteria and so on ... sometimes what might happen is that
the organisation have got vacancies and they are losing rent ... so the
management wants that place filled very quickly ... they don't care ...
even though the person don't quite fit with the place ... but I don't
agree with that ... I think that criteria are there for a reason ... if a
person don't need something they don't need it ... you don't just put
somebody in just to fill the vacancy and collect the rent. (Social action
worker)
For the social action workers, conflicts between their personal values and the
regulations were more important as a cause of ethical dilemmas than were
expectations from the agency. What social action workers understood to be
their personal values were in fact related to social action principles. They often
found that the agency guidelines or regulations did not embrace these
principles, and this created conflicts between what their personal values told
them was right and the regulations. Conflicts between personal values and
regulations were also identified as an important cause of ethical dilemmas
within the statutory and voluntary sectors. For the statutory social workers,
conflicts between personal values and regulations occurred mostly in relation to
admissibility criteria.
We struggle ethically because of the restraints put on us by outside
policies which we can't change ... or whatever it is ... criteria or
whatever ... we can't change that. (Statutory social worker)
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According to workers from the voluntary sector, conflicts between personal
values and regulations were also present, but they were seen as being a positive
rather than a negative aspect, because this discharged them from a certain level
of responsibility in their intervention, which was similar to the experiences of
statutory social workers.
I think it affects in a positive way ... because ... you know ... it relieves
us from a responsibility ... [... ] although it might seem more controlling
sometimes you know. (Voluntary sector worker)
However, they still perceived regulation as controlling part of their
interventions, without emphasising the fact that it can lead them to experience
ethical dilemmas.
Because of the different understandings of the effect of regulation in relation to
their personal values in the cause of ethical dilemmas, it is not possible to
identify this dilemma as occurring across sectors of social care practice.
Nevertheless, the concept of regulation clearly has a substantial impact on their
day-to-day work.
The organisational context of work appeared to affect the level of
empowerment that service users can expect to gain during an intervention.
Indeed, the organisational context of work can help or hinder with the
development of empowerment, depending on whether or not the organisation's
core values, policies and resources prioritise empowerment as an approach to
intervention. The use of vignettes also helped to demonstrate that, even where
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social care practitioners understand and believe in the principles of
empowerment, if the organisation does not promote them (by putting into
practice the elements essential to achieving them), empowerment is difficult to
achieve. For example, all the social care practitioners qualified the guidelines as
being too strict, too vague, old-fashioned or very restrictive. They all agreed
that the guidelines were important and could not be ignored, as they ensured a
certain level of accountability (as well as, in many cases, protecting the user).
However, at the same time, they were considered as tending to interfere with
achieving at least the structural level of empowerment, because of inflexibility
in the ways they are applied.
Everything that we are told and everything in our policy guidelines ...
and everything we train is about empowerment, .. in the books ... but
the reality is that when we try to deliver that is very difficult because
our services with older people are very much 'doing for' instead of
'doing with', (Statutory social worker)
This was also the case for workers practicing within the voluntary sector.
You've got to operate out there in a way of saying 'what you say is
important to me' .. , or 'it's your right to do that' ... empowerment ,..
people have skills ,.. etc ... and then turn around and operate in a
totally different way you know ... you know, projects have to face the
organisation and the world out there ", so in a way, we have two faces
", we say 'this set of principles should apply inside and outside' yeah?
But the organisation wants to be higher up and seems to be pressured.
(Voluntary sector worker)
Statutory social workers and workers from the voluntary sectors said that they
were held back in achieving empowerment because of the organisational
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context of work. Social action workers also work within an organisational
context and had experienced the same issues in relation to empowerment as
their fellow workers from other fields. However, some organisational contexts
of work related to the social action settings were less rigid than the one found
within the statutory sector. This enabled the social action workers to be more
flexible and, consequently, to attain better results in using empowerment as an
approach. In practicing in such a context, social action workers can bring the
concept of empowerment to the forefront of their decision-making processes.
However, where the organisational context of work is not favourable to
achieving it, social action values are not sufficient to ensure empowerment of
the user, as this social action worker explained:
In terms of empowerment, it [organisational context of work] is a sort
of pain in the neck ... no, but I should not say that because in terms of
being an Equal Opportunity Employer, in terms of being responsive to
youth work, in terms of disabled people, women and black people
working for the Council, they probably lead the field .... [... ] But
sometimes you get hung up with the policy and procedure that you
have to follow .... For example, you have to be over 18 to hire the Hall
... but there might be some very responsible and mature 17 year olds
... but if they are not 18, there is no chance that they are allowed to hire
the Council Hall ... is that completely necessary? But the Council is so
rigorous that this can be a block to empowerment But on the other
hand, it makes people go through the procedures it makes people
learn about the procedures ... and maybe that's not a bad thing. (Social
action worker)
Consequently, in the light of the answers gathered during the interviews, in
order to be successful in achieving empowerment, the worker needs several






A commitment to the value of empowerment;
An understanding of the concept at different levels, and a suitable
approach to achieving it;
A flexible organisational context of work;
An organisational context of work that promotes empowerment in their
policies and practices.
In most cases, however, the organisational context of work was not supportive
of workers trying to use empowering approaches in practice, especially those
that aimed to achieve structural changes. From this data analysis, there are two
different concepts that can be explored and discussed further. These are the
impact of the organisational context of work on the cause of ethical dilemmas
and the concept of an ethical dilemma itself. The following chapters will
therefore explore these themes and develop an explanatory theory that will
allow for a better understanding of ethics in social care practice. Chapter Seven
will aim to examine the sole category of 'power' through the concept of the
organisational context of work and how social theory helps in understanding
the situation experienced in social care practice in regard to ethical practice.
Chapter Eight will then build on the theorisation of the power given in Chapter
Seven to examine various levels of ethical dilemmas as experienced in social




Theorisation of the Sole Category: 'Power'
This chapter alms at theorising the concept of 'power', the sole Grounded
Theory category at saturation point. To do so, I will consider the contribution
that some social theories make to understanding the concept of power as
experienced between social care practitioners and their different organisational
contexts of work. Building on the examination of the concept of power found in
the Literature Review Chapter, the first section will briefly examine the sole
category in the light of the work of Anthony Giddens and will then move on to
theorising power using a Foucaultian analysis. This theoretical examination of
the concept of power will then establish a framework for further discussion of
findings in Chapter Eight.
The Concept of Power
Thus far, the data that have emerged from the process of Grounded Theory
have led to the discovery of the concept of power (understood by practitioners
as reflected in the organisational context of work) as the sole category. Indeed,
wherever ethical dilemmas are experienced (in the fields of statutory social
work, the voluntary sector or social action settings), the main element
influencing the decision-making processes of practitioners is the operation of
power. This operation of power influences the ways in which practitioners
intervene with service users, either in relation to their capacity for empowering
practice, or in relation to the ways they approach ethical dilemmas and ethical
issues in general.
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The data collected during this study demonstrated that the decision-making
process experienced by social care practitioners from all three fields is mainly
influenced by the power exerted by the organisational context of work in which
the intervention takes place. In statutory agencies, the regulations were felt very
strongly, whereas in social action settings, power relationships were perceived
as more limited because of, on the one hand, a quasi-absence of organisational
rules and regulations, and on the other, a strong social action value base that
underpinned social care practitioners' actions.
Nevertheless, the power relationships present through the organisational
context of work were noted as contributing toward the creation of ethical issues
in practice and to the way in which they were resolved. The concept of the
'organisational context of work', being referred to by social workers and social
care practitioners, was therefore central to the research participants' discussion
of ethics. In order to clarify the following discussion, I will define, in the light of
the codes and categories previously examined in chapter Five, the concept of
'organisational context of work': any elements that can be found in a particular place
of work, that regularise, and therefore influence, the practice ofsocial workers and social
care practitioners. It includes elements such as: organisational values, budgets,
admissibility criteria and methods of resource allocation; agency policies and procedures
(including codes of conduct), and statutory duties and regulations. It also includes
those who contribute to its implementation, such as managers and other staffwho are
perceived as having power over social care practitioners.
The research findings have shown that the organisational context of work
wields a very strong influence upon ethical practice within social care in direct
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and indirect ways. The effects that the organisational context of work had on
social workers and social care practitioners were minimal when power
relationships between practitioners and their work context were limited, and
maximal when the networks of power between social worker and agency were
omnipresent. In order to examine the effects of power on social care
practitioners, it is important to recall the main findings according to sector:
Statutory social workers identified that clear practice guidelines are beneficial,
as they justify the professionalism of their actions, but at the same time, they felt
constrained by them. They often felt that another course of action would be
more appropriate for the service user when resolving ethical dilemmas, but as
the organisational context of work was so clear about how to operate in
particular cases, practitioners felt they had to follow the prescribed course of
action. This type of dilemma is closely related to what Banks (2006) labelled as
'ethical issues'. Indeed, most of the time, the statutory social workers identified
that their chosen course of action was directly influenced by their organisational
context of work, and that this took precedence over their professional values or
the user's needs. It is important to point out that these practitioners emphasised
that the organisational context of work was not always alien to their
professional values and the user's needs when making decisions. To
summarise: statutory social workers stated that the organisational context of
work and the power operating through it has a significant impact on their
interventions and simultaneously influences their decision-making processes.
Similarly, practitioners from the voluntary sector also tended to make decisions
in relation to what the organisational context of work suggested, though the
power exerted by the agency varied according to the size of the organisation
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and the weight of the organisational context upon workers. Indeed, the more
voluntary sector practitioners were regulated by their organisational context of
work, the more impact it had on their decision-making processes in relation to
ethical dilemmas. Practitioners from this sector clearly indicated that the
organisational context of work influenced their decision-making processes with
regard to ethical interventions. Yet in situations where their professional values
directed them towards a different course of action, they felt that there was some
room for manoeuvre and therefore more freedom to deviate from the
procedures and the organisational context of work. Practitioners from the
voluntary sector indicated that, depending on the level of power exerted by the
agency (experienced through the organisational context), decisions could be
adapted for the benefit of the service user. However, in many cases, especially
when the agency was large and closely related to the statutory sector (by
funding or being commissioned to provide a service by the Local Authority for
example), the organisational context of work would put pressure on their
decision-making processes about ethical dilemmas.
Again, the findings clearly demonstrated that the power felt through the
organisational context of work within voluntary organisations impacts directly
on the workers' decision-making processes. Therefore, the more structured the
voluntary organisation was, the more the workers found themselves in similar
situations to those experienced by statutory social workers. On the other hand,
the smaller the organisation, the more flexibility the workers had in resolving
ethical dilemmas. The power felt through the organisational context of work in
a voluntary organisation also clearly had an impact on decision-making
processes for practitioners in this field.
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At the other end of a continuum, social action workers tend to work in more
flexible organisations, due to the social action principles that underpin their
work. Therefore, respondents who practise social action in smaller, less
structured (and often independent) organisations, also experienced ethical
dilemmas as being influenced by the organisational context of work, but the
impact was not considered to be as important as it was for practitioners from
other sectors. For example, practitioners who worked within an agency with
close links to the statutory sector, or to a national voluntary organisation,
experienced dilemmas in relation to the organisational context (as did
practitioners from the other sectors). However, their decision-making processes
still tended to be more influenced by their social action values and the user's
needs, rather than by the organisational context of work, as was the case in the
statutory and voluntary sectors. Therefore, social action values and users' needs
took precedence over the organisational context of work in this particular
sector.
Consequently, it is clear that regardless of the setting in which social care
practitioners operate, the power relationships between them and the social care
agency (operationalised through the organisational context of their work), to
varying degrees and extents, has an real impact on their ethical practice and
decision-making processes. The more power is felt, the less choice the worker
has in terms of ethical decision-making. The next section will explore how the
work on power of Anthony Giddens and Michel Foucault helps in
understanding the impact power has on the decision-making processes of social
care practitioners faced with ethical dilemmas.
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The concept of power as key element in decision-making processes
To theorise the findings above, different concepts of power could be used.
Indeed, the literature review on power and empowerment (Chapter 2)
examined a number of models for understanding power such as those of
Barnes, Lukes, Foucault, Weber and Giddens.
Giddens' Structuration Theory appears appropriate to use in attempting to
establish the theoretical framework for understanding the concept of power.
Indeed, Structuration Theory was developed in the light of the interpretivist
methodology (Layder 1994; King 2005) and therefore applies coherently to
methodologies such as Grounded Theory and research perspectives such as
Symbolic Interaction.
As explained in the literature review, Structuration Theory attempts to
overcome the micro and macro perspectives by explaining social realities as
being part of a dualism which is mainly maintained by the actors. Indeed,
according to Structuration Theory, people cannot be excluded from the
formation of the structure as they are seen as knowledgeable and creative
beings (Layder 1994). This feature of Structuration Theory closely relates to
symbolic interactionists who envisage actors as being active producers and
reproducers of meanings in society. Therefore, using Structuration Theory to
understand the sole category power enables the researcher to examine power as
being part of a dualism where both the social care practitioners and the
organisational context of work, operate together in defining each other's
meaning, and therefore shaping the social context in which social services are
provided. Indeed, for Giddens, structure is not external to action and therefore
action can always influence the structure (Layder 1994; Elliott 2001). Thus,
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applying Giddens' Structuration Theory to this study, the organisational
context of work could be understood as both a medium and an outcome of
social workers' activities.
That said, Giddens' Structuration Theory poses one particular issue in regard to
this study and, specifically, in relation to conceptualising 'power'. Indeed, social
workers from the statutory sector described their experiences of resolving
ethical dilemmas as being largely influenced by their work context and the
power relationships felt through it, and therefore did not identify themselves as
being capable of changing the organisational context of work. For example,
many of the participants explained that, by challenging the structure, they
would themselves feel the impact on a personal level. Indeed, some social
workers and social care practitioners felt that the structure was such that not
pursuing a particular course of action could result in them being disciplined, or
even sacked. Therefore, social workers portrayed themselves as not wielding
much power over their decision-making, and thus, their experience does not, as
they view it, illustrate well what Giddens suggests; that is to say that human
beings are creative and knowledgeable and have the capacity to influence the
structure of their social environment (Giddens 1976). As Layder (1994:132)
explains, according to Giddens, "human beings create meanings and social
reality from within social settings and therefore social forms such as institutions
and structure have no existence apart from the activities they embody." On the
other hand, the data that emerged from this study have clearly indicated that
social workers and social care practitioners, especially from the statutory sector,
in many cases, believed that courses of action were imposed on them regardless
of their professional values and expertise or the service user's needs.
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Giddens' Structuration Theory therefore emphasises that human beings and
structure both shape the other. However, as King (2005:229) explains, "if
individuals are free at any moment to do otherwise, it is possible that structure
does not really constrain what they do." The data offer quite an opposite view
of the situation in so far that the organisational context of work was perceived
by social workers as having a strong impact on their decision-making. The
power relationship therefore appears to be stronger on the structure side than
on the human action side.
It is, however, important to bear in mind that the research perspective used
during the research was SYmbolic Interactionism. Blumer (1969:2) explains that
symbolic interactionism is based on three premises:
First, the human beings act toward things on the basis of the meaning
that the things have for them. [The second premise of SYmbolic interaction
is that] the meaning of such things is derived from, or arises out of, the
social interaction that one has with one's fellows [and finally] these
meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process
used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters. (Blumer
1969:2- own emphasis)
The symbolic interaction perspective, which Giddens offers, applied to
understanding the category of power (the sole category emerging from the
Grounded Theory process), still demands an understanding of power that is
relational; in other words, power is experienced through social interaction.
However, as pointed out earlier, Giddens' perspective on power tends to be
"thin on the structure or institutional side of the action - structure problem"
(Layder 1994:143). In this research, the data indicated that the structure
(organisational context of work) wielded more in the balance of power than
individual actions. A social theory that emphasises more the macro aspect of
understanding behaviours would therefore be more appropriate for
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understanding the data emerging from this research.
However, Symbolic Interactionism is a micro perspective, in the way that it
stresses the importance of interaction between actors and thus, it links, in a
complementary way to the macro concept of power as developed by Foucault
(1985). Power, for Foucaultian scholars:
is not a thing that is held and used by individuals or groups. Rather, it
is both a complex flow and a set of relations between different groups
and areas of society which change with circumstances and time.
(Danaher et al. 2000:xiv)
This definition of power highlights the same components identified by Blumer
(1969) in relation to SYmbolic Interaction: a set of relationships or social
interactions that are interpreted, and therefore change according to different
situations. Thus, linking Symbolic Interaction and Foucaultian analysis of
power allows for a greater understanding of the relationship of the micro and
macro and therefore provides a viable basis for exploring power in the context
of this particular research. Indeed, although utilising SYmbolic Interaction with
a Foucaultian analysis may appear unusual, it is consistent with Layder's
(1994:74) encouragement on the use of macro and micro theories in
combination:
the belief that knowledge and social analysis generally is based on direct
observation and experience (empiricism) severely limits the SYmbolic
Interaction contribution to the macro-micro issues since it has both
empirical and theoretical dimensions. Nonetheless, I believe that much of
what SYmbolic Interaction has to say is complementary to, and thus may
be fruitfully integrated with, other strands of thought. That is, on its
own, it does not provide an adequate account of macro-micro links.
However, if its strong features are properly integrated with more
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structural theories, then some aspects of Symbolic Interaction could be
brought to bear upon our understanding of the links between macro and
micro phenomena.
My central point in theorising power and setting the explanatory theory is
therefore to utilise both a Symbolic Interaction perspective and a Foucaultian
understanding of power to develop the discussion on ethical dilemmas
resolution and ways forward in practice. Using a macro perspective to
understand the concept of power as experienced by social workers and social
care practitioners acknowledges the weight that structure wields on their staff
while resolving ethical dilemmas.
Nevertheless, Foucaultian analysis of power does not generally gIVe a full
account of the interaction between structure and human activity (Layder 1994)
although, in Foucault's later work, the concept of the subject as being capable to
change and even to influence milieus, started to appear in his theory of power
(Dreyfus 2004b). Foucault (1988a:19) states:
Perhaps I have insisted too much on the technology of domination and
power. I am now more and more interested in the interaction between
oneself and others and in the technologies of individual domination, the
history of how an individual acts upon himself, in the technology of self.
Nevertheless, most of Foucault's theory gives a greater emphasis on the
structure rather than the human subject. Therefore, the Symbolic Interaction
perspective complements the use of Foucaultian analysis of power as it allows
for explanation of the effect of the power at a micro level. This understanding of
power and its effect at micro level is very close to Foucault's suggestion for
analysis of power, as Smart (1985:79) explains,
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Foucault has argued that analysis should proceed from a micro-le el in
order to reveal the particular histories, techniques and tactics of power.
Such an ascending analysis of power would in addition be able to reveal
how mech anisms of power have been appropriated, tran formed,
colon ize d and extende d by more general or global forms of domination.
Th erefore, Symbolic Interaction allows us to exa mi ne the experience of social
workers between them on one level, wh ile Foucaultian understand ing of power
allows examination of the effect of po wer on the group of practitioners. Figure 7
below illustrates the combination of symbolic in teraction and Foucaultian
analys is of power. Although the theories are from very different school of
thought (macro and mi cro th eori es), there is still an element that links both
perspectives together, that is the con cept of relati on sh ips.
Figure 7 - Contribution from Symbolic Interaction and Foucaultian
analysis of power in understanding ethics and ethical issues in social
work























Th e r lational element present in both perspectives will therefore con titute my
main argument for under tanding, a well a cou nteracting th e effect of power.
It will con titute the theoretical underpinning for a framework, in pired by the
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work of Alasdair MacIntyre and of virtue ethics, by which it becomes possible
to increase resistance of social workers to challenge power. However, at this
point, it is important to examine the data in the light of a Foucaultian analysis of
power. By Foucaultian analysis of power, I include the work of Michel
Foucault, but also the work of other contemporary sociologists who have
furthered his theory of power.
Foucault defines power as:
[... ] relational, something that is exercised from a variety of points in the
social body, rather than something that is 'acquired, seized, or shared'.
Relations of power are not considered to be secondary to other
relationships but are immanent in the latter (Foucault 1979:94 in Smart
1985:112)
Danaher et al. (2000:ix) adds that a Foucaultian understanding of power covers:
the technologies, knowledge, discourses, politics and practices used to
bring about the production and management of a state's human
resources. (Danaher et al. 2000: ix)
Power is therefore relational and has the purpose of controlling, analysing,
regulating and defining society's behaviour. In relation to this study, power
was especially perceived within the relationship between the organisational
context of work and the social care practitioner.
One limitation of using a Foucaultian understanding of power is that the
concept of 'institution' was not given much attention in his theory, apart from
the indirect reference to governance and the place of the state in power
relationships (Elliott 2001). However, and despite the fact that Foucault does
222
not refer to institutions directly, a Foucaultian understanding of power can
nevertheless help to situate the elements that constitute the 'organisational
context of work' as these elements all comprise what Foucault refers to in his
notion of 'discourse', 'knowledge' and 'discipline', and which, in relation to this
study, fosters the power relationships in social care. It can therefore be argued
that through a Foucaultian understanding of the concept of power, the
formation and resolution of ethical dilemmas can be understood, among social
care practitioners from different fields.
Indeed, Webb and McBeath argue that a Foucaultian perspective on power is
valuable for understanding the 'nature of social work':
Following Foucault, we argued that, in the nature of statutory social
work, client and social workers are caught within networks of power
emanating from institutions, alliances between discourses of social
sciences, and techniques of intervention. (Webb and McBeath 1990:68)
Many of the social care practitioners interviewed for this research stated that in
various cases, ethical dilemmas are out of their control, and their ways of
resolving them are mostly influenced by elements external to them. These
elements have an impact at different levels, depending on the way power
operates within an organisation. In order to gain further understanding of how
power operates in the different sectors of social care, and the impact it has on
practitioners' decision-making processes in relation to ethical dilemmas, it is
important to analyse the features that constitute 'power' for Foucault, and the
ways they impact on social care practitioners' experiences of ethical dilemmas.
The following section explores three features that contribute to maintaining
power relationships in social care organisations, and their practical impact on
social care practitioners.
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Power through Knowledge and Discourse
Knowledge, as understood by Foucaultian scholars, can be defined as:
perspectives, ideas, narratives, commentaries, rules, categories, laws
terms, explanations, definition produced and valorised by disciplines,
fields and institutions through the application of scientific principles.
(Danaher et al. 2000:xiii)
As explained earlier, Foucault (1983) explores the concept of power as emerging
from the relationships between partners. For example, social workers are not
more powerful than service users per se, but the position the state puts them in,
and the knowledge they acquire through formal education, gives them a
relationship of greater power over the users they interact with in providing
services. Consequently, the power relationship to which Foucault refers is
understood to be unequal. These inequalities are in tum maintained by the
production of knowledge, and knowledge is maintained through the use of
different discourses.
Foucault (1992) understands the notion of 'discourse' to be very important in
the formation of power relationships. Discourse can be understood as:
language in action: they are the windows, if you like, which allow us to
make sense of, and 'see' things. These discursive windows or
explanations shape our understanding of ourselves, and our capacity
to distinguish the valuable from the valueless, the true from the false,
and the right from the wrong. (Foucault 1992:49)
A discourse is therefore a way to form, change, or maintain people's
perceptions of what is right or wrong in society. It is a form of communication
that maintains order and practices.
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The General Social Care Council is a good example of an organisation that
promotes a 'discourse' in Foucault's sense; this will be explored further below.
However, using a Foucaultian analysis of power, it becomes clear that social
care practitioners do not simply 'hold' power, but instead work within the
context of a complex, layered power relationship that exists between
themselves, the organisational context of work and the service users. Therefore,
practice within a statutory social work framework (as in the present system), for
example, becomes naturalised and legitimised by reference to the
organisational context of work, which maintains the knowledge of 'how to do
things' through the discourse used (in the form of policies, procedures, laws
and regulations).
Foucault's explanation of the discourses used to maintain power relationships
also helps to explain the bad press that some social workers have received over
cases of misconduct. Indeed, according to Foucault and in relation to discourse,
when a problem occurs, society tends to look for the immediate enemy rather
than the 'chief enemy' (Foucault 1983). In the context of social care practice and
ethical misconduct, the Foucaultian analysis explains that although social
workers often take the blame directly, it would be more appropriate to examine
the context in which practitioners have taken decisions and then identify the
ways in which the organisational context of work impacted on the case. Indeed,
too often the effects of power can be felt as issuing from the individual social
worker (which Foucault refers to as the 'immediate enemy'), instead of being
perceived as corning from the structural level (which Foucault refers to as the
'chief enemy'). Social workers can be blamed for not taking appropriate
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decisions, but Foucault's understanding of discourse and power proposes that
answers should be sought within the organisational contexts of work instead.
Danaher et al. (2000:xv) explain that:
power, which Foucault takes from Nietzsche, refers to the notion that
meanings, ideas, rules, discourse, knowledge, and truths do not
emerge naturally, but are produced in order to support, advantage or
valorise a particular social group.
Translated into the social care practice setting, the power Foucault refers to is
maintained by social care policies and procedures and the overall management
system, which implicitly maintains knowledge about 'how to behave' and
'what is accepted within the setting' through a general discourse that social
workers and social care practitioners have to promote. Therefore, those who are
perceived as powerful (for example line managers over social workers) are
perceived in this way because of the discourse they articulate, the knowledge
they have acquired and the rules they apply. This perception of their power is
created through the discourse they articulate, and thus discourse is not just the
act of speaking, but the practices that form the whole reference system.
Discourse is therefore very important in relation to the concept of power within
social care practice. Because discourse is 'taken for granted', it can only be
challenged by making people aware of their perceptions and the relational
nature of discourse. For example, it is easier to blame a social worker in relation
to misconduct than to blame the agency, the social policies and the overall
culture and structure of the organisational context of work:
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At the same time, these principles [discourse] are more or less
unconscious - we don't go around thinking about them, or referring to
them. They are the grounds on which we base everything, so we more
or less take them for granted. (Danaher et al. 2000:17)
Discourse is therefore closely related to the organisational context of work and
sustains the power relationships between workers, agency and service users.
Foucault (1983) also relates power to knowledge, competence and
qualifications, and argues that society as a whole defines what an acceptable
qualification is, through the maintenance of a discourse. Power and knowledge
are therefore reciprocal, in that knowledge is a way to access powerful positions
and powerful positions are a way to form and define knowledge. A Foucaultian
analysis of the experiences of social care practitioners in resolving ethical
dilemmas in their practice would therefore imply the following: a social care
practitioner can be perceived as exercising power over a service user, for
example in providing or not providing the service needed. However, the
rationale for this behaviour is not solely the responsibility of the social care
practitioner. It arises not only with the professional skills, knowledge and core
values of an individual, but also in the organisation that places the practitioner
in a relationship of power over the user, via the agency policies that underpin
the practitioner's work. What makes the social care practitioner
'knowledgeable' is in fact the context in which they practice. They are directly
influenced by the way the agency operates and the organisational context of
work.
Power, as understood by Foucault, is relational, not a possession. It is a
relationship between different partners, organisations, and structures, which is
transmitted by the culture and structure of institutions. A social worker
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working for an agency is therefore influenced by many elements that can justify
a course of action with regard to the service user. However, as the data have
shown, the same situation can present itself very differently if the context of
intervention is changed:
The person is a container whose self-identity and psychological interior
is largely a product of the relations of power, discourse and practice in
which he or she is enmeshed. (Layder 1994:103)
Discourse and knowledge are very important for maintaining power
relationships, according to Foucault. The data analysis has indicated that social
care practitioners tend to comply with regulations and the overall
organisational context of work. Their power is therefore partly maintained
through the use of discourses that make certain values and knowledge more
acceptable than others, and which consequently provide practitioners with a
definition of what is considered to be right or wrong.
Power through Discipline
From the discussion above, it is clear that knowledge and discourse are very
important in sustaining power relationships in social care practice. However,
discourse and knowledge cannot maintain the power relationships in an agency
without some form of discipline. Discipline is understood by Foucault as:
the notion of punishment or coercion and second to the notion of a set
of skills and knowledge which must be mastered in order to achieve
success in particular field. (Danaher et al. 2000:x)
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The notion of discipline is the third element that has an impact on the decision-
making process in relation to ethical dilemmas and it can also be felt as a
consequence of the regulations that are embedded in the organisational context
of work. Regulation is defined as:
The act of regulating: The state of being regulated; an authoritative rule
dealing with details or procedure; to bring under the control of law or
constituted authority. (Webster 1996:985)
In examining the definition of regulation, it becomes clear that it is in fact
closely related to the concept of discipline. Indeed, if a regulation is not
followed, discipline can be used to punish the' deviant'. Therefore the concept
of discipline is very important in the overall discussion of power, because even
though discourse and knowledge are embedded in (and maintained by) the
organisational context where interventions take place, without discipline,
practitioners are free to act in line with, or against, the regulations and
procedures transmitted through the organisational context of work.
In examining the impact of the organisational context of work on practitioners'
decision-making processes, it appeared from the data analysis that practitioners
who were highly regulated in their practice were more likely to follow the
regulations than, for example, their professional values, when resolving an
ethical dilemma. The following comment was made in relation to a conflict
between professional expertise and regulation:
You've got to tread carefully ... because obviously if you step over
the line ... you will make trouble for yourself (Statutory social
worker)
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This social worker's comment echoes Foucault's thoughts when he asserts that:
I think a number of individuals in this situation are saying no and
denouncing the system. This does not protect them against exclusion or
the fact that their exclusion is now accepted by everyone, not only
obviously by the bureaucracy but also by their colleagues. This proves
the extent to which social work has become programmatic and
institutionalised. (Foucault 1972:91)
The concepts of discipline and punishment are important components of
institutionalisation and can be understood as:
a corpus of law and texts that must be remembered; that operates not
by differentiating individuals, but by specifying acts according to a
number of general categories; not by hierarchizing, but quite simply by
bringing into play the binary opposition of the permitted and the
forbidden; not by homogenizing but by operating the division,
acquired once and for all, of condemnation. The disciplinary
mechanism secreted a 'penalty of the norm', which is irreducible in its
principles and functioning to the traditional penalty of the law.
(Foucault 1991:183)
The concept of discipline as found in today's social care system is applied in a
subtle way, through the organisational context of work where social care
practice takes place and by regulatory bodies in health and social care:
Disciplinary power moved the focus of control to individuals
themselves. That is, by understanding that they are constantly under
surveillance, individuals begin to oversee themselves, to regulate their
own behaviour in the light of its assumed visibility to others.
(Layder 1994:99)
The notion of discipline takes place in the context of the normalisation of action
(Foucault 1991). Applied to the context of social care practice, and in particular
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to these research findings, the disciplining of action takes place through the
organisational context of work (rules, organisational culture, regulations,
criteria) and through the sustainability of power relationships (the use of
discourse and knowledge) between agencies, users and practitioners. Indeed,
many social care practitioners mentioned referring to the staff handbook,
eligibility criteria and overall regulations when making a decision about ethical
dilemmas. Layder (1993:99) adds that:
in effect, the principle of surveillance became internalised. In this sense,
the functioning of power becomes automatic rather than the result of a
conscious exercise by some external agency.
The General Social Care Council is an example of regulatory body that uses
disciplinary routines and programmes. Social workers have to follow a rigid
curriculum in order to gain their qualifications. They then have to work within
a framework of eligibility criteria, statutory duties and budgetary constraints,
all of which helps to discipline social workers to behave in a particular way. As
Layder (1993:101) explains, in relation to a Foucaultian analysis of the effects of
power:
individuals in particular social settings and contexts are affected by
power relations in terms of their self-identities, attitudes and their
(psychological) predisposition.
In other words (and in relation to this particular research), the institutions social
workers gain their qualifications from, and the organisations which employ
them, impose a set of prescribed guidelines through the organisational context
of work, and this takes precedence over the user's needs in some cases. For
example, if a practitioner judges that the rule needs to be challenged for the
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benefit of the service user and therefore acts in a manner that differs from
expectations within the organisational context, the practitioner can be
sanctioned. The concept of disciplinary power is therefore important in solving
ethical dilemmas.
Disciplinary power, together with discourse and knowledge, play an important
part in the decision-making processes of practitioners when faced with an
ethical dilemma. Disciplinary power, discourse and knowledge are all
maintained by the organisational context of work in which interventions take
place. Nevertheless, the organisational context of work is also very important in
maintaining a standard of intervention and service that is fair and of a good
quality. However, as the research findings have indicated, when the
'organisational context of work' exerts heavy pressure on practitioners
experiencing a dilemma and the course of action required by the agency is
different from the service user's needs or interests, the dilemma tends to be
resolved by putting the agency's priority first. On the other hand, in an
organisation where the organisational context is looser, practitioners feel they
have more freedom to behave in the best interests of the user and according to
their professional training and values. Indeed, many of the practitioners
perceived the organisational context of their work as oppressive. The concept of
power, as understood by Foucault, is helpful for understanding the situation in
which social care practitioners make ethical decisions, in terms of the context of
power relationships between themselves and their agencies.
The discussion above has outlined how power relationships in social care
agencies are maintained by the use of discourses, knowledge and discipline, at
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a micro level, that is to say, over social workers and social care practitioners. As
English (2006:87) explains,
Foucaultian poststructuralism focuses on the technologies (practice) of
power and the ways in which power becomes present and capillary, that
is, working its way through systems of human interactions. (... ) In a
Foucaultian sense, the emphasis is on the how of power and not the what
or the why or the when.
This exploration has therefore led the researcher to acquire an understanding of
how power operates within social work and consequently develop a typology to
understand different levels of ethical issues among social workers and other
social care practitioners across different types of settings. Symbolic Interaction
has complemented the Foucaultian analysis of power in so far that, while
Foucault offers a macro perspective to understanding how power is operated
through the organisational context of work as well as how it affect social
workers, in their daily ethical practice, Symbolic Interaction shines light on how
social workers, by their semi-autonomous capacity to create for themselves
meaning for their experience of ethical issues in practice, can counteract the
effect of the power and act ethically at micro level.
Although Foucaultian analysis and Symbolic Interaction are two theories that
share more differences than similarities by their nature (macro and micro
perspective) they nevertheless share the element of relationality, that is to say
that both perspectives use the concept of relationships as central to their
arguments. Indeed, the element of relationality renders the combination of both
social theories possible as it is through different 'levels' or 'types' of
relationships that 'construction of meanings' are developed and negotiated
according to both theories. For example, while relationships of power develop
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between institutions, the organisational context of work, social workers and
social care practitioners and service users, it is also through relationships and
interactions that social workers interpret and construct their understanding or
their positions. This combination of Symbolic Interaction and Foucaultian
analysis of power resembles Structuration Theory as developed by Giddens, but
also shares differences, in so far that while Giddens believes that human agency
shapes structure by interacting directly with it, the combination of Symbolic
Interaction and Foucaultian understanding of power does not necessary imply
that the structure will change, but at least, may allow social workers, though
their interactions and relationships, to develop some mechanisms of resistance
to power.
Therefore, Symbolic Interaction and Foucaultian analysis within this research
complement each other and bring a fuller understanding of how power
operates at a macro level and is felt at capillary level, as well as how it can be
counteracted. The combined application of both perspectives is fundamental to
the development of the discussion in Chapter Eight.
It has been argued above that a Foucaultian analysis offers an appropriate
framework to understanding the emerging core category 'power', felt through
the organisational context of work. The next chapter will build upon the
conceptual understanding of the core category power, that is to say, a concept





Thus far, the data analysis in Chapter Five and the theoretical examination of
the core category in Chapter Six have clearly identified the central role that the
concept of power plays (through the organisational context of work) and how it
has the capacity to influence practitioners' decision-making processes with
regard to ethical conduct. Indeed, the organisational context of work and the
way power operates within an organisation have emerged as the most
important elements. These strongly affect the ways that practitioners resolve
ethical dilemmas and adhere to ethical conduct and principles in general.
The first section of the discussion will draw on the concept of power developed
above in Chapter Six and will develop a model to understand the similarities
and differences in relation to the resolution of ethical dilemmas in social care
practice.
The second section aims to explore the ways in which the work of Alasdair
MacIntyre can assist in understanding the experience of social care practitioners
in relation to ethics and ethical dilemmas and how this applies to the model of
power discussed in the first section. It will be suggested that a return to 'virtue
ethics' in relation to ethical dilemmas can counteract the effects of relational
power and increase the resistance of social workers facing ethical dilemmas
towards the organisational context of work. The relationship between
Foucault's theory of power and MacIntyre's understanding of ethical conduct is
crucial to this thesis and made possible by the contribution of the symbolic
interaction research perspective. The use of virtue ethics as understood by
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MacIntyre (1995:1999) will be central to this section, as it helps to shine light on
a different way of practicing ethically in social work and social care.
Finally, the third section will explore some practical applications of MacIntyre's
concept of virtue ethics in counteracting the effects of relational power. It will
begin by discussing the concept of collective practical reasoning (adapted from
MacIntyre 1999) and its importance in developing and cultivating the virtues on
the one hand, and how the Socratic Dialogue approach (Saran and Neisser 2004;
Kessels 1999; Morrell 2004) constitutes a suitable framework for nurturing a
collective practical reasoning practice and, thus, cultivating social work virtues
on the other hand. It will be argued that Socratic Dialogue can provide social
work students and already qualified social workers with a greater opportunity
to develop and maintain ethical conduct regardless of the organisational context
of a given intervention. It will emphasise how the development of 'virtues',
acquired during collective practical reasoning and developed through the
practice of Socratic Dialogue, can enable social work students and practitioners
already employed to work more ethically and thus to improve the overall
ethical practice in social care.
Social care Practitioners' Experiences of Ethical Dilemmas: Levels of Ethical
Issues and Consequences on Their Well-being
The data collected during this research, and the previous section on discourse,
knowledge and discipline, clearly indicate that a Foucaultian understanding of
power can help to cast some light on the ethics of social care and social work.
Furthermore, the research has so far demonstrated that ethical dilemmas and
decision-making processes occur in relation to the different organisational
contexts of work, and that, depending on the field of practice, some patterns
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appear in the ways the dilemmas emerge and are resolved . Thi ection will
therefore examine different levels of ethical issues tha t appea red within the
p ractice of those who participated in the research. Figure 8, below, illu trate
p atterns fou nd throu gh the process of the research.
Figure 8- Levels of 'power' and impacts on the





































Th e experience of social care practitioners fitting wi thin the lower part of the
figure (low level of power), fits the definition of an ethical di lemma (A) as
defined by Banks (1997:218): 11 A choice between tw o equa lly un welcome
alternative courses of action ." This particular definition applied particularly
well to social action workers and to some workers from the vo luntary sec tor.
Practitioners from these settings defined their experience of resolvin g ethica l
dilemmas as having to choose between two courses of action, for exa mple a
e perienced in dilemmas between care and control. Of course, as Banks (1997)
e plains, none of the values are really seen as 'welcome', because wha teve r the
d ci ion, an y per on involved can be left with negative con equence . The
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vignettes used in the fourth data-collection phase explored this type of ethical
dilemma. Practitioners were unhappy with the alternative solutions and, in the
end, were making decisions likely to impact the least on every user, practitioner
and agency involved in the situation. Because social care practitioners from
social action settings and the voluntary sector are not as closely regulated by the
organisational context of work compared to those in the statutory sector, they
have more flexibility in the decision-making process and therefore have more
scope for ethical reasoning (0).
However, because practitioners from the voluntary sector and social action
settings do not experience as much pressure from the organisational context of
work, they are left with complex ethical decisions to make, instead of being able
to rely on regulation to make their decisions. When discussing their experience
of ethical dilemmas in practice, one respondent stated the following:
As a social action worker, you have a lot of responsibility, because
there are no structures in terms of social action that give you any kind
of guidance at all ... and you could be a social action worker working
with deprived children or single mums on an estate ... and what if
there is an issue of Child Protection there? What happens? As a social
action worker, you won't have all the structure and legislation to hand
that a social worker would have ... you know? Where do you go back?
You can't go back to the process because the child's life is involved ...
and you can ask 'what, why, how, action, and reflection', but it can
blow up in your face! Social action does not have any of that and that's
why it crosses over a very dangerous territory. (Social action worker.)
Therefore, although experiencing ethical dilemmas in Banks' terms, and having
an opportunity for ethical reasoning because of the limited impact of the
organisational context of work on their practice, social action workers and some
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practitioners from the voluntary sectors found themselves in difficult situations
when resolving ethical dilemmas.
On the other hand, within statutory social work and for some practitioners from
the voluntary sector, the experience of ethical dilemmas is somewhat different.
Some practitioners referred to the concept of ethical dilemmas as defined by
Banks (1997), but others indicated that they rarely experienced ethical dilemmas
in practice. A statutory social worker mentioned that no ethical dilemmas were
apparent within her practice, but referred to her experience in terms of
'personal dilemmas':
I just don't think we have the dilemmas ... apart from personal
dilemmas ... I don't think we have ... because it is out of our control ...
so it is not our ethical dilemmas is it ... really ... you know we are a
huge organisation ... and I am just a little person at the bottom ... it is
all this structure of other people that make the decision[s]. (Statutory
social worker.)
The notion of a 'personal dilemma' was defined as referring to a situation
where the practitioner has no choice about the course of action because of the
pressure from the organisational context, but where the practitioner
nevertheless feels awkward because another course of action (not prescribed by
the organisational context of work) could have greater benefit for the user.
Therefore, the concept of 'personal dilemma' occurs when practitioners
perceive themselves as being helpless in regard to a situation. This concept of
personal dilemma resembles the concept of 'ethical problem' (B) as suggested
by Banks and Williams (2005). Indeed, Banks and Williams (2005:1011) explain
ethical problems as "where a decision has to be made, but where there was no
dilemma for the person making the decision - i.e. it was clear which course of
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action to take". However, in the case of the social workers' accounts collected
during this research, the perception of the ethical problem was slightly
different. Indeed, despite the clarity of the course of action imposed through the
organisational context of work, it was not always perceived as morally right by
the respondents. Therefore, by acting according to the prescribed way, social
workers felt' awkward' and even 'unethical'. In so far as no alternative course
of action was perceived as possible, they were morally unhappy with the
outcome. Although social workers demonstrated a level of reflection while
resolving the dilemmas presented to them, the scope for ethical reasoning was
constrained by the pressure of the organisational context of work (C).
This experience relates to a second definition, which can be linked with the
concept of power developed by Foucault (1983). Indeed, 'personal dilemmas'
(as expressed by one of the participants) or the concept of ethical problems as
defined by Banks and Williams (2005) occur when the practitioner has a
prescribed course of action to follow, through the knowledge, discourse and
disciplinary mechanisms maintained by an agency in the organisational context
of work. This pressurises the individual to follow a particular course of action
in the face of other important values, such as users' needs or the values of the
professional. Foucault (1983) explains that this sort of power (here sustained by
the organisational context of work) is most effective when it is 'hidden from
view'. Indeed, knowledge and discourses are being used to control and regulate
individuals and populations:
The official version of things is that they are 'working in our interests',
'taking care of us', looking after us and watching over us 'for our own
good'. (Danaher et al. 2000:68)
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This explains why social care practitioners, when reflecting on the impact of the
organisational context of work on ethical decision-making, emphasised that
'regulations', 'admissibility criteria', 'agency policies and procedures' and
'statutory duties and regulations' made them clear about the way to behave.
Thus, most social care practitioners from the statutory sector who have
experienced 'personal dilemmas' have not seen the need to challenge features in
the organisational context of work, but instead have dealt with the
consequences on an emotional level. Therefore, the individual experiencing the
'personal dilemma' does not experience this within the first definition of ethical
dilemma given by Banks (2006), as they do not have a real choice in relation to
the course of action to take. Practitioners experience no apparent 'ethical
dilemma', as the course of action to take is clearly suggested by the
organisational context of work. They feel an absence of choice but, at the same
time, are left with the consequences of the imposed course of action and thus
experience a personal dilemma. This notion of personal dilemma affects the
practitioner, but in contrast to the 'ethical dilemma' defined by Banks (2006),
this type of dilemma does not affect the course of action per se. Resembling the
notion of ethical problems to which Banks and Williams (2005) refer to, it affects
the practitioner's own values and principles and therefore has consequences for
the well-being of the practitioner.
A Foucaultian analysis of power therefore has much to offer for understanding
ethics in social care practice. By understanding power as something structured
for individual, group, organisational or class purposes, and as something being
exercised in human interactions (Foucault 1981), it is possible to see that ethical
dilemmas and problems take place in the context of power relationships. These
relationships are structured within the organisational context of work.
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Starting from an understanding of Foucault's analysis of power as a structural
one, it would be relevant to assume that any conclusions emerging from a
Foucaultian understanding of power should emphasise a 'structural' strategy to
counteract the effect of power. Nevertheless, following the symbolic interaction
approach, the strategies proposed in this research tend to reach into a micro-
interpersonal perspective, in so far as it is argued that, by understanding power
as relational, a strategy for counteracting its effect could be achieved by
changing the perceptions that people have of power relationships and, thus,
increasing resistance. As Kaufman (2003:240) notes,
Foucault's theory is helpful for supplementing our understanding of the
power of institutions with an understanding of how power relations are
carried and constituted in knowledge system, in interpersonal relations,
in the ways our bodies are positioned by social forces, in the ways we are
catalogued and categorised, and in processes of self-exploitation.
It therefore becomes arguable that changing the perceptions that people have of
power relationships can affect the way that ethical situations are perceived and,
thus, in the context of this research, can contribute to modifying the pattern of
ethical practice. Blumer (1969:59), adopting the symbolic interaction
perspective, remarks:
The actor is seen as one who is confronted with a situation in which he
has to act. In this situation, he notes, interprets, and assesses things with
which he has to deal in order to act.
In relation to this research, the findings have shown that social workers are
involved in different relationships of power (depending on their work context,
for example) but also interpret these power relationships differently from one
setting to another. This interpretation in tum affects their ethical practice. For
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example, while one social worker from the statutory sector noted that ethics is
understood as "something related to whether you keep your job or not", (which
indicates an (unconscious) mechanism of power through discourse and
discipline), another practitioner from the statutory sector defined ethics as
"behaving wrongly or rightly" (which does not explicitly imply a perceived
power relationship in the definition). Yet, Rhodes (1986) is clear that social work
ethics is undermined by the overall procedures of an agency that tend to
weaken ethical practice and moral responsibility, especially within the statutory
sector.
Therefore, the difference between both social workers above is more related to
their interpretation of their positions within the various relationships of power as
opposed to different relationships of power. Indeed, English (2006), in relation
to an analysis of Foucaultian power in the context of her own research,
emphasises the fact that actors can resist power by creating their own
knowledge. Symbolic interaction helps us to understand that, regardless of the
omnipresence of power in society, there is a possibility that agents can interpret
situations differently and, thus, change their reaction to power relationships.
In order to further explore relationships between the concept of relational
power, the capacity to act on the relation of power, the organisational context of
work and the notion of ethical practice, MacIntyre's After Virtue perspective
(1985) will be invoked. It is intended that the use of MacIntyre's theory of
'virtue ethics' will provide a possible approach aimed at counteracting the
effects of power felt in relation to the emergence and resolution of ethical
dilemmas.
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Applied Moral Perspectives to Counteract the Impact of the Relationships of
Power on Ethical Decision-making
We have seen from the previous section that ethical practice is influenced to
different degrees by the organisational context of work and the power
relationships that are felt within it. However, although a link between the
concept of power and the experience of ethical decision-making has been
demonstrated, it is still unclear as to how the issues raised might be resolved in
order to improve ethical social care practice.
In the field of social care ethics, it is very common to resolve ethical conflicts
using mainstream moral philosophies such as the Kantian and utilitarian
approaches. Indeed, Banks (2001) suggests that most of the writing on social
care ethics is related to Kantian or utilitarian perspectives, where the Kantian
prioritises the self-determination of the user, and the utilitarian focuses on
achieving the greatest good for the greatest number. Osmo and Landau (2006)
support Banks's findings that social workers usually make decisions related to
ethics supported by utilitarian or Kantian theories, and also add that arguments
based on virtue theories are infrequent. Therefore, while Kantian and utilitarian
approaches to ethics were explored in the literature review and fit well within
some of the principles of social work practice, it is rare that an ethical dilemma
can be solved using one or other approach, as they are often conflicting. For
example, while the principle of the greatest good for the greatest number
(utilitarian) could very well apply to a particular situation, the concept of self-
determination of the user (Kantian) can rarely be acted upon simultaneously
(McBeath and Webb 2002). Consequently, mainstream moral philosophies are
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not always appropriate for resolving ethical dilemmas in social care practice,
especially when the ethical conflicts reveal complex relationships of power.
While the value base of social work reflects a Kantian approach through the
value of self-determination of the user (see CCETSW Statement of Values 1995,
Appendix 6), the welfare state tends to prioritise a utilitarian approach because
of limitations in human and financial resources (Almond 1985; Banks 2006).
One of the critics of a principles-based approach to ethics is that it is distant
from 'human experience' and that it is too abstract and theoretical to assist
social workers in resolving ethical dilemmas practically (Abramson 1996). A
Foucaultian understanding of power, the symbolic interaction perspective and
the Grounded Theory process have led the researcher to search for ethical
perspectives that might have the capacity to increase the resistance by social
workers who are operating within a relationship of power. In this context, the
moral perspective developed by Alasdair MacIntyre in After Virtue (1985)
appears to be worth examining. This section therefore aims to explore the
relationships of power in the context of a virtue ethics approach applied to the
practice of social care.
Revisiting Alasdair MacIntyre's Position on Virtue Ethics
The theory contained in After Virtue "is meant to set out a program for future
work" (Murphy 2003:39). Indeed, After Virtue (MacIntyre 1985) was the first in a
series by MacIntyre relating to ethical perspectives and moral agreements: it
was followed by Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (1988), Three Rival Versions of
Moral Enquiry (1991) and Dependent Rational Animals (1999). MacIntyre aimed to
cast light on ethical behaviour in contemporary society and prompted the
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development of his theory around the importance of 'virtue' in moral
philosophy.
MacIntyre's thesis was summarised in the literature review; it supports a return
to 'virtue ethics', which was primarily developed by Plato and furthered by
Aristotle. In order to arrive at this conclusion, MacIntyre takes the reader on a
journey that explores his interpretation of current morality, which he sees as the
result of a fragmented understanding of ethics taken out of its cultural and
historical contexts. This has mainly occurred because of the dominance of a
society that is interpretivist, in ethical terms, which means that ethical or moral
and conduct is understood to be an expression of personal preference.
MacIntyre argues that virtue ethics (with the question 'what sort of person ought
I to be?') was the dominant approach in western moral philosophy until at least
the Enlightenment period. However, from the eighteenth century onwards,
moral philosophy changed radically, and philosophers such as Kant (Kantian
ethics), Mill and Bentham (utilitarian ethics) and Ayer and Moore (emotivism
and intuitionism) started to analyse ethics in terms of the question 'what
behaviour should one adopt in order to live an ethical life?' and consequently
began to dictate ethical conduct as being related to a set of principles to follow.
That, as Vardy and Grosch (1999) argue, has achieved little:
Reason, passion, choice, utility and intuition had all failed ... what was
left was meaningless in the strict, philosophical sense of the word. We
can establish facts through science and true or false statements through
logic, but the world of value, the realm of morality is beyond fact, truth
or falsehood. Instead morality is simply the expression of personal
preference in a culture which has abandoned the virtue and rejected
this sense of community. (Vardy and Grosch 1999:103)
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In this vein, MacIntyre (1985) sees modem moral philosophies as being
developed around the question of 'action': 'What action should I take in order
to live an ethical life?' Indeed, returning to the literature review, it was clear
that Kantian and utilitarian approaches to ethics simply explore different ways
of determining the right behaviour to adopt. For example, the Kantian approach
(Kant 1785) states that a course of action should be based upon the response to
the three categorical imperatives ('act if the maxim of your action was to
become through your will a universal law of nature'), while the utilitarian
position is known as the theory of usefulness (cited in Vardy and Grosch
1999:63). This focus on action, however, constitutes only one part of MacIntyre's
critique, since he also queries the value of the' question of action' as the best
way to understand ethical behaviour:
[... ] The central problems of moral philosophy come to cluster around
the question' How do we know which rules to follow?' (MacIntyre
1985:236)
MacIntyre expresses another concern. His critique of moral philosophies
highlights not only the fact that people understand ethics as a matter of action,
but also that they define ethics, moral conduct and norms of behaviour as a
question of personal taste and preference (emotivist and interpretivist). Indeed,
MacIntyre bemoans the spread of emotivism and other interpretivist moral
philosophies in society, as, in his opinion, they render the "state of moral
agreement in a grave disorder" (MacIntyre 1985:256).
MacIntyre instead believes that ethics should be concerned with character,
answering the question 'what sort of person ought I to be?' rather than 'what
action should I follow?' Through an exploration of modem moral philosophy
247
(including the Kantian and utilitarian approaches), and in particular through
his critique of emotivism, MacIntyre develops his argument for a return to
'virtue ethics'.
However, MacIntyre cautions that 'virtue ethics' are not always compatible
with effectiveness and therefore do not always go hand in hand with the aims
of organisations, which usually prioritise effectiveness:
The organisation is characteristically engaged in a competitive struggle
for scarce resources to put to the service of its predetermined ends. It is
therefore a central responsibility of managers to direct and redirect the
organisation's available resources, both human and non-human, as
effectively as possible toward those ends. Every bureaucratic
organisation embodies some explicit or implicit definition of costs and
benefits from which the criteria of effectiveness are derived.
Bureaucratic rationality is the rationality of matching means to ends
economically and efficiently. (MacIntyre 1985:25)
Nevertheless, and despite the fact that virtue ethics are not always compatible
with effectiveness, MacIntyre argues that the development of virtues could
enable people to act more ethically and, as applied to the context of this
research, enable practitioners to do more than follow only the guidelines for
practice in the organisational context of work in various settings.
Starting from MacIntyre's position, I will argue that a return to virtue ethics can
contribute to rendering social care practitioners better at taking ethical
decisions, because virtue ethics is concerned with quality of character rather
than guidelines to be followed. Social care practitioners from the statutory
sector would then be faced with ethical dilemmas rather than personal
dilemmas or ethical problems, as identified by Banks and Williams (2005).
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Social action workers, on the other hand, would become more confident at
making ethical decisions even where there is an absence of guidelines, as virtue
ethics does not rest on following rules. Having developed the virtues, a
practitioner would have the strength of character to implement the course of
action that they deem appropriate and would thus increase the level of
resistance to power relationships when appropriate, regardless of the context in
which the action takes place:
We cannot characterise behaviour independently of intentions, and we
cannot characterise intentions independently of the settings which make
those intentions intelligible both to agents themselves and to others.
(MacIntyre 1985:206)
Attempting to practice social work and make ethical decisions by mainly
applying rules and regulations imposed through different work contexts is not,
according to MacIntyre, the way forward for ethical practice. It will be argued
that a virtue ethics approach can aid in counteracting this pressure, or its lack,
thus helping in reaching ethical conclusions. I will now go on to explore further
the appropriateness of virtue ethics in social work practice, before proposing a
way forward for insuring ethical deliberation without being totally constrained,
or disabled by, the power relationships felt through the organisational context
of work.
Ethics within a 'Practice'
The section on virtue ethics in the literature review introduced the idea that
social work fits within the definition of 'practice' as understood by MacIntyre
(1985). Indeed, MacIntyre (1985) explains that practices are very important in
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defining a morally good life for an individual. It is useful, at this point, to
remember what a practice constitutes in MacIntyre's terms:
A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as
well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept
the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my own
performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes,
choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and
practically define the practice. Practices of course, as I have just noticed,
have a history: garnes, sciences and arts all have histories. Thus the
standards are not themselves immune from criticism, but nonetheless
we cannot be initiated into a practice without accepting the authority of
the best standards realized so far. (MacIntyre 1985:190)
Social work, as illustrated in the literature review, constitutes a 'practice' in
MacIntyre's sense. Hence, social work involves standards as well as a set of
values. However, MacIntyre also stresses that practice takes place within
contexts, and as this study has demonstrated, settings and organisational
contexts of work impact upon social workers and social care practitioners'
understandings of ethics and ethical dilemmas. Consequently, several ethical
conflicts emerge from the interplay between the 'practice' value base and the
work settings in which social work takes place. However, as explained in the
first section of this discussion, power plays an important role in maintaining
organisational contexts of work. What links the concepts of power and
discipline developed by Foucault (1977) is that power relationships jeopardise
the development of the 'practice' of social work. Indeed, MacIntyre (1999)
argues that, when a person enters into a practice (such as the practice of social
work), they embed within them the values of the profession and the standards
of practice, rather than just following rules and regulations prescribed by the
setting:
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Neither kind of rule, neither inviolable negative rules nor positive
prescriptions, can by itself be a sufficient guide to action. Knowing how
to act virtuously always involves more than rule-following. (MacIntyre
1999:93)
In other words, although the organisational context of work (operating within
different practice settings) defines what is expected from social workers
through rules and regulations, it is important for practitioners to retain their
practice values at the forefront of their decision-making and challenge the
organisational context of work. MacIntyre (1985) believes in a return to virtue as
the key to doing so, even when the practice takes place within an organisational
context of work and a particular setting:
Rule-following will often be involved in knowing how to respond
rightly, but no rule or set of rules by itself ever determines how to
respond rightly. (MacIntyre 1999:93)
The organisational context of work greatly impacts on the way ethical practice
is constructed, interpreted and maintained within social care, through power
relationships between agencies, social care practitioners and service users.
Indeed, the organisational context of work, through the use of discourse,
knowledge and discipline, maintains the power relationships necessary to
dictate rules of conduct and behaviour. This leads social care workers to
practice in the ways revealed in the data collection and analysis for this project:
Foucault was only the latest in a long line of thinkers - Augustine,
Hobbes, and Marx are his most notable predecessors - to remind us
that institutionalised networks of giving and receiving are also always
structures of unequal distributions of power, structures well-designed
both to mask and protect those same distributions. So there are always
possibilities and often actualities of victimization and exploitation
bound up with participation in such networks. If we are not adequately
aware of this, our practical judgment and reasoning will go badly
astray. The virtues which we need in order to achieve both our own
goods and the goods of others through participation in such networks
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only function as genuine virtues when their exercise is informed by an
awareness of how power is distributed and of the corruption to which
its use is liable. Here as elsewhere in our lives we have to learn how to
live both with and against the realities of power. (MacIntyre 1999:102)
Thus, MacIntyre tells us that developing and nurturing virtues can aid people
to live a good life within structures of domination and power relationships.
Developing and nurturing virtues, for MacIntyre, also constitutes a means to
resist these power relationships and, in the case of this research, can be
interpreted as a way of maintaining ethical practice, regardless of the specific
work setting.
The last section of this discussion intends to identify possible strategies through
which social care practitioners might develop social work virtues that would
enable them to integrate their professional values (which I will call 'practice'
values) simultaneously with working for an agency that imposes a high level of
control over their work. This last section will be focused mainly on
undergraduate and postgraduate social work education and also on social
workers already working within social care agencies.
The justification for this focus on social work education and training relates to
the emergence of the General Social Care Council's emphasis on the importance
of qualifications. The high level of education now required to become a
qualified social worker (a protected title since April 2004) is a key factor in
attracting those who wish to work in the social care field. Lynn Berry, Chief
Executive of the General Social Care Council, explained:
There has never been a better time to get into social work. There are
many exciting and varied opportunities across the voluntary, statutory
and private sectors, a new degree giving much practical work
experience, a £3,000 bursary and golden hellos being offered by some
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employers. And the work of social workers is getting far greater public
recognition and status. (Berry 2005)
A social work qualification, as opposed to a general social welfare education,
can be perceived as very attractive to people wishing to work in social care,
because many social work jobs nowadays require the practitioner to be
qualified, recognised by and registered with the General Social Care Council.
Thus, the findings of this project will be considered in the context of social work
education (as opposed to other forms of social care training that do not entitle
the person to use the recognised title of 'social worker' on completion of their
programme of study).
Impact of the Findings on Social care Practice and Training
Thus far, the literature review and the discussion have examined the ways
ethical dilemmas occur in practice and the elements that impact on the decision-
making processes of social care practitioners. Much of the literature consulted
in relation to ethics in social care practice pays attention to categorising the
likelihood of different ethical dilemmas, with only little attention given to the
role of organisational context in the creation and resolution of ethical dilemmas.
Indeed, research in the field of ethics and social care has focused on the
categorisation of ethical dilemmas according to profession or field of practice,
but has not provided a holistic understanding of the formation and resolution
of ethical dilemmas that encompass the whole field of practice and its unique
'practice' values. For example, Banks (1995), Rhodes (1986) and Clark (2005)
have examined the different elements that appear to influence the emergence of
ethical dilemmas in the field of social work. Many other authors have provided
a typology of values and dilemmas in social care practice as well as in other
fields of health care, such as occupational therapy and counselling. However,
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despite this attention to the professional values of different fields of
intervention and the relationships they have with the emergence of ethical
dilemmas, none of the research, apart from that of McBeath and Webb (2002),
has thoroughly focused on how and why the organisational context of work
impacts on social care practice.
Thus, the literature mainly focuses on the variety of ethical standards within
social care and ethical practices in different professions, and when it pays
attention to the context in which the practice takes place, no practical solutions
are proposed. However, in the light of this research, the use of Macintyre's
work, the Foucaultian understanding of power underpinned by a symbolic
interaction perspective, assists in developing a model that has the potential to
enable social workers and other social care practitioners to intervene ethically in
line with their 'practice' values and regardless of the fields they work in.
Macintyre (1999) suggests that people - in this case, social work practitioners -
need to develop practical reasoning in order to unlock and cultivate virtues that
are appropriate to their practice. This practical reasoning activity, which
involves both reflection and self-knowledge, is an enquiry that
provides us with grounds for the criticism, revision, or even rejection
of many of our judgements, our standards of judgement, our
relationships and our institutions. (Macintyre 1999:157)
Macintyre (1999) emphasises the need for developing and cultivating virtues
through practical reasoning, and for ceasing to comply only with rules and
regulations, particularly when the organisational context of work differs from
the practice value, as in the case of social work practice settings.
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If we revisit what essentially constitutes a virtue, it becomes clear that practical
reasoning could help social workers to feel clearer about their 'practice' values
and the nature of social work practice, rather than being solely synchronised by
utilitarian, Kantian and intuitionist approaches to ethics or being deeply
affected by the organisational context of work in the different settings in which
social work takes place.
As MacIntyre points out, a virtue can be developed through strength of
character. He explains that virtue is "an acquired human quality" (1985:191),
rather than a feeling about rightness or wrongness. These personal qualities or
'virtues' have to be practised in order to become part of one's life as opposed to
a one-off'act of heroism' (Lynch and Lynch 2006). Understanding the primary
concept of virtues, as well as developing them through 'practical reasoning',
could help practitioners to feel more confident in their decision-making
processes and, consequently, to challenge the power relationships that exist
between themselves and the organisational context of work. Some virtues that
could relate to social work practice have been identified by Lynch and Lynch
(2006) and Clark (2006) as temperance, magnanimity, gentleness, truthfulness,
wittiness, friendliness, modesty and justice.
If we return to the concept of power developed by Foucault, it has become clear
that, when resolving ethical dilemmas, social workers act in response to the
power relationship that exists between themselves and the organisational
context of their work with the service user. Foucault (1977) is very clear that
power is relational; therefore, in order to challenge the effects of power upon
the decision-making process, social workers need to challenge their relationship
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with the organisational context of work. However, taking into account the work
setting where social work takes place and the strong impact of the
organisational context on practitioners, it is very difficult for them to challenge
this power relationship. Ferguson and Lavalette (2004:304) point out:
Social workers find they have less freedom and control over their contact
and work with clients; they are subject to speed-up, bureaucratic control
and regulation; their work activities increasingly confront them and their
clients as a set of ' alien' practices; and all this limits the scope for social
workers to stand shoulder to shoulder with their clients in the face of
their oppression - the system increasingly places barriers between the
social worker and the client.
It is therefore necessary to create a way for social workers to develop their
resistance to power coming from the organisational context of work, in order to
practice ethically, regardless of the external pressures put upon them. However,
the development of a resistance mechanism has been identified as being a gap
in Foucault's work on power. Indeed,
there is a banal sense in which it could be argued that Foucault's claimed
identification is the omnipresence of power also indicates a matching
potentiality of resistance, but from within his own and his disciples'
discourse there is no independent basis from which to develop principles
of opposition. (Walzer 1986, cited in Gould 1990)
Therefore, while Foucault does not develop a practical way to counteract the
effect of power felt through relationships, he nevertheless examines the
importance of developing a new form of subjectivity. Indeed, he suggests that
the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to
try to liberate the individual from the state, and from the state's
institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of
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individualisation which is linked to the state. We have to promote new
forms of subjectivity through refusal of this kind of individuality which
has been imposed on us for several centuries. (Foucault 1982:216)
Foucault's comments, translated to social work, imply that social workers need
to adopt a different approach to solving ethical dilemmas, to the extent that, as
explained earlier, most dilemmas occur within, and are resolved through,
different power relationships. In reality, and based on a Foucaultian
understanding of power, social workers should not to try to work against the
system, but instead (and in the light of social work 'practice' values) they
should challenge the ideologies that are promoted through the system of social
care, refusing to take them for granted as the best options for everyone. This is
where MacIntyre's theory on virtue ethics comes to the fore. Undeniably,
MacIntyre suggests that a return to virtue ethics will enable society to live in a
morally right way. The findings of this research indicated that, when social care
practitioners tried to resolve ethical dilemmas, the organisational context of
work often seemed to take precedence over their' practice' values. When we use
MacIntyre's understanding of virtue as the necessary perspective for acting
ethically in society, 'practical reasoning' becomes the means by which virtue
can be developed and cultivated to the point that virtues become habits and
overall 'strength of character'. These virtues applied to social work could take
the form of strengths of character such as courage, wittiness, critical thinking
and self-consciousness (McBeath and Webb 2002) and can assist social workers
to challenge inappropriate use and abuse of power and therefore act ethically
regardless of the context in which they practice. The following section will
propose ways in which the concept of practical reasoning as developed by
MacIntyre can be integrated into social work education in a practical manner.
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Development of Social work Virtues through Practical Reasoning
The organisational context of work has been clearly linked with the concept of
power as understood by Michel Foucault. Social workers will always have to
work within an organisational context, because as things stand, social welfare is
mainly provided and maintained by the state (Dominelli 1997). Foucault is clear
that individuals need to be more challenging on what is ordinarily taken for
granted, but he does not offer a practical way of doing this. MacIntyre (1999),
on the other hand, suggests that the concept of practical reasoning that aims to
develop the virtues should be central to moral inquiry and, therefore, applied to
social work with the purpose of helping social workers to develop virtues.
Practical reasoning, In MacIntyre's sense, involves "reasoning together with
others, generally within some determinate set of social relationships"
(MacIntyre 1999:107). The relationships to which MacIntyre (1999) refers to are
formed as a result of associations between individuals sharing the same
practice: in the case of this research, social workers through their professional
identity and social work activities (see discussion on 'social work as a practice',
above). It is through habituation in practical reasoning that the virtues, or
positive character traits such as courage, justice and temperance, develop and
consequently enable people to act morally. Indeed, as Morse (1999) asserts, a
virtuous character performs virtuous acts in any given moral situation (Morse
1999).
Practical reasoning, however, does not only mean "travelling along guidelines
and conventions" (Payne 2002:126). Payne suggests that
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any situation may need us to develop and change our guidelines,
responding to new aspects of the work and social circumstances that
we meet. We must look underneath the surface relationship and events
which are presented to us. At any time we may need to think again and
think differently. Because this kind of flexibility is the essence of
dealing with any human being and being effective in working on
complex human problems, critical awareness and refection is an
important practical implementation of the social work value of
respecting human individuality and rights. (Payne 2002:126)
The concept of reflective practice could be a helpful tool for social workers
seeking to develop virtues through practical reasoning and to become more
ethical social workers. Reflective practice has been common to social work for
more than two decades and is already an important element of the social work
education curriculum (Brown and Rutter 2006). Reflective practice involves
making links between the practice and the theory, but necessitates more than
carefully thinking things through and taking all aspects into account (Payne
2005). Trevethick (2005:252) explains reflective practice as a process that
"involves developing the capacity for flexible and creative thinking". However,
as it stands, reflective practice alone does not seem to be sufficiently well-
developed to be helpful to social workers trying to resolve routine ethical
dilemmas (Houston 2003). As Gould and Taylor (1986, cited in Gould and
Baldwin 2004) argue, reflective practice is becoming something of a 'slogan'.
Indeed, this research project has shown that practitioners still allow the
organisational context of work to take precedence over their 'practice' values,
especially where their work setting is highly structured (as in the field of
statutory social work).
Reflecting on the research finding, and assuming that social workers attempt to
be 'reflective practitioners' while intervening with service users, and in
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particular when faced with an ethical issue or a dilemma, it would be
appropriate to suggest that reflective practice does not suffice when the ethical
issue takes place within the power relationships of day-to-day practice. This is
echoed by Yin (2006), who claims that inappropriate conditions for reflective
practice can trigger the destruction of the social worker's self-enhancement.
Indeed, Yin (2006:783) asserts that
inappropriate conditions include an oppressive social environment,
demanding working environment, social workers' unresolved past
trauma as well as social workers' poor physical and mental health. An
oppressive psycho-social environment implies an imbalance of power in
a professional's working environment that is oppressive to the
individual worker. (Miehls and Moffatt 2000)
Therefore, power relationships also affect the capacity for reflective practice.
The first conclusion that can be drawn from these findings is that it is not
sufficient to be a reflective practitioner in the way suggested by the current
definition: something needs to be added to current social work training in
relation to the concept of reflective practice. MacIntyre (1999) is helpful to
consider, because in conceptualising practical reasoning, he links the concept of
individual reflective practice to a more collective process of practical reasoning:
Rational enquIry about my practical beliefs, relationships, and
commitments is therefore not something that I undertake by
attempting to separate myself from the whole set of my beliefs,
relationships and commitments and to view them from some external
standpoint. It is something that we undertake from within our shared
mode of practice by asking, when we have good reason to do so, what
the strongest and soundest objections are to this or that particular belief
or concept that we have up to this point taken for granted. Such rational
enquiry extends and amplifies our everyday practical reasoning.
(MacIntyre 1999:157)
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MacIntyre is introducing the concept of practical reasoning as a collective activity
(1999) as the necessary means to develop and unlock the virtues required for
good conduct in society. In relation to this research, the implications are clear
for the value of 'collective practical reasoning' in social work. What
differentiates MacIntyre's understanding of practical reasoning from the
concept of reflective practice (as presently understood in the social work and
social care sector - a sort of "lesson learnt" (Chiu 2006:184» is his belief that, for
ethical action to take place, the process must happen collectively. In the context
of the present research on social work, this means that decisions taken by
practitioners in relation to ethical dilemmas should be actively informed by
collectively agreed 'practice' values and developed through collective practical
reasoning.
It is also worth noting that the collective nature of the activity proposed by
MacIntyre (1999) relates well to the principles of the social action model
(Mullender and Ward 1991; CSA 2004), which, through groupwork activities,
participants improve on their powerless state. Applied to this research, the
collective nature of the practical reasoning is therefore an additional means to
resisting power relationships encountered in practice. Indeed, the capacity for
mobilisation is perceived as a weakness of the social work staff as Treanton (in
Foucault 1972:91) explains:
I believe that the great diversity that exists among social workers
prevents consciousness raising on their part, and this contributes to the
crisis. They have great difficulty [trying] to become unionized. They
have great difficulty in developing collective agreements.
The introduction to collective practical-reasoning activities in social work
education and practice would therefore not only enable social workers to
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become 'virtuous', but also, by its collective nature, reinforce the resistance to
power felt though their organisational context of work:
Practical reasoning is by its nature, on the generally Aristotelian view
that I have been taking, reasoning together with others, generally
within some determinate set of social relationships. [00'] The making
and sustaining of those relationships is inseparable from the
development of those dispositions and activities through which each is
directed towards becoming an independent practical reasoner. So the
good of each cannot be pursued without also pursuing the good of all
those who participate in those relationships. (MacIntyre 1999:107)
In the light of MacIntyre's perspective, it can be argued that reflective practice
should not be carried out independently by each social worker. If this were to be
the case, the emotivist perspective would be given precedence over the virtues
that MacIntyre argues are necessary for a just and moral society.
In practical terms, I would argue that this research has shown the potential
benefit for the social work education curriculum and the social work practice in
general if the following element was to be integrated: developing collective
practical reasoning among students and social work practitioners with an
emphasis on the understanding of power on the one hand, and of critical
reasoning, practice values, and ethics on the other.
First course curricula must also make room for the examination of frameworks,
of power that operate in social care agencies and in society in general. Bar-On
(2002:998) agrees in that, "if social workers are to help their clients, then they
must master the discourse of power and use it effectively". I therefore argue
that it is fundamental to provide an opportunity for social work students and
social workers to develop an awareness of the effects of power relationships
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between organisations and their settings, and the place of social work and social
care within these relationships. This in effect calls for an emphasis on the
examination of 'power' and its impact on social work practice rather than on an
examination, for example, of social work methods and applications outside of a
practice context. This examination of power can be achieved through teacher-
led lectures, but also through different activities involving'collective practical
reasoning' as social workers and student practitioners acqUIre an
understanding of the effects of organisational power upon their future practice.
Ethical practice is not only about 'practice' values and the training curriculum
per se, but as is evident in the work of Foucault and MacIntyre, it is also about
the operations of the organisational context of work, the impact this has on
ethical practice, and the practice of 'collective practical reasoning' as a way of
developing and nurturing the virtues that helps counteract the effects of
relational power emerging in various work contexts.
Second, and only in relation to social work education, I would suggest that the
teaching of ethics starts from a practice value base as well as from a virtue ethics
perspective (which is necessary for maintaining the practice - see MacIntyre
1999), instead of a code of conduct to obey (rule-following ethics). Foucault's
insights on resisting power and developing ethics of self also reflect an
objection to rule-following and codification of behaviour. Indeed, as Levy
(2004:22) points out,
Foucault tells us, that where the codes are numerous and detailed,
'practices of the self [00'] almost fade away. But finding an adequate place
for liberty in ethics requires that the practices of the self remain vital. An
over-emphasis on codification decreases the margin of liberty.
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This critique of the use of codes of ethics and codes of conduct for teaching
ethics is also supported by such commentators in social work as Morelock
(1997), Book (1982), Reamer and Abramson (1982), Read and Billups (1986) and,
in particular, Yelaja (1982) (in Morelock 1997), who strongly recommends that
moral philosophy is included in teaching as opposed to plain applications of
codes of practice. A code of practice can provide students with an overall value
base for social work, but it also needs be critically examined and discussed from
a practical-reasoning standpoint. This is also supported by Bisman (200-l), who
claims that critical social work should not rely on ethical rules for guidelines or
on the social sciences for expertise, but on a better grasp of the complexities of
moral concepts. This is also emphasised by Downie and Telfer, "who urge
social workers to spend more time analysing the moral ambiguities of their
authority, rights and function" (cited in Bisman 2004:118). Finally, McBeath and
Webb (2002:1020) agree that the "very stuff of good social work" should be the
practice of virtues developed through reflection, experience and circumspection
and not just the work'done'.
Third, in the light of the above discussion and of my experience of higher-
education teaching in the field of social work, I believe that the present
curriculum does not address the Issue of collective practical reasoning
effectively. At most, the concept of reflective practice over-emphasises the
individual rather than a collective-thinking process. McBeath and Webb (2002)
suggest that virtues can be developed through education by critical evaluation.
This suggestion, however, remains on the personal level, whereas a more
collective approach to critical evaluation is needed. However, they also suggest
exploring dialogically different qualities needed in different situations and
using counterarguments, examining what qualities remain; exploring these
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would suggest a different approach to responding to ethical situations
(McBeath and Webb 2002).
This thesis therefore argues that developing a practical way for promoting
collective practical reasoning, which, according to MacIntyre (1999), helps to
cultivate the virtues, could, from a Foucaultian understanding of power,
contribute to increasing resistance to power and consequently positively affect
ethical practice in social work.
However, a note of caution must be made in relation to the effect of increasing
resistance to power relationships. As Layder (1994:102) explains,
Foucault understands power not as a commodity which may be acquired
or seized, nor is it the property of an individual or class. Rather it has the
character of network and its threads extend everywhere (Sarup 1988).
Resistance, too, exists everywhere and simply reinforces the need for
discipline and subjugation in the first place.
Therefore, following Foucault's early conceptualisation of power,'? there is a
danger that increasing the social worker's resistance to power relationships can
directly result in the agency or other structural sources of power such as the
GSCC increasing their discipline mechanisms as well. Indeed, as many
commentators have noted through examining power from an early Foucaultian
perspective, the increase of resistance to power creates more mechanisms of
discipline (Smart 1985; Layder 1994).
10 See Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish. London: Penguin.
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However, during his later work, Foucault (1988; 1993; 2005) proposed an
alternative solution for increasing the potential for resistance. As Dreyfus
(2004a:1) comments,
for early Foucault, the subject is reduced to a function of discourse; for
middle Foucault, writing can open up new worlds, and in later Foucault,
freedom is understood as the power to question what is currently taken
for granted, plus the capacity to change oneself and, perhaps, one's
milieu.
In his late work, Foucault refers to this strategy for resistance as "technologies
of the self" and parrhesia (courage of truth), "where individuals create their own
identities through ethics and forms of self-constitution" (Best and Kellner
1991:61). Through such technologies or processes, individuals can question
their identity as a subject and thus increase resistance to networks of power.
Indeed, Foucault (1988a:18) explains that
Technologies of the self are the various 'operations on their own bodies
and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being' that people make either
by themselves or with the help of others in order to transform
themselves to reach a 'state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or
immortali ty.
My argument is that "technology of the self" (Foucault 1988a), made possible
by a process of transformation, is achievable through what MacIntyre refers to
as practical reasoning and, in the context of this thesis, collective practical
reasoning as an activity that leads to the development of a virtuous social care
workforce. "Technology of the self" also echoes the nature of symbolic
interaction whereby individuals, through collective practical reasoning, interact
with others and thus construct the meaning they give to situations as well as, if
appropriate, developing a resistance to power relationships.
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Indeed, just as Foucault began to recognise that the subject can be "self-
determining, capable of challenging and resisting the structures of domination
in modern society" (McNay 1992:4, cited in Besley 2005:79), so some
commentators have even developed Foucault's work to the point where they
see a close link between increasing resistance through the technologies of the
self and the integration of 'virtue ethics' to his work. As Levy (2004:30) explains,
Foucault's virtue ethics thus focuses, not on the subject, but on the
character of the individual. While a subject is something given in
advance, character is the set of dispositions and motivations to act into
which we are acculturated and which we may then choose to cultivate or
reject. According to this picture, if the self has depths, it is only because
it has created them. Here too, though, Foucault is not a lone voice, but
working in an area that has also been cultivated by at least some virtue
ethicists.
Therefore, for Foucault, technology of the self and parrnesia assist in rejecting
subjugating structure and relationships of power and in cultivating personal
dispositions or virtues that increase resistance to power relationships in society.
Levy goes on:
If I am right, if Foucault's last work can indeed usefully be read as
participating in the project of elaborating a new virtue ethics for late
modernity, then this work could undoubtedly have been rescued from a
number of obscurities and hesitations had Foucault engaged with the
parallel projects of the Anglo-American virtue ethicist. At the same time,
those virtue ethicists who seek to elaborate a tradition-based theory, and
reject the notion of human nature, would find in Foucault both a
powerful justification for their position and an example as to how they
might proceed. Perhaps, then, the fact that we can now see what value
each could have been to the other should stand as a warning to those of
us in both philosophical traditions, that in ignoring the work of the other
we risk inhibiting the development of our own. (Levy 2004:31)
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This thesis therefore argues that collective practical reasoning IS a vvay of
cultivating personal dispositions or virtues (MacIntyre 1999) and that social
workers, by nurturing a set of social work virtues, can find a strong ground for
beginning to increase their opportunity for resisting power. Besley (2005:79)
explains:
In his later writings [Foucault] broke with this relationship to emphasise
games of truth not as a coercive practice, but rather as an ascetic"
practice of self-formation. Work completed by the self upon itself is an
ascetic practice that is to be understood not in terms of more traditional
left-wing models of liberation, but rather as practices of freedom. This is
an essential distinction for Foucault because the notion of liberation
suggests that there is a hidden self or inner nature or essence that has
been 'concealed, alienated, or imprisoned in and by mechanisms of
repression'. (Foucault 1997a:282)
Therefore, Foucault does not believe that an individual can be 'liberated' from
the networks of power:" rather, Foucault emphasised the notion of developing
freedom, a process of self-development where individual and society can define
"admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society" (Foucault
1997a:283, cited in Besley 2005:79). As a result, social workers will increasingly
work within their practice values that call for 'human dignity and worth',
'integrity', social justice' and 'service to humanity' (BA5W 2002) and begin to
act less in regard to bureaucratic norms and their organisation's rules and more
in the service users' needs and interests (Rhodes 1986).
11 'Ascetic' in this context means an "exercise of self upon the self by which one attempts
to develop and transform oneself, and to attain a certain mode of being" (Foucault 1997a:282,
cited in Besley 2005:79).
12 Foucault does not believe that the subject is born free.
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The following section will therefore examine a possible way to develop virtues
through the exercise of collective practical reasoning. 'Socratic Dialogue' will be
explored as a tool to achieve this and for proposing ways in which such a
strategy can be integrated into social work training and practice.
Socratic Dialogue as a Tool for Collective Practical Reasoning and
Development of the "Technology of the Self"
Socratic Dialogue, which is known as being a good tool for developing practical
and critical reasoning (Philippart 2003), and which originates from the I Analogy
of the Cave' (Plato, Republic, Bk. VII, pp. 514-520) (cited in Kesselss 2005b), was
only furthered by Nelson and Heckman in Germany during and shortly after
the Second World War (Saran and Neisser 2004).
Saran and Neisser (2004) describe the Socratic Dialogue approach as being
practised in small groups (8 to 14 participants) with the help of a facilitator and
as encouraging participants to reflect and think independently and critically so
that self-confidence in one's own thinking is enhanced and the search for truth
iParrhisia in Foucault's terms) in answer to a particular question is undertaken
as a group. Philippart (2003) argues that the many conflicts of interests, ethical
standards and visions for the future found in multi-cultural and pluralistic
society pose a problem in decision-making in regard to ethics. He claims that
Socratic dialogue helps constitute a growing awareness of the actual
assumptions, presuppositions, norms and values that playa role in the
personal and collective thinking and feeling on every kind of matters.
(Philippart 2003:70)
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This understanding and practice of the Socratic Dialogue approach would
therefore enable students to practice the concept of collective practical
reasoning proposed by MacIntyre (1999).
Many authors also agree that the Socratic Dialogue approach can be a very
effective tool for developing virtues (Overholser 1999; Gronke 2005; Kesselss
2005a) in so far as participants, through discussing a set question, develop
'virtuous' habits such as critical thinking and self-consciousness (McBeath and
Webb 2002). The Socratic Dialogue approach helps to enhance effective thinking
about organisational life (Burnyeat 1990, cited in Morrel 2004), enabling
problem-finding (Arlin 1990, cited in Morrel 2004) and protecting against
complacency or misplaced certainty (Meacham 1990, cited in Morrel 2004). The
Socratic Dialogue approach benefits from the involvement of different
stakeholders, as it provides an opportunity to nurture a more diverse
discussion on the topic (Boers 2005; Kesselss 2005a). In addition, as Morse
(1999:52) notes,
The impact of one's involvement with different members of the
community becomes pivotal in virtue theory because both habit
formation and the setting of one's value takes place at the level of our
interaction with other members of the community and their reactions to
our actions.
This could be achieved by involving students, service users and carers as well
as academics in classroom discussions where a diversity of ideas, experiences
and perspectives would be explored and maximised.
The Socratic Dialogue endeavour is for the group to reach consensus, not as an
aim in itself, but as a means to deepen the investigation. Philippart (2003) refers
270
to consensus in values, principles and ideas. Socratic Dialogue only requires
adherence to basic guidance, and so it provides a framework to apply it to a
classroom situation. The procedures for Socratic Dialogue are set out in Figure
9, below.
Figure 9 - Socratic Dialogue procedures
The Socratic Dialogue normally uses the following
procedures:
• A well formulated, complex question, or a statement, is set by
the lecturer before the group activity begins (for example:
What is Justice?).
• The first step is to collect examples experienced by
partlclpants in whic~ the given topic plays a key role. (I was
working YVlth Y and It was so unjust': I felt I was treated justly
when I did X)
• One example is chosen by the group, which will usually be
the basis of the analysis and argumentation throughout the
dialogue.
• Crucial statements made by the participants are written down
on a flip chart or board, so that all can have an overview of
the discourse.
• Using counterexamples - inconsistencies with other beliefs
• Striving to reach consensus
(Adapted from Saran and Neisser 2004; Khron 2005; Morrell 2004)
The last basic rule (striving for consensus) is also examined by Houston (2003)
in his discussion on how to develop the social work virtues, in so far as he also
suggests reaching consensus by using a Habermasian" model for decision-
making. As Socratic Dialogue places the importance of consensus as being
central to the process, it can therefore provide a framework for developing
some of the social work virtues through collective practical reasoning.
However, McBeath and Webb (2002) point out, in relation to virtue ethics, that
Socrates differentiates between two types of virtues: the intellectual virtues and
the moral virtues. Socratic Dialogue is a way of developing the 'moral' virtues
13 The Habermasian model of decision-making is based on reaching consensus, as with
the Socratic Dialogue approach.
271
such as liberality and temperance, as it provides participants with opportunities
to examine their experience through collective practical reasoning. On the other
hand, MacIntyre (1988) suggests that intellectual virtues can only be nurtured
through education. In order to develop intellectual virtues for social work, I
suggest that is necessary that students are also exposed to a variety of theories
of philosophy, sociology (including power) and ethics. Osmo and Landau
(2006) also assert that social work students should be taught critical thinking
together with ethical theories in order to develop better arguments for their
decision-making processes.
The use of Socratic Dialogue as a means for collective practical reasoning
would, in addition to, for example, lectures on critical thinking, value bases,
moral philosophy and relationships of power in society, create opportunities for
opening discussion around political and ethical questions and protect against
what Rhodes (1986) refers to as "moral schizophrenia". It is therefore proposed
to include Socratic Dialogue to teacher-led lectures in order to develop both
moral and intellectual virtues. Below, in Figure 10, is an example of the format
that could be used for each session of a social work module on the topic of
social work ethics and values:







Introduction: plan and topic of the session, learning
outcomes (15 minutes)
Socratic Dialogue: the question .will be aiming at
deliberating in relation to the main tOPiC of the
session (1 hour) "what does self-.determination.of "
service users really mean In SOCial Work practice?
Break
Lead lecture: Kant. Kantian ~thics and Kantian legacy
in social work practice. Karman elements of the GSCC.
BASW and IFSW codes of ethics
Reflection break: developing practical applications -
examination of the 'consensus' reached dunng the
Socratic dialogue and the lead lectu~e (gr0l:lP . .
discussion about application of Kantian ethics In SOCial




The content of each individual session would vary from one week to another
and could cover topics in the realm of philosophy and sociology relevant to
social work. Examples could include 'utilitarian ethics', 'social justice', 'virtues
ethics', 'ethics of care', 'power', 'empowerment' and 'professionalism'.':
However, as illustrated in Figure 10, Socratic Dialogue precedes the lecture so
that participants can collectively and critically reason on the topic as opposed to
discussing a theory learned during a teacher-led lecture.
However, it is also important to make room for students to relate theory to
practice, and thus, a third part of the session is used as a workshop to develop
praxes on the topic. In order to make the use of Socratic Dialogue and collective
practical reasoning even more relevant to practice, it would be useful for
students to have regular contact with social work agencies through a practice
placement. Therefore, by either integrating a 'concurrent placement' into the
model developed above, or to extend the Socratic Dialogue session to the
placement's 'recall days', would enable the student to "think and do praxis"
(Freire 1972), a concept that Coulshed and Orme (2006:17) explain as one that
"encourages people to perceive, interpret, criticise and transform the world
around them". Indeed, students would not only have the opportunity to
practise collective practical reasoning and to gain understanding of theories in
classroom settings, but would also have the weekly opportunity to apply their
learning and understanding to practice, and vice versa.
Socratic Dialogue can also cover a range of topics, as Morrel (2004:388) explains:
14 This list is not exhaustive.
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[Socratic Dialogue] can be revealing about structures as well as rhetoric.
For example, in many roles, status and authority are traditionally
understood as dependent on a notion of expertise (Baldwin 1995:380).
Inquiry that identifies frequently unquestioned assumptions (such as the
belief that one can say what expertise is) could highlight how some truth
claims rest on value judgements, or social structures (Illich et al. 1997). In
extremis this is seen in the idea that knowledge only makes sense in a
given discursive practice. (Foucault 1979, 2002)
Many authors claim that Socratic Dialogue is possible as long as the given
guidance is carefully integrated into the work of the participant (Leal 2005;
Khron 2005; Gronke 2005), as presented in Figure 10, above. The potential of
Socratic Dialogue as a pedagogy in higher education is therefore enormous, JS
it does not require much in terms of resource mobilisation, since the process is
relatively simple.
I would suggest that the results of this research could be used to inform
curricula development and to explore new ways to educate social workers in
ethical practices. An enhanced curriculum by integrating collective practical
reasoning (in this example, through using Socratic Dialogue) would not only
pay attention to the uniqueness of the 'practice' values in the field, but would
also create opportunities to analyse the organisational contexts of work and the
impact of power relationships in the social care system on ethical conduct.
Towards a more 'Critical Social Work Community
This thesis has so far argued that it is essential to educate social work students
about the importance of collective practical reasoning that leads to the
development of virtues. This opportunity can be actualised, as explored in the
last section, by a combination of Socratic Dialogue sessions, teacher-led lectures
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and concurrent practice-placement opportunities. This will enable students to
discover for themselves that it is not sufficient to learn 'practice' values and
ethics without paying particular attention to the contexts and relationships of
power in which social work operates. In developing their capacity to become
collective practical reasoners, students would become capable of nurturing (and
therefore applying) their 'practice' values, making sure that their values remain
at the forefront of their daily social work activities, regardless of the contexts of
intervention.
Through this process of the development of virtues through collective practical
reasoning activities, the newly qualified social care workforce may then be able
to understand the impact of work settings and organisational contexts on their
ethical decision-making and should therefore be equipped for more effective
ethical decision-making. The development and cultivation of a strong
commitment to 'practice' values, together with an understanding of the power
relationships entangled within the work setting, should help to achieve better
ethical conduct within the profession. Unquestionably, newly qualified social
workers will have to adapt to the demands of the organisation, but they should
be prepared to challenge organisations when necessary, and appropriate social
work virtues can help them to achieve this. However, there is a danger, if the
collective practical reasoning process is not maintained, that social workers,
some time after qualification, may lose their opportunity to nurture the virtues
developed through education and thus themselves become entangled in the
web of power relationships.
As Ballock et al. point out in explaining the results of a survey conducted in the
mid-1990s, "44 per cent of those interviewed agreed that 'I felt that my values
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are different from the Department's values'" (cited in Ferguson and Lavalette
2004:303). This statistic shows that a high percentage of qualified social workers
work within an environment that does not always allow room for social work
values, and therefore, it is important to examine ways in which newly qualified
and well-established social workers are provided with the opportunity to
develop and cultivate social work virtues and thus maintain ethical practice to a
high standard.
To do so, my argument will be twofold. On the one hand, group activities based
on the Socratic Dialogue technique (or another form of collective practical
reasoning) should be adopted by social care agencies. On the other hand, the
'Practice Teaching Award' and other post-qualifying social work programmes
should incorporate Socratic Dialogue as a pedagogical approach to teaching
wherever possible.
My first argument is that the integration of Socratic Dialogue techniques in the
decision-making process would benefit both social work staff and managers. I
argue that extending the use of Socratic Dialogue to social care agencies, by
implementing it through already available social work activities could be a way
to develop and nurture collective practical reasoning among social workers and
thus to foster the virtues developed through education or being developed
through social work practice. This integration of Socratic Dialogue techniques
can be done through existing group activities such as group and individual
supervision, case conferences and even lunchtime Socratic Dialogue sessions
(Socratic cafes). This inclusion of Socratic Dialogue within weekly social work
activities would protect against complacency and allow social care agencies to
be responsive to the ever-growing need for critical reflection in social work
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practice. Complementarily, the introduction of Socratic Dialogue techniques
could enable social care agencies to adapt to progressive social care practice
and, to a certain extent, to become 'learning organisations'. The concept of a
'learning organisation' can be interpreted with the late Foucaultian
understanding of power, where the subject has the capacity to change oneself
and, possibly, one's milieu (Dreyfus 2004a).
Indeed, following Revans's Law, Gould (2000:586) explains that, "for an
organisation to survive, its rate of learning must be equal to or greater than the
rate of change in its external environment". TOPPS England, through the
publication of the National Occupational Standards for Social Work, is clear
that a qualified social care workforce, especially at the post-qualifying level,
needs to meet a competent level of 'critical thinking' in their practice:
Think critically about their own practice in the context of the GSCC
Codes of Practice, national and international codes of professional ethics
and the principles of diversity and equality and social inclusion in a wide
range of situations, including those associated with inter-agency and
inter-professional work. (National Occupational Standards for Social
Work, cited in Brown and Rutter 2006:1)
Therefore, for social care agencies 'to survive' and to comply with the
expectations from social care regulatory bodies, different mechanisms will need
to be introduced in order to allow greater opportunities for critical thinking.
However, this may also be indirectly resisted by the social care agencies, which
may see collective practical reasoning through Socratic Dialogue as threatening.
Indeed, one of the aims of collective practical reasoning and the subsequent
development of virtues is to safeguard people against misplaced certainties,
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and therefore, through practical reasoning, it is possible that social care staff
would find grounds for challenging the organisational context of work.
The grounds for resistance to the social care agencies would be legitimate, as
they have the responsibility to ensure that their staff comply with the GSCC
code of practice, IS which states that social care staff must be "meeting relevant
standards of practice and working in a lawful, safe and effective way" .16
Nevertheless, this could therefore make collective practical reasoning difficult
for agencies because, as pointed out earlier by MacIntyre (1985:25), 'virtue
ethics' is not always compatible with effectiveness and therefore does not
always go hand in hand with the aims of organisations.
Indeed, even though the National Occupational Standards for Social Work
stress the importance of critical reasoning, TOPSS England, the organisation
that developed them, and a registered charity and company (TOPSS 2004 in
Horner 2006), does not possess regulatory power in relation to its
implementation. It can be argued, however, that, even though collective
practical reasoning may bring some resistance from the social care agencies, it
can help re-focus social work interventions on service users' needs as opposed
to bureaucratic demand. By dialoguing, social workers would have the
opportunity to nurture social work virtues" as well as question the context for
practice and indirectly, gain strengths and ability in beginning to resist power
relationships by developing themselves as practical reasoners.
15 GSCC code of practice for employers, Article 5.1 states that social care employers have the
responsibility to inform their staff about the GSCC code of practice for employees as well as
complying with it.
16 GSCC code of practice for employees. Article 6.1.
17 For example, critical thinking, courage and empathy.
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In addition to using Socratic Dialogue as a tool for group supervision and other
group activities within social care agencies, this approach could also benefit
activities such as Child Protection Case Conferences, where a variety of
professionals, managers and service users could examine the best ways to take
a course of action. Indeed, as Rhodes (1986:149) points out,
Case conferences are supposed to be forums for expressing and resolving
some of these differences, but often they service instead as a show piece
for visiting consultants or as a public exhibition of a worker's best case.
Activities based on Socratic Dialogue, if undertaken according to the basic
guidance, could indeed nurture an opportunity for 'expressing and resolving
differences', as the approach emphasises the importance of questioning
meanings, and thus, through this activity, all actors are provided with an
opportunity to explore and understand one another's values and points of view
during the process of reaching consensus.
Therefore, collective practical reasoning through the use of Socratic Dialogue
for examining daily ethical issues faced by social workers is a way of
maintaining some of the social work virtues needed for ethical social work
practice in general as well as for resisting some of the power relationships
within which social work activity takes place. These important changes are
made possible by nurturing dispositions such as critical analysis, courage and
introspection. However, social care agencies' staff also need to sustain the
intellectual virtues to which Socrates refers. This could be done by also
adapting Socratic Dialogue and teacher-led lectures to post-qualifying social
work programmes and other Continuous Professional Development activities.
279
It is therefore now that I tum to my second suggestion to improve ethical
practice in social care agencies.
My second argument that I put forward is that some of the teaching on the
Practice Teaching Award should be delivered under the same framework of
Socratic Dialogue as outlined above for university social work programmes.
This would bring two important contributions to the inclusion of collective
practical reasoning in social work practice. First, practitioners having
undertaken Socratic Dialogue training would be a portal for other social
workers wishing to further the collective practical reasoning skills and who are
already qualified. Moreover, having been exposed themselves to Socratic
Dialogue experience, practice-learning supervisors would be able to utilise the
approach with students on placements and thus, model them to be collective
practical reasoners from the outset of their professional careers. Simpkin (1979,
cited in Bar-On 2002:1011) supports this in arguing that
A preliminary step toward increasing social workers' professional autonomy
is for social work education programmes to re-examine their fieldwork
practice, which apparently is a major contributor to social workers'
acceptance of bureaucratic control. This is largely because it is at this stage of
their training, as distinguished from the classroom, that students first learn
that expressing dissatisfaction with positional authority is interpreted as a
mark of 'immaturity' and hence as a lack of 'professionalism'.
From Simpkin's comments, it appears that there is a danger that students who
undertake practice-learning experiences may, from the outset, develop a feeling
of powerlessness. By educating practice assessors and practice teachers of the
benefits of using Socratic Dialogue with students on placements, this would not
only enable them to cultivate and develop social work virtues, but would also
enable students to extend the process of collective practical reasoning to their
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practice. This process, as Dreyfus (2004b:1) argues, "helps us free ourselves
from understanding ourselves as subject" and, thus, helps to develop their
resistance to possible power relationships that could compromise their ethical
decision-making in the present work context or in the future.
It becomes clear that there is a value in using Socratic Dialogue for collective
practical reasoning in education as well as within social care agencies. The use
of Socratic Dialogue can ensure the development and nurturing of social work
virtues at the same time as helping to develop mechanisms for resistance to
power in social work practice. As Rhodes (1986:154) puts it,
To encourage moral responsibility in bureaucracies, we need a new
approach - an approach which would in effect begin to debureaucratise
bureaucracies. Workers must begin to break down the radical separation
between their personal integrity and their professional lives, by
accepting responsibility for the ethical and political dimensions of their
work.
The above exploration of the ways in which Socratic Dialogue for collective
practical reasoning can be utilised in social work education and within social
care agencies has provided insights on the potential for ensuring ethical and
moral forms of practice. Collective practical reasoning can enable students and
social workers alike to develop themselves as virtuous practitioners and, thus,
to create for themselves mechanisms that enable them to resist various
relationships of power that, too often, as demonstrated within this research, put
social workers in compromising ethical situations. One way forward is to foster
the importance of a virtue-based social work practice, underpinned by a major
emphasis on collective practical reasoning within daily social work activities
and education. This will result in social workers being more ethical and
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conscious of the ethical dimension that social work entails on the journey to
becoming competent social workers, from early social work education and




"There is a hole in the moral ozone"
(Christina Hoff Sommers 1992)
This research was conducted using a constant comparative approach based on
Grounded Theory methodology (Glaser & Strauss 1967), and began by
exploring social work roles, values and ethics across different settings of social
care practice in England. As the research process evolved, the findings revealed
first, that ethical dilemmas occur at different levels in social care practice, and
second, that the effect of power perceived through the organisational context of
work is often responsible for the emergence of ethical dilemmas, as well as the
way in which they are resolved. To conclude the research has demonstrated
how the concept of collective practical reasoning and the development of
virtues (MacIntyre 1999) could help in counteracting the effect of power by
developing frameworks for increasing resistance by social workers towards the
organisational context of work (Foucault, 1988). The Socratic Dialogue process
was used to illustrate a possible practical application of collective practical
reasomng In social work education and beyond, that is to say among the
already qualified workforce.
The research initially explored differences and similarities in relation to the
boundaries between the practitioner and service users in statutory social work
and social action work (the voluntary sector was included later in the research
process). It ended by suggesting ways of improving understanding in relation
to ethics in social work and social care practice, as well as by introducing a
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strategy to overcome the pressure that results from the impact of the
organisational context of work in resolving ethical dilemmas. By interviewing
social care practitioners and social workers, analysing this data, and relating it
to modern moral and sociological theories, it has been possible to suggest a
more holistic approach to understanding the emergence of ethical issues in
practice, and at the same time improving the comprehension of social work
ethics. The previous chapter argued that through a different form of training
and continuous professional development based on virtue ethics, collective
practical reasoning and Socratic Dialogue, social care practitioners and social
workers can find a ground for improving their ethical practice and
understanding. This understanding should be based on commonly agreed
practice values and not so much on codes of conduct, regulations, procedures,
budgets or statutory duties; these factors were grouped as the concept of the
'organisational context of work' for the purpose of this study.
Because of the nature of the Grounded Theory process, examining the first
research statement did not constitute the end of the research process, and
further research questions and statements have been explored during the
course of the project. Indeed, the first statement aimed at examining whether or
not the general roles and values surrounding ethics in statutory social work
were different from those in social action work; this was revised in the light of
the preliminary findings. The central statement therefore intended, through the
Grounded Theory process, to examine the occurrence of ethical dilemmas in
different fields of social care practice, and to identify the elements that underpin
the decision-making processes of social care practitioners.
284
The discussion has shown that the concept of power, identifiable through the
relationships between the organisational context of work, the social care
practitioner and the service user, affects the cause of ethical dilemmas as well as
their resolution. Indeed, a Foucaultian analysis of the experiences of social care
practitioners has shown that depending on the degree of pressure it exerts upon
the worker, the organisational context of work creates work environments
vulnerable to the emergence of these dilemmas, and also influences the way
they are resolved. This has been discussed in the section on ethical problems'
and I ethical dilemmas'.
The research has investigated the existence of similar ethical issues across
different fields of practice, as well as similar elements underpinning the
decision-making processes of social care practitioners in these fields. The
research led to a particular focus on one element that is present regardless of
the field of practice: the relationships of power present within the
organisational context of work in which the dilemma takes place.
The concepts of collective practical reasoning and virtue ethics, as understood
by MacIntyre (1999), are helpful in terms of resolving ethical problems directly
related to pressures from the organisational context of work. Indeed, MacIntyre
offers a revised perspective on virtue ethics, which enables us to understand
ethics as observable in personal traits of character, instead of through sets of
actions laid down by rules of behaviour, as suggested by the Emotivist, Kantian
and Utilitarian approaches which are commonly used in contemporary social
care.
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In the light of this research, the implications for social work and social care
practice become clear. On the one hand, it is important to develop the notion of
collective practical reasoning among students so that they can carry the values
of social work practice into their work settings and act virtuously. This can be
made possible by the inclusion of activities known as being helpful for
developing the virtues such as Socratic Dialogue techniques to led lectures
within social work education. It was also suggested to extend the use of Socratic
Dialogue to different activities already taking place in social care agencies, as
well as within different post-qualifying social work programmes in order to
nurture social work virtues while in employment.
Limitations of the research
One of the limitations of the research was that the process did not allow room
for exploring what might constitute the relevant virtues necessary to the
practice of social work and social care. Indeed, at the present time, values for
social work and social care practice in England are not at all clear and therefore
cannot be easily translated into practice. For example, the General Social Care
Council has published two codes of ethics (one for employers and one for
employees), but a clear set of values for social work practice cannot be found
anywhere in their published literature. Instead, the General Social Care Council
has published a set of 'headings' for practice, which constitute broad statements
of practice rather than values (GSCC 2002). Instead of values, regulatory bodies
set rules and regulations to follow. Therefore, in order for practitioners to
cultivate the virtues necessary for social work practice, it is essential that social
workers and social care practitioners collectively define and agree upon a clear
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set of values relevant to their profession, taking into consideration the traditions
and contexts in which the practice has evolved. Because Maclntyres theoretical
perspective was only applied at the end of the Grounded Theory process, it has
not been possible to explore what might constitute these social care and social
work virtues.
Another limitation was that even if MacIntyre's ethical perspective had
appeared earlier in the research process, it would have been difficult, in the
context of this research, to define virtues relevant to social work and social care
practice, because of the resources this would have involved, and also because of
the methodology used. Indeed, according to MacIntyre (1985), virtues can only
be cultivated and developed within a practice" and by practitioners. An
attempt to identify the virtues relevant to social work practice would require a
large-scale research project as well as a significant mobilisation of resources,
well beyond the scope of this project, in order to work with students and
practitioners to define the virtues they need in their work. Moreover, it would
not be appropriate for one researcher alone to conduct research that attempted
to pinpoint the virtues necessary for social work and social care practice; this
would necessitate the participation of several social workers from different
settings, together with other social work researchers and social work students,
and possibly with other stakeholders such as service users and carers.
In addition, another methodology would be more appropriate for conducting a
research project that aimed to identify social work virtues. The task of
developing and agreeing upon the 'virtues' of social work would require social
workers and social care practitioners to be collectively and actively involved in
18 Practice in Macintyre sense i.e, a discipline that involves standards of excellence
(1985:190) as opposed to 'practicing social work activities'.
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the research process. In order to enable them in such a process, an action
research framework would be more appropriate. For example, different steering
groups could be formed, facilitated by a social worker-researcher, in order to
discuss the importance of virtues for social work practice as well as the range of
virtues needed in the profession.
However, a new research project has already emerged as a direct outcome of
this PhD thesis. The research project, which is jointly directed by myself and a
colleague at Coventry University, is concerned with exploring the question of
how social work students can be engaged pedagogically in such a way that they
develop a greater capacity to practice in a more consciously ethical manner
through collective practical reasoning. The project aims at setting out an
underlying theoretical argument which seeks to develop a link between two
areas of research within social work which have not yet been considered
together: these are empowerment and virtue ethics. The purpose of placing
these two together is that we wish to argue that the concept of empowerment is
concerned with something more than the promotion of socially just and anti-
oppressive outcomes. Our argument is instead that empowerment needs to be
framed as a practice in which a range of virtues are embedded. The second aim
of the project is to evaluate Socratic Dialogue as a pedagogical strategy for
encouraging those virtues which we argue are the basis of this more conscious
form of ethical practice based on collective practical reasoning (see appendix 7
for full research proposal).
To conclude, I would like to return to the beginnings of the project in 1998,
when I started to practice social action work within an organisation where the
organisational context of work was not favourable to this approach. As a matter
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of fact, I did not, at this time, identify that the situation I faced as a 'personal
dilemma', as my course of action was already pre-determined by the agency's
organisational context of work. Having learned about Foucault's notion of
power and its relationship to social work practice, as well as having understood
the contribution of MacIntyre to theories of ethics and ethical practice, my
reaction to both the dilemmas exposed in the introduction would have been
different.
Having had the opportunity to develop and nurture some of the essential
virtues for social work though practical reasoning, I might have continued to
take the food horne, believing that it was indeed the right course of action;
certainly, a virtues such as 'courage' has relevance to my own professional
experience - the courage to follow through with a challenge to the way that one
of my 'practice' values urged me to act, in terms of 'respect and dignity of
service users' and of 'belief and defence of concept of social justice' - not simply
following rules. However, doing so would have put me in a difficult position as
I would have probably faced disciplinary measures by the authority which was
funding the project I was coordinating. Indeed, after taking the food only once,
I was called into a senior manager's office to be told that, even though after
explaining to them the rational behind my action, this behaviour should not be
repeated.
Ultimately, the senior management would have probably disciplined me after a
couple of times if I had carried on taking the food horne. However, continuing
to take the food horne, knowing that I could face disciplinary action would be
considered, from a virtue ethics point of view, as an excess of courage
(recklessness), and perhaps even a lack of temperance from my part. Virtue
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ethics, in this case would necessitate that I am a practical reasoner, which
would enable me to examine different ways of upholding service users'
interests while aiming at empowering them. As a result, I would perhaps have
talked them through my own dilemma about taking the food home (honesty).
On the other hand, having had an opportunity to discuss my dilemma with
fellow social workers would have also helped me to think through the best
course of action in this situation. Indeed, if I had strong links with other
'practical reasoners', that is to say, social workers participating in activities
around collective practical reasoning and belonging to the same or a similar
organisations, who supported me openly in my action, then perhaps the fact
that I challenged the organisation would have pushed the boundaries a little
further instead of simply being disciplined.
This, in my opinion, highlights the importance of developing virtues though
practical reasoning at a collective level, not only to make sure that the virtues are
developed by and for practitioners and service users, but also to ensure that
when a practitioner believes that the organisational context of work needs to be
challenged, social mobilisation is also possible. Thus, virtue ethics enable
practitioners to develop practical reasoning, which is essential in order to
become virtuous while the collective nature of the activity renders the
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List of the Social Action Principles
What Is Social Action
Social action is made up of two essential and inseparable elements - the principles and the
process. These do not stand alone, but are completely dependent upon each other. Combined.
they form an effective approach for working with people and a powerful force for change.
The Social Action Principles
• Social action workers are committed to social justice. We strive to challenge
inequality and oppression in relation to race, gender, sexuality, age, religion, class,
disability or any other form of social differentiation.
Social action is about fighting for fairness, equality and justice and this needs to be stated
clearly. We recognise that injustice, discrimination and oppression exist and take a stance
against it. in all our work.
• We believe all people have skills, experience and understanding that they can draw
on to tackle the problems they face. Social action workers understand that people
are experts in their own lives and we use this as a starting point for our work.
Our job is to help uncover what is already there, to encourage people to use the insights
and knowledge they possess to bring about changes in their own lives.
• All people have rights, including the right to be heard, the right to define the issues
facing them and the right to take action on their own behalf. People also have the
right to define themselves and not have negative labels imposed upon them.
Ordinary people's right to be involved in the changes that affect them, to have a voice and
a stake in the society they live in, is fundamental to social action work. The right to 'name
their world', to define themselves and the world around them is something we insist on.
Too often people have to contend with labels imposed upon themselves, or the places
they live, for the ease of policy-makers and professionals.
• Injustice and oppression are complex issues rooted in social policy, the environment
and the economy. Social action workers understand people may experience
problems as individuals but these difficulties can be translated into common
concerns.
We recognise that there are many different problems in individuals' lives. They may feel
overwhelmed and daunted by these, they may even feel blamed for them. Social action
gives people the opportunity to break free from this negative view, understand their
individual problems in a wider. political context and to do something about organising to
overcome them.
• We understand that people working collectively can be powerful. People who lack the
power and influence to challenge injustice and oppression as individuals can gain
it through working with other people in a similar position.
Oppression is maintained through isolation and division, though it is experienced by the
majority. Our job is to bring people together so that they can share their experiences and
pool their resources and skills to fight injustice. Finding common cause may give
individuals the will and power to tackle more complex issues than they might have dared
on their own.
• Social action workers are not leaders, but facilitators. Our job is to enable people to
make decisions for themselves and take ownership of whatever outcome ensues.
Everybody's contribution to this process is equally valued and it is vital that our job
Is not accorded privilege.
Social action workers value all skills and knowledge equally, making no distinction
between experience and formal qualifications. Our job is to work alongside the group,
resisting the temptation either to become a group member or a group leader.
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The Social Action Process
As already mentioned, the principles and the process of social action are inseparable.
The role of the social action worker is to facilitate the group through a five-stage process.
The intention is to change the traditional relationship between service users and the
professionals employed to work with them. A social action worker is a facilitator, not a
provider. In this process service users are not just consumers, they are active agents for
change.
Working alongside community members in this way requires the ability to plan and prepare well, to
be creative, to listen actively, to be patient, to be disciplined and to be interested in people's lives.
It is also essential to maintain a consistent and realistic level of optimism and enthusiasm that will
fire the group.
The five stages are as follows:
What
This is all about discovery, finding out what is happening in people's lives. What are their issues,
problems and concerns? What makes them angry, frightened, happy, and frustrated? What
occupies their thoughts? The social action worker designs ways in which the community members
can express all this, creating as comprehensive a picture as possible of what is going on in their
lives at present, without interpretation and without at this stage having to worry about what to do
with the material. This is often the longest stage of the social action process. Video, role-play,
photography, drawing and discussion will all be used during this exploration of life in the
community.
Why
Once the issues have been agreed it is important to identify the reasons why they exist so that any
solutions devised will attack root causes and not just symptoms. Asking 'why?' helps people
examine their private troubles in the wider context. It provides them with a deeper understanding of
their causes. This is necessary if community members and service users are to go on to create
and own positive social change. This stage of the process allows the community members to
engage in analysis and to present their understanding of the problems facing them. It also helps to
discover the most effective point of intervention; the place at which it is possible to make changes
that will affect the final outcomes. This analysis is accepted by the social action worker, without
interpretation once again, reinforcing one of our basic beliefs: people are experts in their own lives.
How
So what do we do with this understanding? How can the community members change things in a
meaningful way themselves?
Here the role of the social action worker changes. The responsibility now is to create safe spaces
where the group can test out their ideas for change before putting them into practice. It is vital that
the community members are not set up to fail and that their ideas undergo a rigorous examination
before taking them to the world outside the group. The decision on which ide~s will be .ta~en




The group then put their idea(s) for change into effect. They should by now have a realistic sense
of the possible outcomes, whether it will solve their problem or simply be the first stage in a longer
struggle. Even if the action disappoints, as sometimes happens, the legacy of the work is that the
group members now have an understanding and practical experience of the tools needed for
dealing with problems that they will face in the future.
Reflection
The fifth stage is for the social action worker to bring the group together and ask: 'what happened?
Now that we have carried out our action, are the issues, problems and concerns the same?' This
critical reflection enables the community members to learn from their experience and to plan future
actions for change. The What, Why, How process begins again.
The above information was taken from the Centre for Social Action's Webpage:
http://www.dmu.ac.uk/faculties/hls/research/centreforsocialaction/whatssocialac
tion.jsp
Accessed on os" February 2007
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Appendix 2- Focus groups interview schedule'?
Ve rs ion 3
?
. .Focus group for mental health s uppo r t worker .411111' ...111•••_ •
Nottingham l·U.OO
• Welcome
• Introduce self, Annie and project
De Montfort University has been commissioned b) the Deparunei t of
Health to can} ' out a re iew of what are broad ly termed health. upport
workers. Thi is a short-term label for a very diver C workforce. to be
found in . fHS. local authority and independent s ctor settings. The
Depart ment of Health's core definition of a heal h uppon worker provided
by the Department of Health is someone \\ ho is not prof sionally qua lified
or registered but who has hands-on responsi bility for patients or licnts.
The purpose of the revi w is. IiI' t of all. to map this group of worker : to
get some idea of how many there are, what setting ' the) work in and what
are their roles and responsibilities. Secondly. we have been asked to
consider whether the regulation of this group of employees need to be
strengthened in order to protect the publ ic.
• This sess ion will take I 1/2 hours. Working in small groups and as a
large gro up. Flip chart will be used to record . Confidentiality .
• Any questions
• Ask everyone to introduce themselves. sa) a little bit about their
background and the training the~ are undergoing .
• Exercise. Boundaries
We'r e part icularly interested in exploring the boundari s around your work .
The first boundar) \\1': would like )OU to look a is that between health and
socia l care. Do you dis tinguish between the t\\ 0 area in the work you do?
Are there some tasks whic h you would firmly Identify as health -related and
others which are to do with social care. Or are the) in pra rice integrated in
the tasks you do.
19 This interview schedule was used for the data collection with the 3 focus groups
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The second type of boundary is between your role and that of profes sionally
qualified sta ff. Is there a clear div i ion ofrespon ibility or i he realit . a
considerable degree of overlap. I' d like you to spend a few minutes
discussing this (in small groups ifappropriate) and then fe d back to the
group as a whol e.
• Exercise. Risks
Are there any risk s ass oc iated with emp loying unqualified support workers
in the mental health field a) to worke rs themselves and b) to patie nts /users .
Arc patients/users any more at risk when SUppOt1 worker. do the shared
tasks than when the pro fessionally qua lified staff do them? Continue
worki ng in groups and then once again v. e ' 11record your thought on this.
• Exercise. Protecting the public
Existing safeQ.uards
At present. the responsibiliry for afegu arding the publi w] n health
SUr rO l1 workers are employed rests main ly with the employ er. \\ hether (hi:
is an NHS tru t or a priv ate nursing home proprietor. In order to make sure
that suitable and competent people are employed, the employer can put in
place the foll owing safeguards:
• pre-service checks (may include acc e s to lists of unsuitable peop le)
• checking against volunta ry registers for some groups of worke rs
• codes of conduct
• training and continuing devel opment opportuni ties
• profe ssional manageme nt and supervis ion
• complaints procedures
s t i t- /IL'"I ,1fl. '-J-'
The safeguards may be reinfo rced b) regular inspec tions by statutory
bodi es.
Keep ing toget her a a larger group this ime, I' d like to work through the
li t with )OU and hear your comments abou t how effective aeh measure is
in ensuring that onl v suitable people arc emp loyed and that the. are
cornpct nt \\ hen in post.
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Taken together, do these measures constitu e a strong and cffec ive s. stern
for regulating support workers . Which is the mos important? Are there
any weak points?
A nat ional sys tem
We have talked abou t the things that employer can do. Finally. I would
like you to work together for a fe\\ minutes 0 COl sider whe her there is
also a case for some kind of nauonal mechanism to regulate staff uch a:
yourse lves . You will no doubt be familiar with the General I ledica l Council
and the UKCC, but there are several others for specific professional groups,
Such bodies usua lly hold a regis ter of members. the) promot codes of
conduct , they intluence professional training. the) investigate comp laints
agai nst indix iduals and they can in some circumstances trike off
individuals from the reg ister. At present. cornpul of) regulation through a
national body exis ts only for professionally qualified staff upport \ ork rs
are not included. Do you think there i a case tor ext nding this kind of
regulation to health suppo rt workers? Would it be in the patient' intere t
and your interest? Would there be an) disadvantages'!
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Appendix 3- Questionnaire
Leicester 21st June 2000
DE MON T FO R T
U N IVE RS IT Y
E IC E 5TER
Facu l Y of Me n l'!r" aoo
C ~""unl~Y .... tuc e s
Decanmant of Soc.a: and
C 1"11 ....um y S: c es
Dear Respondent.
PrI')I"s..~ ~ De Ie \Nard ...... 9 A.
Heao of 08::>& tm -r-
Thank you for agreeing to complete this questionnaire The information aarh red will be used for a
research undertaken for a PhD in Social Work at De Montfort University
The aim of the research is 10 investigate the experience of practitioners in statutory social services and
voluntary organisation in comparison to pracmioners and researchers from ocial action in respect of
their conduct and ethics and to determine the differences or similaruies between them all It IS hoped 10
be able to propose guidelines for a code of conduct tor practitioners who are undertaking social acnon
work and, more "idel~. from discussion in the ne» proposal of Social Care Council. about code of
conduct for social workers / social care practitioners,
I think it is important to emphasise th ~ l all information gathered will bc kepi anonymous and solely for
the purpose of this research.
I do realise that you are VCr) busy with your own work and that this " ill not be at the top of your list of
priorities. However. I am very grateful thar ) ou have agreed to give some tim 10 complete uns
questionnaire. The questionnaire is composed of21 questions for you 10 answer m "TIling. or 10 tick.
depending 0 0 the question. and also another -I questions about yourself on 8 separate sheet, The latter
will be used for statistical purposes onl) and again. will be kept anonymous.
I would he grateful to gel the questionnaire back by the laresion the lst August 2000 If there arc any
questions you feel are unclear. do not hesitate to contact me.




Social and cornrnunuy Studies
De Montfort Universiry
(0 116) 270 0073
07977 0~~949
annie_sanfacon@yahoo.com
Sc -apt on Comeu. Scrapto' Lercester lE 7 95"
Tclepbone (0 116 257 7196 Fa. (0 116; 257 70e lo ' ernel ", p wv. .... mu r ; l
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aSocial Services area office
OOther, please specify' _
01ndependent sEctor
') '1oluntary. please spec ify: _
OPrivate, please specify' _
Wnat is Jour type of pract ice (e.g. ,'dl/l ~u a, case oad gr up ,u· e and
ycur client group?
---------------
II/hat is he name of the ;:;gencJ! r:arll a' ior for v!,", lcl1 u ' " "
What is yo r fu ll job title?
'.f'J'rc:.t are y ur quatificaticrus, as a socia l vorker , SOci8'
(you can tick OlOiE than one answer)
o [·Jo particutar qua lifica' ". I t" soc ral v.c-k.
o GC5E crease ;Jeclfy dl P . llb, p.r t"
--- - - --- - ----o r- , re E:: I, please specify the S.Jb)EC S
o Tra ining prov ided by ne aqenc: , please spec ify (he 5uD)c: t(s'
- ------- --- --- - - - - - - - -
o National Vocational Gual ifi-:a'ion I V - GNVQ)
:) Level i. please soec fy
':) Level 2. please spec ,:, - _
) L svel 3, please spec 'f;
a Social wcrk Diploma (C '-' 'V D'03 I
o Youth Sf d Comrnun. t Ore oma
') Eache,o"s Deqre e, crease s;)e:1J : e uo eo:" _
oJ Post gracu3te cua tificat ens olease sceclTy
Ot"'er please s ec
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Question 2.
\ /ha is your job description as sccla: ca re pracutioner in th:s age . c/ r .f Je'..
t ale no' job des criotion Nt-at does yOJr agen cy e .pect you t'j do?
------------
------_._- ---- _ ._ - - - - - ------
Oucst io n 3.
I ~ your day to deli .'10 f t>. ri iffelC'-.t to what }' 'J'J have describe bove?
o Yes
o 0
If yes, can you Jescribe what are your day to day roles and task s and why
they are net the sam e a in question 2?
Ouas ion 4.
Do you belong to an'! prcfesslcna' oroanisaticn 'e.:;. BAS'/ Ut'C\." t-tl" in
re lation to your practice ?
o NC'. Please pass to cu esuon 13.




'Nith.r the profess iona. 'Jrgar satior If' 9
ao fO U ~,;2Ve a, y w ritte -, cC're of cor d
>'ou '"13ve to respect?
a Yes
o No
at..s IJ l,.-<C ~
ecce 0 ; - ra': i ~e
- ,-'J c 9
~ ~ Q ~ 0 : IC$





If you use it, explain in wll icn cortex and g:. e an example
--- -- - - -- - - - - - -- - - - - - ---- -
---- - - - - -----
._-- ----- ------- -----
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Qu es io 6.
Does he agency for '/n: ~h you ':or!': != ' o ide any gUI e In ES '1 ela ,0 " " J JU
practice?
') No Please r ~S~ to ::::Jeo ·.;0 ~ 7
') Yes. If yes v, ,8: ind? (you -:;' :id: r-ore tnan c.ne
Q Staff har book
o Code of conduct I cede 0 E h c
o Other, please soec.ry _
Does it influence y .Ii work?
Please mark each one
2
bJ .0 S
Please exp lain wha yo can find inside ''lis f' ese Quid sre (e 9
wha t topics ar covered ho / pre scnptiv e I' IS etc)
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Exnlain in whicn ~ ituationr ) y OLl /TI ght use ''l ese ;r .wJellr:es
--- - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - --- - -
- -- - - - -------- - - - - - - - -
If your agency does rol provide any forI! ' or vnrten r uldslir e , which




Are you 'Jblig ed to fo row or be infl enced by an, tatutory legal j ! e ,e 9
Children Act, whl thi-r your wor~?
o No
o Yes
If yes, please fili the follcwi,lJ chart: (use one row per stat rtory lie 31
duty)
I Does it inf;L.en~& yoi.r

















For you , what is an ethical dilemma?
Que stion 9.









In facing ethical dilemma , many issue are important to consider '" en
solving it, such as persona! values, personal and profess ional judgem~nt.
user's needs, agency policy , ecce of conduct or code of ethics from the
agency or profess ional organis ation a rid so 0 n, ~" /hen you experience an
ethrcal dilemma or if you were to experience one, what would yo I consider
as impo rtant in your decision making and why?
- --- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ------
--- - --- - --
--- - - - - - ------ -
8
326
Que sti on 11.
FO' you what is empowering practice?
Ques tion 12
Does your organisation ! agency promote empowerment of the client! user?
o Yes
o No
If es , can you explain HOW?
If no, can you expla in Wf-;Y?
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Question 13.
Do you conside r yourself to be a practitioner wi 0 use an en pOJ.cin_
approach i ~ your work?
o Ie
o Yes
If no. please explain W H'(
If yes, please explai.i WHY and HOv', you use it:

























I 2 I 3
I I




HV lllik~11 is it ~rla' you 'NOUla ac: Ir tr.e ~,a cesc t ed i
statem snts accordin to vo'..r ow.,.. ,3 Je:: 7 '
:;:F::.c2'-: ~: --:~----------
'~:I
-/~1S plan the go' I~ and
.bJectlves of an Intervention
orocess .
I ccn sicer 111} seli 35 tl' e
expert \'I ~ e , It 15 nrr-e rcr
r:.a .,~ 9 the intci'V..:n \.:::n
think I~c user shcu d
always be free 0 express
'. ~I e l r vOir Ion.
I beli eve the problems faced
by the client the, bril"': C
tl1Gr.1:p l·IP<
I think the user should
,,!wa;'s keep contro l over t1e
ay.::nca fer action.
Qu estion 14,
I believe 'i'II: agency 5 ru es
- .-: to be considered
ro f - , ,,: the cuer rs r eeds
Icc 'lOII€:3C tne srcup or
In::ivid l. 31 mtervenuon but
facili tate cec .s.cn rr-akmc
I value the strencths in
people. •
I c r,sid",r U' e USE'r as
someone who has r:..:ht to
choose I'/ rlal kine f '"
lit~r\ ennon he/she wants
I ,'/oula r.eve: accept
nec anve lecels towarc s
;11'Sr-t i Jsers
!Piar. the In t'~ rvE:r, t I), for lh~
user, I have tne appropr .ate
kno- l ed9~.
I belie ve that tne ;:,roblams
faced by the user are
complex and It is by external
chance that the situanon can
~-!"~V~ .
I always ley to cn alle1 g" 311 1
Iorrr: 01 oppressicn
Quest ion 15
Do you ever exp erience any form of ethical d ilemma ir regar~ to :ha e- 'dC' ce
of empowe rment wi th your lien t I users .'Iith ,n your aqency?
o Yes
o No
o I do not use em powerment as approach of mte ent ic -i
If YES, which kind of ethical dilemma do you face in ie!a ion to an
ernpov/erlnq practice? (you can tick more tha n one)
o Boundaries in relation 'lith users
o Conflict wi th objecti es and va lues ca rried t I he a e cf
o Respect of confidentia lity
o Difficulty with cora riunrcauon
') As se ssment of fisk
o ,'nowledg e abou t serv ces
D FlexlbLiry and fairness I 'ie pre /ision of _erv rce
o Budge:
() Other. please spec ify.
Oues ion '16
Do you feel there is a need for introducmg a code of Ethics for ALL social
care practit i ners regard less of their qual ification and where t' ey work?
o Yes
o No
Please , justify you r answer:
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Question 17
If a code of Ethics Vias de eloped for all SC: 3 " rk-rsJ ce ra ca-e
practit ioners includinq oualified and quaiifiec _taf', i 0', if e:y . 0 ... d , • t e
to u e it?
QVe:ry likely OFairly likely o ot veri Ii'~e y O Very _11 It<e l.'
Can you explain why?
---- - -,-----
----- - -- - - - - - - - -
Qu estion 18
What do you think such a code should include?
- ---- -------- ,




Fer .hose interest should the code e developed'? , ck orly one a . te: ~at
reflects the main I dominant mteres;
o For the user 's mte ests
o For the protess ional zpe sonal interests
( ) For the ege .1cy · ~ interests
(') For the use r's and professional's j, teres.s
o For the user's and agency's in e-es 5
o For the professicn al's end age'lc" s intE'ie. ts
:) For the user's. professional 's and ~ ency S Inle 251::.
Question 20.
For the protect! n of w ,::-;' '., "at.: i '< it is more nnportan to develop a
code of Ethier.? (c.ess e chose only 0;",6 answer)
o For 11-.,
(l ~, me ag ,,: y 'mere y L worK
~ for you, as a social care practit ioner




Would you agree 0 meet u wit!". n e fer an inter )! ',,!,!-jere .ou lo as,", 7~
,0 comment on some "ca. a stud les ; eflica l duernmas ar.o t i e 'la y '!Vel
would solve them?
o Yes Please enter SOrT e de tails to set Jp an
appct trnen:
Nam e '
Te :E Jr~ef,umber I,d3, 'tlni e) _
The oes: time . r you tc m et :'; ' and I' te-v e«
r) No
Thank you for your nrne.
All answers are kep t anon ymou s
Annie Sansfacon
Socia l and communi 'I lUJ IE1





:) Ma !e o
2 (our age: _
3. Your ethr ~ g~oup : (Choose one section from la) to (e) then :ick the
appropria.e box to indicate your cultural background)
a . White
o British J lnsh 0 any other backgrour j
please spec ify _
b. Mixed
'J White anc Blacl Caribbean
o White and Black African
o While and Asian
o AnI ether mixed back.. · OU. d, please spec fy




o Any other Asian backgrcu d, please specify'
d a lack or 91ack British
o Caribbean
o African
o Any other Black back round, please specify
e. Other ethnic £jroup
please specify: _
4. Your religion :
o NO'1e
o Christian (including Church of England , Catholic,






:) Any ether religi:)r please sp .cify· _




IlR lEW: PRII·' '/"1
cornp.mson of It.-: ctn md ronduC'l In ~ Il lnOf'\ Jnd socul Joo ,or
'" 11h; :10 4"~JI. n
Rl; 1';::;;Ir...h (Ph PhD
.dille of <."'r :.!:Inl~hllIL'1l
_______ _ _ ....:t....:· I~tl :..:.lS:::h:::lI.:.;l!..: ...:·;It. ~
20
/ l U,,'11C1I1 I
\\· h~ l t· \\l)lI IJ \OU uuate vour ,ll.=.JllI auon ul un the ~ , ...·1.11 ct 1\".t" i f .lt ll h ..·..11
\ o lunta ry, etc)
' . I IIC'"" 1 )1 ~
\\ Ii. ll h li lt.' \ I. I l l ll . lhl)lIt "I 1.,1 llk III II I If .,:.1111 .llll111
c..h lt'~t l\.' 1 1 ~
\\ k it ki llel \1 er lo..:r:.. are I" l I it' d b ,1 111 1'.1 111 , 1(1\'11
rrr . re
20 Note that the use of English as found in this tool of data collection is in it original state (1999)
and has not been edited .
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I •
Ill\. nd \. f\ , 1 1.1 u
QlIC~t1()1 -\
110" could (I ll C(11 ider the mrluen c 01-1 ~ 1.'._1< ,111 ~, __ . IIII' 0 II ,)rgan _ I r
()11~ -tlon -
\\ h I Ih~ "'"!._~'11 <it , '1' ,
Oucsuon (,
Would ~"11 con_ld.:r vour orgurusnuon a on.. vho pra..uce ann-oppre mn r nd .:mp",'ermcnl
approac h '1 Wh~ ·1
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Appendix 5: 4th Stage of data coll ect ion
Semi-Structured interviews and Vignette -base Interviews
Interview
(Thanks the person for meeting me a second time, exploring confidentiality of
the research etc.)
Since the last time (we met of you fill the questionnaire in), have you experience
any sort of ethical dilemmas you would wish to share?
From the questionnaire, respondents have identified many elements as main
cause for ethical dilemmas. Could comment on these, telling me if you
experience them within your practice and which one of these (or any other)




















How does the organisational context of your work (e.g. legislation, structure of
organisation and hierarchy, and so on) help or not in relation to your work in
general?
Probe: for example, do you think the staff handbook is a constraint or of any
help in relation to your work?
From the questionnaire, people who answered mention that often, regulation,
legal duties or even agency policy and procedures affect their work in relation to
ethical dilemmas. They identified that often, these regulations are one of the
elements that cause ethical dilemmas. However, when they were asked if code
of practice or code of ethics was developed, it would they would use it. Could
you comment on it?
How does the organisational context of your work help or not in relation to
ethical dilemmas?
How does the organisational context of your work help or not in relation to the
empowerment of the user?
How do duties, statutory legislation, (or any sorts of regulation such as staff
handbook.) affect your work? Does it affect in a positive or negative ways?
How do duty or statutory legislation affects your work in the context of ethical
dilemmas? Does it affect on a positive or negative ways?
How often does legal duty or statutory legislation affect the empowerment of the
user? Do you think it affect on a positive or negative way?
How do you think funding affect the cause of ethical dilemmas?
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Appendix 6: CCETSW Statement of Values
Values of Social Work.
Social workers assist people to have control of and improve the quality of their
lives, and are committed to reducing and preventing hardship and disadvantage
for children, adults, families and groups. Social workers practise in social
settings characterised by enormous diversity. This diversity is reflected through
religion, ethnicity, culture, language, social status, family structure and life style.
They work with individuals and families from backgrounds and cultures of which
they may have little direct experience and intervene in the lives of people whose
life chances may have been adversely affected by poverty, ill health,
discrimination and/or disability. In intervening in peoples lives to achieve
change, social workers must recognise the interrelationships of structural and
individual factors in the social context in which services operate and the need to
address their impact on the lives of children and adults.
It is essential because of the responsibilities that social workers and probation
officers carry and the influence and impact that they can have on the lives of
vulnerable people, that as well as being skilled and knowledgeable, they treat
people with respect and are honest, trustworthy and reliable. They must be self
aware and critically reflective and their practice must be founded on, informed
by and capable of being judged against a clear value base.
The Values Requirements.
In order to achieve the award of the DipSW, students must demonstrate in
meeting the core competences that they:
• identify and question their own values and prejudices and their
implications for practice.
• respect and value uniqueness and diversity and recognise and build on
strengths.
• promote people's rights to choice, privacy, confi.d.entiality and p.rote~tion,
while recognising and addressing the complexities of competing rights
and demands.
• assist people to increase control of and impro~e the qual~ty of th~ir live~,
while recognising that control of behaviour Will be required at times In
order to protect children and adults from harm.
• identify, analyse and take action to co~nter discr.imination, r.acism,
disadvantage, inequality and injustice, usmq strategies appropriate to
role and context.
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• practise in a manner that does not stigmatise or disadvantage either
individuals, groups or communities.
Since values are integral to rather than separate from competent practice,
evidence that value requirements have been met, must be drawn from and refer
to specific practice undertaken in relation to the six core competences. It is
clear, consistent and thoughtful integration of values in practice that students
must demonstrate and programme providers seek evidence of in all assessable
work.
© CCETSW 1995-2000
Extracted from: CCETSW 'Assuring Quality in the Diploma in Social Work - 1, Rules and
Requiremments for the DipSW' (Revised 1995). Part 2 Requirements for Qualification.
Accessed online: http://www.wofscon.com/diPsw/handbOOk/ccetsw/values.html




This research project !s con.cerned with exploring the question of how Social Work students can
be engage~ pedago~lcally In such a way that they develop a greater capacity to practice in a
more consciously ethical manner.
The proposal is divided into two parts:
Part 1 begins by setting out an und~rlying th~oretical argument which seeks to develop a link
between two areas of research within Social Work which have not yet been considered
together; these are .Empowerm~nt and "Virtue Ethics" (Maclntyre,1985). The purpose of placing
these t~o together IS that we wish to argue that the concept of Empowerment is concerned with
something. ~ore than the promotion of socially just and anti-oppressive outcomes. Our
argument IS Instead that Empowerment needs to be framed as a practice in which a range of
personal qualities, or 'Virtues', are embedded.
~art 2 ~s c~ncern~,d with d~vel~ping a Pedagogical strategy which develops the above using
Socratic .DI~logu.e. Socr~tlc DI~logue has been selected as a pedagogical strategy precisely
because It IS epistemologically linked to the concerns articulated in Part 1; that is it works
experie~tially ?n the terrain ?f nurturing and encouraging those 'virtues' which we are ~rgue are
the baSIS of this more conscious form of ethical practice.
We have broken up the Proposal Summary into three parts concerned respectively with
Empowerment, Virtue Ethics and Socratic Dialogue.
Part 1
Empowerment
The International Federation of Social Workers has defined their vision for the Social Work
profession as one which "promotes social change. problem solving in human relationships and
the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance well-being" (IFSW, 2001 in Horner 2003;
2). Despite the centrality of the concept of empowerment to contemporary Social Work, many
have commented on the fact that the term is used to mean many different things to different
people and groups. Ward and Mullender (1991), for example, have observed that the term has
become something of a "bandwagon" within which so many diverse agendas have found a
home that it is at severe risk of becoming meaningless. Zippay (1995) has exemplified this
noting that an emphasis on themes such as self-help, community organisation and reducing
dependency on the state can variously appeal to a wide range of positions right across the
political spectrum - conservatives, liberals and radicals - though of course the strategies each
would deploy to achieve these ends would be entirely different and most likely opposed to each
other. For example the sale of council houses has been viewed by conservatives as an
'empowerment' strategy, yet be viewed in entirely opposite terms by those on the left
(Zippay:265). Central to these different approaches is the question of whether ideas about
empowerment incorporate questions of structural inequality or are purely concerned with an
individualistic conception of the term. Discussing what she sees as the dominant use of the
term empowerment within Social Work in the UK specifically, Langan (1998) has argued that
the term implies "an individualistic conception of power, which, by reducing social relationships
to the interpersonal, obscures the real power relations in society" (1998:114). Hence the
problem is that though a broader conception of social power is implied, in practice this is defined
individualistically. Pearse (2002) takes a more critical position still. He argues that the term
represents a new form of "governmentality". Developing the work of Michel Foucault (1980), he
argues that the term's emancipatory intent offers no necessary guarantee about outcomes,
which may themselves be "marked by a more subtle refinement of domination, masked by the
respectability of a liberatory discourse" (2002:113).
WI HLS I Student; Ethics; CU EthiCS Forms; CU Ethics PG and StaN Form ,
October 2005
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While we fully accept that the meaning of the term is contested, at the same time we would
argue that if Social Work .is.to. be capable of achieving progressive and meaningful change in
the lives of people, then It IS Imperative defend the term "empowermenf' within Social Work.
We would seek to develop the definition offered by the IFSW, using the work of Paulo Freire.
who defines empowerment as "the deepening and widening of the horizon of democratic
practice".
(http://aurora.icaap.org/talks/freire.html:para20).This definition insists on a social
rather than individual understanding of the term, and the practice based on such a definition
n~ed~ to be conceive~ as a ~rocess, as opposed to a one-off action or event. It also implies a
reJect.lon of ~onsu~e~lst notions of the term concern.ed with 'giving people what they want'.
Consistent with Freire s overall approach (1970), practice based on empowerment is conceived
as a.dialogue betwee~ practitioner and service user, but which is based on an analysis of power
relations and a commitment to uncovering or 'naming' the operation of power, and resisting the
abuse of power.
This understanding of empowerment points to its significance for both Social Worker and
Service User. The work of Van Hooris and Hosfstetter (2006) furthers this point through the
development of a methodology for correlating the sense of empowerment of the social worker
themselves with the capacity to empower service users during the process of intervention. This
work draws on additional research which proposes that a meaningful practice of empowerment
emerges through a sense of creating new possibilities and experiences (Lord, 1991; Lebosse et
al 2004), as well as learning opportunities which focus on structural, social and institutional
levels of problem understanding (Bernstein et ai, 1994; Wallerstein and Sanches-Merki 1994).
While there is considerable discussion on the issue of what constitutes Empowerment within
contemporary Social Work teaching, recent research has suggested that the translation of this
into practice in frontline Social Work is far more problematic. Pullen's research (2005) has
noted that when faced with ethical dilemmas in practice, Social Workers have difficulties in
dealing with these - however the nature of that difficulty lies not in students and practitioners
willingness to engage with ethical issues, but rather the predominance of an organisational
context which limits or restricts such discussions (Pullen 2005). In relation to the above, we see
this, rather than the Foucauldian concern around 'governmentality' as the primary reason why
emancipatory intents are not translated into outcomes. Central to these issues within Social
Work pedagogy is the relationship between classroom teaching and Social Work Practice
Learning (Placements). While students may be able to offer definitions of empowerment within
the classroom which incorporate the dimension of structural inequality, these conceptualisations
tend to be dissonant rather than congruent with their experience of Social Work placements.
Bar-On (2002) has argued that the centrality of Placements within Social Work degree
contributes substantially to this; he proposed that placements are the "major contributor to
social workers' acceptance of bureaucratic control ... because it is at this stage of their training,
as distinguished from the classroom, that students first learn that expressing dissatisfaction with
positional authority is interpreted as a mark of 'immaturity' and hence. as a .Iack of
'professionalism' (2002: 1011). This work could be. seen to draw on CI?SSlcal soclolo~.lcal
understandings of the nature of modern bureaucracies, such Max Weber s Idea of the Iron
cage" of bureaucracy (Weber, 1984). However we would also argue tha~ these constra.ints are
even more significant in a period where the intellectual content of SOCial work teachinq and
practice is being challenged by an emphasis on 'competency'. within practice (Cowden and
Singh 2006). which has the potential to undermine further the ethical Imperative upon which the
definition of empowerment for which we argue has the potential to be practiced.
Virtue Ethics
McBeath and Webb (2002) and Pullen (2005) have argued that given the significance of socio-
political constraints in contemporary Social Work. prac.tice, ther~ is considerable value in using
"Virtue Ethics" as a means of recasting the moral Identity of SOCial workers. McBeath and Webb
(2002: 1016) argue that the value ot this for socia! .wo~~ lies ,in the, ".emphasis up~,n judgment,
experience, understanding, reflections and disposition. A .vlrtue .IS defined as a pattern of
behaviour and feeling: a tendency to act, desire and feel In particular ways In appropriate
WI HLS I Student I Ethics I CU Ethics Forms;' CU EthiCS PG and StaN Form 1
October 2005
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situations - ~ virtue is not an unth~nkin.g habit, but rather involves an intelligent judgement about
the a.ppropnate response to the situation you are in."(Warburton 1999:55). A virtue is therefore
a tr~lt ?f ~haracter, developed through habit and instruction, and one that promotes 'human
flouns~lng (~.raham 20~4). McBeath and Webb (2002) identify elements such as developing
analytical abl~lty and skills as l~ell as ~he cultivating a moral 'character' which In their opinion,
enable a socl~1 worker to ~e VlrtUOU.S. While they suggest that the virtues can be developed
through expenence, reflection and circumspection, it is unclear from their work as to how this
can b~ su~cess~ully achi~v~d in pr~ctice. Other commentators have pointed out that another
pot:,ntlal ~I~alls Invol~ed I~ tntroducinq virtue ethics for Social Work teaching being that there is
~n insufficient attention given to the problem of how virtue is defined and established in the first
Instance" (Houston 2003:819).
M~~lntyre (19~9) has argued that the key to unlock and develop virtues lies in conceptualising
critical r~aso~lng ~s a collective activity. This is the model we are looking to follow in the
module In which this teaching will take place - 'Principles of Social Work'. We intend to do this
through the use of Socratic dialogue groups. These are significant as we believe they will
enable stud~nts to ac~uire and practice critical reasoning on a collective level and in doing so
develop SOCial work virtues. The module will situate the concept of virtue ethics as a central
component to the teaching curriculum. We also believe this will compensate for the limitations
of traditional approach to teaching ethics which are based on social work codes of practice and
codes of ethics (rule-following ethics) (Morelock 1997), which have been criticised by many




By basing the module "Principles of Social Work" on Socratic dialogue groups we seek to
create a pedagogy which aims toward enabling students to recognise and engage with the
complex ethical and political conflicts embedded in Social Work, as well as to acknowledge
inconsistencies between Social Work's goals and practice (Rhodes 1986).
The significance of Socratic Dialogue as a pedagogical approach is that has the capacity to
bridge the gap between individual critical evaluation, dialogical process and the development of
virtues. Socratic Dialogue originates from the 'Analogy of the Cave' (Plato, Republic, VII, 514-
520) (Kessels 1999) but was then taken further by Nelson and Heckman in Germany during and
shortly after the Second World War. Socratic Dialogue is usually practiced in small groups (8 to
14 participants) with the help of a facilitator (Saran and Neisser 2004). It encourages
participants to reflect and think independently and critically so that self-confidence in one's own
thinking is enhanced and the search for truth in answer to a particular question is undertaken in
common.
One of the most significant aspects of Socratic Dialogue is its emphasis on process. For
example, the fact that the work takes place in groups mean that it embodies Macintyre's
concept of collective practical reasoning (Macintyre 1999). Many authors have pointed to the
way in which this groupwork is itself an effective tool to develop virtues (~verho~se~ 1999;
Gronke 2005, Kessels, 2005), since this contributes to the development of critical thinking and
self-consciousness (McBeath and Webb 2002). It has also been suggested that Socratic
Dialogue enhances effective thinking about organisation~1 life (~urnyeat 1990 in Morr~1 2004),
problem-solving (Arlin 1990 in Morrell 2004) and protecting against complacency or misplaced
certainty (Meacham 1990 in Morrel 2004). The Socratic Dialogue. approach req.U1res that
different stakeholders actively participate in order to promote a more diverse discussion on the
topic (Boers 2005, Kessels 2005). This can be achiev~d by ~nvolving studen~s, s~rvlces .users
and carers as well as academics in classroom dlscussion where a diversity of Ideas,
experience and perspectives has the potential to be explored and maximised.
Within "Principles of Social Work", the Socratic Dialogue approach adopted requires adherence
to a set of basic groupwork ground rules. These are:
1) remaining with concrete experience
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2) full understanding between the participants
3) adherence to subsidiary question until it is answered
4)~M~ngforconsensus
These are ~as~d on the work of Krohn, (1998 in Saran and Neisser 2004). The final rule has
also been. hlghllght~d by Houston (2003) as being specifically appropriate for the development
of the social work virtues.
Below is the format that w~ pro,pose f?r .each of the 13 sessions planned on the programme.
For example, an early session will be aiming at covering "Kant and the Concept of Goodwill ":
9.30 Introduction of the topic (10 minutes)
9.4~ Soc.ratic discussi~n groups: the question will be aiming at deliberating in relation to the
main tOPiC of the session (1 hour) (what does self-determination really mean in Social Work
practice?)
10.40 Break
10.5? Led .Iecture: Co~ering the theoretical underpinning of the question (lecture on Kant,
Kantian Ethics and Kantian legacy in social work practice)
11.50 reflection break: developing practical applications - bridging the gap between the Socratic
discussion and the theoretical underpinning (group discussion about application of Kantian
ethics in Social Work, examining strengths, weaknesses and way forward)
12.15 end.
Scientific background, design, method and conduct of the study
This is a small scale research project drawing on a mixed methodology of qualitative and
quantitative methods. The mixed methods approach is used to provide a more complex
knowledge to inform theory and practice (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003) Both methods are
included in the overall research study and the paradigm emphasis will be of equal status both
methods being used to corroboration of findings. The quantitative aspect of the data collection
will occur first, and will be repeated concurrently to the qualitative aspect of the research.
The research is planned according to three different stages of data collection. A first stage of
data collection will involved quantitative data and the use of a questionnaire adapted from the
'Social Work Empowerment Scale' (Lebosse et al 2004); the second stage of the research
process will involved the same questionnaire re-distributed to students at the end in order to
assess changes in empowerment levels. A third stage of data collection will be undertaken at
the same time but to gather qualitative data by use of semi-structured interview. A fourth stage
of data collection will take place at the end of the 1st practice learning experience (placement)
and will involved 2 focus groups. Details of the design and methods can be found below.
Quantitative Data: Questionnaire adapted from the 'Social Work Empowerment Scale' (Data
collection stage one and two)
The quantitative aspect of the research will be achieved through the use of a questionnaire
adapted from the 'Social Work Empowerment Scale (MIPPA)' (LeBosse et al. 2004).
Questionnaires can be viewed as a stable, consistent and uniform system of measurement
without variation (May 1997), an aspect that semi-structured interviews cannot offer due to the
interactions taking place between the researcher and the participant. The questionnaires will
also produce quick results which will highlight themes which the researchers will .pursue in
greater depth during the interviews which will follo~ at ~he end of the module. Finally, the
questionnaires offer the kind of wide coverage that Interviews would no.t have allo~ed due, to
financial and resource constraints (Sarantakos 1993). The questionnaire Will examine
understanding and perceptions of student's feeling of empowerment and will be completed
twice, once at the beginning of the module 'Principles of Social Work', and again at the end of
the module. The project aims at comparing empowerment levels among students and the
impact which the module has had on their professional development and feeling of
empowerment. Three factors will be examined as a means of measunng this:
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a) 'propensity to act'
b) critical consciousness
c) feeling of personal efficacy.
~he. questionnaire, adapted from Le~osse'.s em'p0wem~ent scale, will be piloted before being
?Istnbuted to the st~dents. The sampling will be convenience sampling' (Bryman 2001) and will
Involve anyone registered on the module who is interested in participating in the research. It is
hope that .most of the cohort will agree to participate in the study. However, their informed
consent Will be sought and their participation will be on a voluntary basis only. Participants will
al~o be free to n? lo~ger partici~ate in the study / complete the questionnaire at any time. As
th!s resear~h project IS o~ly ~t pilot stage, no minimum sample size is required. It is hoped that
this data Will serve as.a spnngboard' for further research on the use of Socratic dialogue as a
teaching tool and the Increase of student's empowerment and the development of social work
virtues. Data analysis will be thematic and comparative and done by using SPSS.
Qualitative data: Semi-Structured Interviews (Data collection stage 3)
The qualitative aspect of the research project will be undertaken in conducting a series of semi-
structured interviews at the end of the module delivery, with a small number of students. The
interview will take place after the module assessment is completed and returned to students, at
around mid-February 2007. This will insure that students do not feel threaten by their
participations to the interview in relation to the assessment of their coursework within the
module.
May (1997: 112) suggests various reasons for the use of interviews, such as the fact that this
tool "provides qualitative depth by allowing interviewees to talk about the subject in terms of
their own frames of reference". It is aimed to capture the experience of project participants
(Mahoney 1997) and gain in depth understanding of the process of participation in the Socratic
Dialogue groups and their experience in developing social work virtues and their feeling of
empowerment. An interview schedule will outline the themes which need to be covered but a
more dialogical procedure will be used, insofar that the interview will be guided by both the
participant and the researcher while ensuring that all the themes are covered (Corbetta 2003).
The sampling will be non-probabilistic purposive (Sarantakos 1993) in so far as students will be
recruited on a voluntary basis and invited to participate in an interview at the end of the module.
It is hope to recruit 6 to 8 students willing to participate in the interview. The interviews will be
taped recorded with consent from the participants. Data analysis will be done by an
examination of theme and then themes will be compared altogether.
Qualitative data: Focus Groups (Data collection stage four)
A fourth and final stage of data collection will take place in June and will aim at gathering data
in relation to social work virtues and empowerment and how those have been embedded in
practice. The focus group is a method of data collection .that can be defined as: "woup
discussions that are organised to explore a specific set of Issues and Involve some kind of
collective activity." (Becker & Bryman 2004:394). Two focus groups, involving about 6
participants each will take place and will examine how di~erent .social, work virtues and
feelings of empowerment have contributed to students becoming ethical, critical, and practical
reasoners.
Focus group is known as an efficient methods to ga,ther data, especially towards the end of
research process as it enable researcher to examine trends. and variances, re~so~s and
causes, attitudes and opinions (Derher and Dreher 1991; Manner 1986). By facl~ltatln,g two
focus groups, it is anticipated we will be ~ble to ?ollect data both about student s attitudes
toward the resolutions of ethical dilemmas In practice, a.s .well as ~ow SOCial work virtues and
their personal feeling of empowerm~nt affect their declslo~, rnakinq processes. As for the
semi-structured interviews, the sampling Will be non-probabilistic purposive (Sarantakos 1993)
in so far the students will be invited to take part in t~e focus groups on the same day than
their last recall day after their practice learning expenence. Again, their participation Will be
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fully voluntary. Data will be recorded using pen and flipchart and then analysed in terms f
content. 0
Research Ethics
The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has published a Research Ethics
Frame~ork (R~F) to .be .used by students and researchers, in order to comply with national
recognlse~ ethl?al.guldellnes for research, effective from the 1st January 2006 (ESRC 2005).
The following cntena were taken from the REF ESRC.
Informed Consent and Voluntary Participation
The notion of inf.o~me.d consent will be paramount during the whole research process. For
example, before fllll~g In ~he. questionnaire, participant will be asked to read, agree and signed a
consent form and will be Invited to ask questions about the research process. Emphasis will be
put o~ voluntary partic!pati?n. Co.nsent will also be sought from students participating in the
interviews and e~phasls Will be given to the confidentiality of the data. Finally, it will be made
?Iear t.hat a.1I partl?lpants are free to opt out of the research process at any time and no form of
Incentive Will be given to any of the research participants.
Confidentiality and Anonymity of the Data
Steps will be taken in order to ensure the confidentiality of the data collected during the
research process through anonymisation of the research results. For example, each participant
completing a questionnaire will be given a unique code made from a random number (according
to the number of students) and an alphabetic letter indicating the questionnaire number i.e.
questionnaire A at the beginning of the module, and Questionnaire B at the end of the module).
No names, organisations or personal details that could lead to the respondent being recognised
will be added to on the data collection tools, and all raw data will be kept safely locked in a filing
cabinet in the researcher's office. The raw data (paper and tape-recorded) will be safely
discarded at the end of the research process. The data will also be anonymised when the
research results are published.
Avoiding Harm to Research Participants
The research process does not discriminate against participants from any race, age, disability,
ethnicity, religion, culture, gender, or in relation to any other characteristics (ERSe 2005).
Participants will be chosen due to their suitability for the sample, which included men and
women from different geographical areas. Nor risk of harm to participant is foreseen. Indeed.
as ERSC (2005) explains, risk to participants can occur when delicate topics are at the forefront
of the research objectives. However the research does not cover any delicate tOPiC and all
respondents will be adult, and will be giving their informed consent in order ~o participate In the
research, and therefore, participants will be fully aware of their choice to participate.
Consequently, no harm could arise for participants.
WI HLS I Student I Ethics I CU EthiCS Forms I CU EthiCS PG and StaH Form 1
October 2005
349
Possible Conflicts of Interest
No conflicts of interest are envisaged dU~ing t.he research process because no funding is
accessed and the researchers are undertakmg this research project in their own time and aim at




Submission of Research proposal and Ethics Governance to Faculty
Review of the Literature
Development of the questionnaire adapted from the 'Empowerment Scale
MIPPA' (Lebosse et a12004)
Pilot of the questionnaire and revisions in light of pilot
September 06 final changes on the questionnaire and development of interview schedules
October 06 Questionnaires - 1st data collection (1st stage of data collection)
Teaching begins
November 06 Pilot interview schedule
Dissemination: Write for publication - theoretical rationale for the research
project (British Journal of Social Work)
January 07 Questionnaires - 2nd data collection (2nd Stage of data collection)
February 07 Data analysis - stage 1 and 2
Semi-structured interviews - data collection (3rd stage of data collection)
March 07 Dissemination: Write and Send abstract for JESW 2007 conference
April 07 Write interim report in light of results obtained in stage 1, 2 and 3 of the
research project
May 07 Application to external/internal funding body regarding collaboration with
additional departments within the Faculty of Health and Life Sciences at
Coventry University or other HE institution
June 07 Focus Groups - data collection (4th stage of data collection)
Data analysis
July 07 Dissemination: write for publication - findings of the research project (Journal of
Social Work Education)
Dissemination: Workshop at annual TALC conference
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